The International Sanctions Termination (IST) dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions imposed by the EU, UN, US and regional organizations in the period from 1990 to 2018, including those that were already in place by 1990 and those still ongoing. The dataset covers 399 cases, its data structure is dyadic, and the core unit of analysis is a sanctions case. If several senders impose restrictions on the same target, the dataset contains a separate case for each sender to provide sender-specific information on variables such as sanctions costs, goals or outcomes. It contains information on the design of sanctions – including expiry dates, review provisions and termination requirements – and captures the gradual process of adapting and ending sanctions. The main sources of information for coding are (inter)governmental documents that stipulate the implementation, extension, adaptation and removal of sanctions. The IST dataset is currently being updated to include the years 2019, 2020 and 2021. When using the data, please cite: Attia, Hana and Julia Grauvogel. Forthcoming. International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset. Journal of Peace Research.

Sanctions are widely used foreign policy tools in reaction to crises in world politics. Accordingly, literature on sanction effectiveness—their intended consequences—is abundant. Yet, fewer studies address the unintended consequences of restrictive measures. This is remarkable given that negative externalities are well documented. Our article explores this phenomenon by asking under which conditions sanctions yield negative externalities. We develop a theoretical conceptualization and explanatory framework for studying the unintended consequences of UN sanctions. Empirically, we draw on data from the rich, but scarcely used Targeted Sanctions Consortium and apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine negative externalities of UN sanctions, complemented by illustrations from the cases Haiti and North Korea. The results document the existence of multiple pathways toward unintended consequences, highlighting the negative impact of comprehensive and long-lasting sanctions, as well as the ability of autocratic targets with economic means to persist unscathed from sanctions.

Between February 22, 2022, and January 11, 2024, territories and organizations worldwide imposed over 16,000 restrictions on individuals from Russia. Furthermore, roughly 9,300 list-based sanctions were placed on entities over that period. The sanctions were first placed due to the country's recognition of the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR) and then due to its military attack on Ukraine. Restrictions targeting individuals typically include asset freezes and travel bans. Sanctions on Russia prior to the war in Ukraine Over the past decade, Western countries have placed restrictions on Russia for various reasons. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, the EU restricted entry to several individuals and froze assets of companies allegedly responsible for undermining and threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. Furthermore, the EU and the U.S. sanctioned several persons and companies in relation to human rights violations and the use of chemical weapons, referring to the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Alexei Navalny. In addition, the United States imposed measures on Russia over its malicious cyber activities and evading United Nations (UN) sanctions restricting trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.

The dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions regimes imposed by the UN, US and EU in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanctions regimes that were in place by 1990, targeting a country, its leadership and entities associated with it. Episodes which are still on-going are also recorded. Included are all sanctioned countries which have been coded – at least – at the start of sanction episodes as “autocratic regimes” by the Hadenius/Teorell/Wahman dataset on authoritarian regimes (2012).

Terrorists and terrorist entities designated by the Singapore government on top of the UN security council set of sanctions.

This paper investigates the effects of U.S. economic sanctions on UN General Assembly voting patterns. Using panel data for 123 developing countries from 1990–2014, and employing an instrumental variables approach to account for potential endogeneity, we find that U.S.- imposed sanctions generally lead to a decline in voting coincidence between the U.S. and target countries when the sanctioned country receives low U.S. aid. However, in instances where the U.S. sanctions countries dependent on U.S. foreign aid, we find targets are increasingly more likely to vote with the U.S. This is because sanctions send a credible signal of the U.S.’s willingness to carry out punishment and cancel future aid to countries that publicly oppose it. Our research shows how sanctions alone tend to pull countries apart while, together with aid dependence, have the potential to bring countries in line with the U.S.’s position on issues, adding nuance to the sanctions literature.

The South African FIC sanctions list, largely based on UN Security Council sanctions.

We use Efficiency to represent GDP divided by energy use, Unilateral to represent sanctions imposed by either the U.S. or the EU only, Plurilateral to represent the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the EU jointly, Multilateral (or UN) to represent the international sanctions imposed by the United Nations, US, EU, and UN to stand for the sanction senders, Eco to represent that the sanctions affect the economy, Non-eco to represent that the sanctions do not affect the economy, Intensity to represent the formal intensity of sanctions, GDP to stand for per capita GDP of the target state, FDI to represent the net inflows of foreign direct investment, Investment to stand for the gross fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP, Industry to represent percentage of energy industry value added to GDP, Ideology to stand for the ideological orientation of the respective government, Urbanization to represent the proportion of urban population, and Openness to stand for exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP.

This dataset contains both UN-mandated and the national sanctions designations for Qatar (Targeted Financial Sanctions).

This dataset focused on focused on the illicit sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Including FY 2022 enforcement activity, this initiative has acted on six tankers, disrupting over 4.98 million barrels of Iranian petroleum worth an estimated $162 million.

Nigeria enforces the UN Security Council list but also has an independent list of designations.

This volume provides a historical record of developments occurring during calendar year 2011, when the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser marked its 80th birthday since its creation as a statutory entity.1 For the first time, the State Department is publishing the official version of the Digest exclusively on-line. By publishing the Digest on-line, we seek to make U.S. views on international law more quickly and readily accessible to our counterparts in other governments and international organizations, scholars, students, and other users, both within the United States and around the world. The Arab Awakening presented a variety of challenges for the practice of international law in 2011. In addressing events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and elsewhere, the United States government carefully applied what Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has called "smart power," utilizing a wide array of foreign policy tools to fit the needs of the particular circumstance. In Libya, the U.S. took a multilateral approach, acting quickly at the UN Security Council to pass historic resolutions that established an arms embargo and sanctions regime and made the first ever unanimous referral to the International Criminal Court. Based on Security Council Resolution 1973's authorization for "all necessary measures" to enforce a no-fly zone, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the United States was part of a limited, NATO-led military mission in Libya. Various additional legal issues arose during the U.S. response to the situation in Libya, including those related to securing a protecting power, addressing the situation at the United Nations Human Rights Council, recognizing the new Libyan government, and arranging for funds to be made available to the new government using assets of the former regime that had been frozen pursuant to Security Council resolutions.