With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

One of the major duties the Bank of England (BoE) is tasked with is keeping inflation rates low and stable. The usual tactic for keeping inflation rates down, and therefore the price of goods and services stable by the Bank of England is through lowering the Bank Rate. Such a measure was used in 2008 during the global recession when the BoE lowered the bank base rate from **** percent to *** percent. Due to the economic fears surrounding the COVID-19 virus, as of the 19th of March 2020, the bank base rate was set to its lowest ever standing. The issue with lowering interest rates is that there is an end limit as to how low they can go. Quantitative easing Quantitative easing is a measure that central banks can use to inject money into the economy to hopefully boost spending and investment. Quantitative easing is the creation of digital money in order to purchase government bonds. By purchasing large amounts of government bonds, the interest rates on those bonds lower. This in turn means that the interest rates offered on loans for the purchasing of mortgages or business loans also lowers, encouraging spending and stimulating the economy. Large enterprises jump at the opportunity After the initial stimulus of *** billion British pounds through quantitative easing in March 2020, the Bank of England announced in June that they would increase the amount by a further 100 billion British pounds. In March of 2020, the headline flow of borrowing by non-financial industries including construction, transport, real estate and the manufacturing sectors increased significantly.

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the advanced economies of the G7 experienced a period of acute financial crises, downturns in the non-financial economy, and political instability. The governments of these countries in many cases stepped in to backstop their financial sectors and to try to stimulate their economies. The scale of these interventions was large by historical standards, with observers making comparisons to the measures of the New Deal which the U.S. undertook in the 1930s to end the Great Depression.

The bailouts of financial institutions and stimulus packages caused the government debt ratios of the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan in particular to rise sharply. The UK's government debt ratio almost doubled due to the bailouts of Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland. On the other hand, the increases in government debt in the Eurozone were more measured, due to the comparative absence of stimulus spending in these countries. They would later be hit hard during the Eurozone crisis of the 2010s, when bank lending to the periphery of the Eurozone (Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece in particular) would trigger a sovereign debt crisis. The Canadian government, led by a Conservative premier, engaged in some fiscal stimulus to support its economy, but these packages were small in comparison to that in most other of the G7 countries.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomic policy returned to the political agenda, and the influence of Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus rose (and then fell) in expert circles. Much less is known, however, about whether and when Keynesian prescriptions for countercyclical spending have any support among the general public. We use a survey experiment, fielded twice, to recover the extent to which UK respondents hold such countercyclical attitudes. Our results indicate that public opinion was countercyclical -- Keynesian -- in 2016. We then use Eurobarometer data to estimate the same basic parameter for the population for the period 2010-2017. The observational results validate our experimental findings for the later period, but also provide evidence that the UK population held procyclical views at the start of the period. Thus, there appear to be important dynamics in public opinion on a key macroeconomic policy issue.

COVID-19 is an economic shock analogous to the global financial crisis. Now, as then, there will be short-term changes as life, industry, and people adjust, but also more long-term structural changes that will live on long after COVID-19 has passed. This presents opportunities for decisive banks to right-size branch networks, optimize the digital experience, and establish sustainability credentials, thus emerging in a stronger position. But many banks will have been blindsided by this issue, which is evolving in fast and unpredictable ways. As in 2008, banks risk being immobilized by uncertainty, or getting caught in constant firefights that prevent a more considered, strategic response. And the costs of any missteps will be much higher than in 2008, as a variety of banking alternatives – including new digital banks, telcos, and tech companies – are poised and ready to grab market share. Read More

The Direct Real Estate Activities industry have come up against numerous headwinds in recent years, ranging from the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 to the high base rate environment in the years since, which has inflated borrowing costs for potential buyers. This is a sharp contrast to the ultra-low interest environment seen over the decade following the 2008 financial crisis. Still, revenue is forecast to edge upwards at a compound annual rate of 0.6% over the five years through 2025 to €622.9 billion, including an anticipated rise of 0.8% in 2025. Despite weak revenue growth, profitability remains strong, with the average industry profit margin standing at an estimated 18.9% in 2025. Central banks across Europe adopted aggressive monetary policy in the two years through 2023 in an effort to curb spiralling inflation. This ratcheted up borrowing costs and hit the real estate sector. In the residential property market, mortgage rates picked up and hit housing transaction levels. However, the level of mortgage rate hikes has varied across Europe, with the UK experiencing the largest rise, meaning the dent to UK real estate demand was more pronounced. Commercial real estate has also struggled due to inflationary pressures, supply chain disruptions and rising rates. Alongside this, the market’s stock of office space isn’t able to satisfy business demand, with companies placing a greater emphasis on high-quality space and environmental impact. Properties in many areas haven't been suitable due to their lack of green credentials. Nevertheless, things are looking up, as interest rates have been falling across Europe over the two years through 2025, reducing borrowing costs and boosting the number of property transactions, which is aiding revenue growth for estate agents. Revenue is slated to grow at a compound annual rate of 4.5% over the five years through 2030 to €777.6 billion. Economic conditions are set to improve in the short term, which will boost consumer and business confidence, ramping up the number of property transactions in both the residential and commercial real estate markets. However, estate agents may look to adjust their offerings to align with the data centre boom to soak up the demand from this market, while also adhering to sustainability commitments.

Investment trusts have navigated a turbulent environment over recent years, characterised by regulatory changes and uncertain economic conditions. While demand for investment trusts has stayed fairly strong, alternative investment vehicles like open-ended investment companies have put pressure with their competitive prices, encouraging investment trusts to band together through consolidation to drive down fees charged thanks to economies of scale. Revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 2.9% over the five years through 2025-26 to £1.7 billion, including estimated growth of 6.5% in 2025-26, while the average industry profit margin is anticipated to be 27.4%. After the financial crisis in 2008, ultra-low interest rates supported equity growth as investors sought attractive returns from companies supported by cheap lending rates. This environment came to an end in 2022, as interest rates picked up rapidly amid spiralling inflation. As a result, bond values plummeted, and stock markets recorded lacklustre growth, hurting investment income. Although the rising base rate environment persisted into 2023-24, investors priced in rate cuts near the end of 2023, triggering a rally in stock markets. Capital also flowed into bonds as investors sought to lock in higher yields before they would potentially decline in 2024-25. In 2025-26, trusts will likely limit their exposure to US markets despite healthy growth seen from big tech firms in 2024-25, cautious of US fiscal policy, rising debt and the risk that trade tariffs will trigger a recession. Bond markets will also remain volatile, with markets unsure about the speed of rate cuts amid trade tensions. However, a declining base rate environment will drive prices up and support returns for investment trusts. Investment trust revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 4.6% over the five years through 2029-30 to £2.1 billion. Investors will continue to reduce their exposure to the dollar, with the European Stoxx index positioned for healthy growth in the short term, being seen as an effective safe haven in uncertain times. However, regulatory changes proposed by the Financial Conduct Authority have been contentious, putting investment trusts at a disadvantage to alternative investment vehicles like OEICs. Investment trusts will seek acquisitive growth, using mergers and acquisitions to minimise fixed costs through scale and ramp up competitiveness.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

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Structured Finance Market Size 2025-2029

The structured finance market size is valued to increase by USD 1128.5 billion, at a CAGR of 11.9% from 2024 to 2029. Increasing demand for alternative investment products will drive the structured finance market.

Major Market Trends & Insights

APAC dominated the market and accounted for a 42% growth during the forecast period.
By End-user - Large enterprises segment was valued at USD 771.40 billion in 2023
By Type - CDO segment accounted for the largest market revenue share in 2023

Market Size & Forecast

Market Opportunities: USD 163.86 billion
Market Future Opportunities: USD 1128.50 billion
CAGR from 2024 to 2029 : 11.9%

Market Summary

The market is witnessing significant growth due to the increasing demand for alternative investment products. This trend is driven by investors' quest for yield and risk diversification, particularly in an era of low-interest rates. One notable development in this space is the increasing popularity of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) linked structured finance products. These instruments offer investors the opportunity to align their investments with their values while also potentially achieving attractive returns. Another factor fueling market growth is the increasing complexity of structured finance products. As financial institutions seek to innovate and differentiate themselves, they are developing increasingly sophisticated structures to meet the evolving needs of their clients.
For instance, a leading global manufacturing company recently optimized its supply chain financing by implementing a structured finance solution. This enabled the company to improve its working capital position and enhance operational efficiency, resulting in a significant reduction in days sales outstanding (DSO) by 15%. Despite these opportunities, the market faces challenges, including regulatory compliance and counterparty risk. As financial regulations continue to evolve, institutions must ensure that their structured products comply with the latest rules and regulations. Additionally, managing counterparty risk remains a critical concern, particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. To mitigate these risks, institutions are increasingly leveraging technology and Data Analytics to assess and monitor counterparty risk in real-time.
In conclusion, the market is experiencing robust growth, driven by increasing demand for alternative investment products and the development of innovative structures. While challenges persist, institutions that can effectively navigate the complex regulatory landscape and manage counterparty risk will be well-positioned to capitalize on the opportunities in this dynamic market.

What will be the Size of the Structured Finance Market during the forecast period?

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How is the Structured Finance Market Segmented ?

The structured finance industry research report provides comprehensive data (region-wise segment analysis), with forecasts and estimates in 'USD billion' for the period 2025-2029, as well as historical data from 2019-2023 for the following segments.

End-user

  Large enterprises
  SMEs


Type

  CDO
  Asset-backed securities
  Mortgage-backed securities


Product

  Loans
  Bonds
  Mortgages
  Credit card and trade receivables
  Others


Application Type

  Real Estate
  Automotive
  Consumer Credit
  Infrastructure


Geography

  North America

    US
    Canada


  Europe

    France
    Germany
    UK


  APAC

    Australia
    China
    India
    Japan
    South Korea


  Rest of World (ROW)

By End-user Insights

The large enterprises segment is estimated to witness significant growth during the forecast period.

In the dynamic world of structured finance, major enterprises play a pivotal role, engaging in intricate financing agreements to manage their capital and mitigate risk. Structured finance transactions involve the combination of various financial instruments, including bonds, mortgages, and loans, which are then securitized and sold to investors. This process enables businesses to raise capital by transferring related risks, with large businesses often serving as the original creators of the underlying assets. The market is characterized by ongoing activities and evolving patterns. For instance, portfolio risk management strategies involve the use of credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps and interest rate swaps, for hedging purposes.

Leveraged finance and Private Equity financing employ synthetic securitization techniques, like structured notes and synthetic collateralized debt obligations, to optimize capital structures. Credit rating agencies assess credit risk, while investment grade ratings provide benchmarks for investors. Liquidity management and due diligence processes

The study investigates the influence of foreign institutional investment on the risk-return profile of firms. Corporate risk is analyzed as business risk and financial risk in this study. The impact of foreign institutional investor’s (FII) holding on business and financial risk taking behavior is studied on 174 listed non-financial firms in India using panel quantile regression methodology for a span of 20 years which include the pre and post 2008 financial crisis periods as well. Panel fixed effect model was found to be appropriate in this study The impact of FII holding is also studied through the distribution of the risk through panel quantile regression. The impact of FII holding on risk taking behaviour of the firms is studied primarily across high, average and low proportion of corporate risk. Overall FII holding has an inverse relationship with corporate risk taking behavior of firms. The positive impact of FII holding across all types of firms in terms of the risk-return profile indicates that their presence is long term and reduces risk taking behaviour of the corresponding firm. The implications of this study will be significant in regulating FII inflows and outflows to ensure discipline on the part of firm management in improving its risk-return profile.

The statistic shows the growth rate in the real GDP in the United Kingdom from 2020 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. In 2024, the rate of GDP growth in the United Kingdom was at around 1.1 percent compared to the previous year.The economy of the United KingdomGDP is used an indicator as to the shape of a national economy. It is one of the most regularly called upon measurements regarding the economic fitness of a country. GDP is the total market value of all final goods and services that have been produced in a country within a given period of time, usually a year. Inflation adjusted real GDP figures serve as an even more telling indication of a country’s economic state in that they act as a more reliable and clear tool as to a nation’s economic health. The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the United Kingdom has started to level in recent years after taking a huge body blow in the financial collapse of 2008. The UK managed to rise from the state of dark desperation it was in between 2009 and 2010, from -3.97 to 1.8 percent. The country suffered acutely from the collapse of the banking industry, raising a number of questions within the UK with regards to the country’s heavy reliance on revenues coming from London's financial sector, arguably the most important in the world and one of the globe’s financial command centers. Since the collapse of the post-war consensus and the rise of Thatcherism, the United Kingdom has been swept along in a wave of individualism - collective ideals have been abandoned and the mass privatisation of the heavy industries was unveiled - opening them up to market competition and shifting the economic focus to that of service.The Big Bang policy, one of the cornerstones of the Thatcher government programs of reform, involved mass and sudden deregulation of financial markets. This led to huge changes in the way the financial markets in London work, and saw the many old firms being absorbed by big banks. This, one could argue, strengthened the UK financial sector greatly and while frivolous and dangerous practices brought the sector into great disrepute, the city of London alone brings in around one fifth of the countries national income making it a very prominent contributor to wealth in the UK.

Data collection consists of 40 semi-structured in-depth interviews (10 in the first stage and 30 in the second) and 2 focus groups. The research presented here is a case study of the sociopolitical transformations of Barcelona in the years of the economic crisis that began in 2008, with a special emphasis on the period 2011-2017. The study was developed in two stages in order to grasp the evolution of an object of study that is very recent and that has gone through importance breaking points over the last years: a first exploratory stage between October and November 2015 and a second stage between July and December 2016. Austerity governance, defined as a sustained agenda for reducing public spending, poses new challenges for the organisation of relationships between government, business and citizens in many parts of the world. This project compares how these challenges are addressed in eight countries: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, the UK and the USA. Governments have long sought effective ways of engaging citizen activists and business leaders in decision making, through many formal and informal mechanisms - what we term collaborative governance. The focus of our research is how collaboration contributes to the governance of austerity. Governments and public service leaders argue that collaboration with businesses, voluntary organisations and active citizens is essential for addressing the many challenges posed by austerity. The challenges include transforming public services to cope with cuts, changing citizen expectations and managing demand for services and enhancing the legitimacy of difficult policy decisions by involving people outside government in making them. But at the same time, collaboration can be exclusionary. For example, if there are high levels of protest, governmental and business elites may collaborate in ways that marginalise ordinary citizens to push through unpopular policies. Our challenge is to explore different ways in which collaboration works or fails in governing austerity and whether it is becoming more or less important in doing so.

Austerity governance, defined as a sustained agenda for reducing public spending, poses new challenges for the organisation of relationships between government, business and citizens in many parts of the world. This project compares how these challenges are addressed in eight countries: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, the UK and the USA. Governments have long sought effective ways of engaging citizen activists and business leaders in decision making, through many formal and informal mechanisms - what we term collaborative governance. The focus of our research is how collaboration contributes to the governance of austerity. Governments and public service leaders argue that collaboration with businesses, voluntary organisations and active citizens is essential for addressing the many challenges posed by austerity. The challenges include transforming public services to cope with cuts, changing citizen expectations and managing demand for services and enhancing the legitimacy of difficult policy decisions by involving people outside government in making them. But at the same time, collaboration can be exclusionary. For example, if there are high levels of protest, governmental and business elites may collaborate in ways that marginalise ordinary citizens to push through unpopular policies. Our challenge is to explore different ways in which collaboration works or fails in governing austerity and whether it is becoming more or less important in doing so. We propose to compare the role of collaboration in governing austerity in eight cities of the aforementioned countries: Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal and Nantes. It is in towns and cities that government has the most immediate and closest day-to-day engagement with citizens and it is for this reason that we chose to locate our research at the urban scale. Our primary objective is to understand whether, and if so how, collaboration among public officials, citizens, business leaders and other actors contributes to austerity governance. For example is there more collaboration, less or are we seeing different kinds of collaboration emerging? Who, if anyone, refuses to collaborate and with what implications for governing austerity? Might collaboration be a way to subvert or resist aspects of austerity? The research is comparative, meaning that it is looking for patterns and to see what lessons and insights countries in different parts of the world might draw from one another. Finding ways to collaborate with citizens has always been important for central and local governments, although collaboration has been a higher political priority in the past 20 years than before. Our study will tell politicians and public officials much about how collaboration works as a way of governing austerity. However we are not trying to 'sell' collaboration, or suggest that those suffering from cuts and wanting to resist them should collaborate if they do not wish to. For citizen activists our research will highlight different strategies and options for speaking truth to power - by engaging with city government and local business elites, or refusing to do so and perhaps focusing on protest instead. We will discover when collaboration serves the ends of community groups and when it does not. Participants in our study, and others, will have the opportunity to discuss these issues at a series of local events, at which we will discuss our findings. The research will also engage with important academic debates about the changing nature of governance. In gathering and comparing a large body of data we will learn about the changing role of government under austerity and whether governing is becoming more elite-focused, remote and hierarchical, or perhaps even more inclusive despite the challenging times in which we live.

We investigate firms’ decisions to pay elective stock dividends, known in the UK as scrip dividends. Scrip dividends give investors the choice between receiving new shares or the equivalent value as a cash dividend. UK firms paying scrip dividends are more likely to be financially constrained, and scrip dividends are used more when access to external financing is costly. Our results are robust to using the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to credit supply. Cash preservation is the most important corporate incentive to use scrip dividends as they tend to be distributed in combination with dividend cuts and with major corporate investments such as debt-financed mergers and acquisitions. Analysis of US dividend reinvestment plans by which investors purchase new shares confirms firms’ cash-preservation motives

Regtech is making its way into insurance. Regulation governing financial services providers has expanded substantially since the outbreak of the global economic crisis of 2008. Keeping pace with changes has become extremely burdensome to financial institutions and insurers alike, while the cost of complying with such requirements has hiked. Regtech can improve data management capabilities and provide insurers with increased automation and data-driven insights in areas such as reporting, regulatory compliance, and financial risk management. In the past few years, investments in regtech startups have been on the rise, reaching a record high in 2018. Insurers are waking up to the potential benefits of regtech, triggering an increase in the number of partnerships. Despite the hype, regtech is still in its infancy and its potential remains untapped. Read More