The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.
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Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.
By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.
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Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USRECD) from 1854-12-01 to 2025-07-10 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.
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United States Recession Probability data was reported at 14.120 % in Oct 2019. This records a decrease from the previous number of 14.505 % for Sep 2019. United States Recession Probability data is updated monthly, averaging 7.668 % from Jan 1960 (Median) to Oct 2019, with 718 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 95.405 % in Dec 1981 and a record low of 0.080 % in Sep 1983. United States Recession Probability data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S021: Recession Probability.
The statisic shows the concern among Americans around the impact of the European financial crisis on the United States economy. According to the source, 15 percent of those polled stated that they were 'not too concerned' about the impact of the European financial crisis on the U.S. economy.
The Weekly Economic Index (WEI) of the United States exhibited notable fluctuations between January 2021 and June 2025. Throughout this period, the WEI reached its lowest point at negative **** percent in the third week of February 2021, while achieving its peak at ***** percent in the first week of May 2021. From 2021 through the initial half of 2023, the WEI demonstrated a gradual decline, interspersed with occasional minor upturns. This phase was succeeded by a period characterized by a modest overall increase. What is the Weekly Economic Index? The Weekly Economic Index (WEI) is an index of real economic activity using high-frequency data, used to signal the state of the U.S. economy. It is an index of ** daily and weekly indicators, scaled to align with the four-quarter GDP growth rate. The indicators reflected in the WEI cover consumer behavior, the labor market, and production.
The statistic shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The gross domestic product of the United States in 2024 amounted to around 29.18 trillion U.S. dollars. The United States and the economy The United States’ economy is by far the largest in the world; a status which can be determined by several key factors, one being gross domestic product: A look at the GDP of the main industrialized and emerging countries shows a significant difference between US GDP and the GDP of China, the runner-up in the ranking, as well as the followers Japan, Germany and France. Interestingly, it is assumed that China will have surpassed the States in terms of GDP by 2030, but for now, the United States is among the leading countries in almost all other relevant rankings and statistics, trade and employment for example. See the U.S. GDP growth rate here. Just like in other countries, the American economy suffered a severe setback when the economic crisis occurred in 2008. The American economy entered a recession caused by the collapsing real estate market and increasing unemployment. Despite this, the standard of living is considered quite high; life expectancy in the United States has been continually increasing slightly over the past decade, the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily recovering and decreasing since the crisis, and the Big Mac Index, which represents the global prices for a Big Mac, a popular indicator for the purchasing power of an economy, shows that the United States’ purchasing power in particular is only slightly lower than that of the euro area.
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Graph and download economic data for Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator (SAHMREALTIME) from Dec 1959 to Jun 2025 about recession indicators, academic data, and USA.
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This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and Its Long-Term Impact: An Interrupted Time-Series Natural Experimental Analysis" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.
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A deep financial and economic crisis ravaged many Asian nations during 1997 and 1998. In this article, the authors examine the impact of the crisis on corporate risk for a subset of large United States firms that are included in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 stock market index. They find that the Asian crisis changed many of these firms' exposure to stock market movements -- that is, their "betas," or sensitivity to stock market risk. In particular, the extent of a firm's sales exposure to Asia appears to be an important link through which the crisis affected beta. This effect is amplified by greater financial leverage.
With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.
Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market
The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.
Market Panic and The Great Recession
As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.
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Graph and download economic data for Equity Market Volatility Tracker: Financial Crises (EMVFINCRISES) from Jan 1985 to May 2025 about volatility, uncertainty, equity, financial, and USA.
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This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Effects: An Interrupted Time-Series Analysis of the Impact of its Quantitative Easing Programs" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.
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ABSTRACT This work, to begin with, draws attention to the clear contrast between the intensity and evolution of the crisis of the thirties and the one that bursts into the early eighties, originating the so-called “lost decade” which, in fact and except for few exceptions, has not yet been overcome. Several main issues are emphasized. On the one hand, the incidence of the first crisis was substantially more serious than the second. On the other, the external circumstances were more disadvantageous and prolonged due to the repercussion of the crisis on the “central economies” and the incidence of the Second World War. In spite of these circumstances, most of the Latin American countries could initiate their recuperation and maintain their so-called “inward development” up to, approximately, the sixties. In the last part, after analysing different facts which influenced the evolution - mainly, the role played by the central economies in the two recalled crisis -, emphasis is made on the fact that we “live in another Latin America” and that it is necessary, above all, to constitute other socio-political agglomerations inherent to the internal and external realities of present time.
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ABSTRACT This paper was written in 2003-04 and aims to investigate the two cycles of US economic expansion in the late of the 20th Century and the 2001 financial crisis. For this purpose, it starts an examination of the mutations of the capital since the 1970s. In the end, it analyzes the international context and the changes in the US hegemony nature at the beginnings of the 21st Century.
This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies.
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The United States recorded a Government Debt to GDP of 124.30 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2024. This dataset provides - United States Government Debt To GDP - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.
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Abstract (en): This collection, A Longitudinal Study of Public Response, was conducted to understand the trajectory of risk perception amidst an ongoing economic crisis. A nation-wide panel responded to eight surveys beginning in late September 2008 at the peak of the crisis and concluded in August 2011. At least 600 respondents participated in each survey, with 325 completing all eight surveys. The online survey focused on perceptions of risk (savings, investments, retirement, job), negative emotions toward the financial crisis (sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, worry, stress), confidence in national leaders to manage the crisis (President Obama, Congress, Treasury Secretary, business leaders), and belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives despite the crisis. Latent growth curve modeling was conducted to analyze change in risk perception throughout the crisis. Demographic information includes ethnic origin, sex, age, marital status, income, political affiliation and education. This longitudinal panel study was launched on September 29, 2008, the day the Dow experienced its largest one-day point drop. The first of seven waves of data collection was dedicated almost exclusively to public response to the financial crisis. Further data collection followed on October 8, 2008, November 5, 2008, December 6, 2008, March 21, 2009, June 30, 2009, October 6, 2009, and August 9, 2011. The surveys were spaced closer together in the beginning of the study believing that the most change would occur early in the crisis and, of course, not knowing how long the crisis would last. Collecting the first seven waves of data over a year's period allowed time for the public to respond to different phases of the crisis. A panel of over 800 individuals participated in the study. This ongoing Internet panel was developed by Decision Research through word-of-mouth and Internet recruiting (e.g., paying for Google search words). Nonrespondents (panelists invited to participate but who chose not to) did not differ significantly from respondents in terms of age, gender, or education. Surveys were left open for completion for four to six days, although most panelists responded in the first 24 hours. These online panelists were paid at the rate of $15 per hour with a typical payment of $6 and an incentive if they completed all surveys. Any panelist who appeared to rush through the survey was eliminated and not invited to participate again. N/A ICPSR data undergo a confidentiality review and are altered when necessary to limit the risk of disclosure. ICPSR also routinely creates ready-to-go data files along with setups in the major statistical software formats as well as standard codebooks to accompany the data. In addition to these procedures, ICPSR performed the following processing steps for this data collection: Created variable labels and/or value labels.; Created online analysis version with question text.; Checked for undocumented or out-of-range codes.. Presence of Common Scales: Lipkus Numeracy Score, Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale, Individualism-Communitarianism Response Rates: Wave 1: 81 percent; Wave 2: 89 percent; Wave 2a:80 percent; Wave 3: 87 percent; Wave 4: 85 percent; Wave 5: 91 percent; Wave 6: 76 percent; Wave 7: 74 percent; Wave 8: 79 percent Smallest Geographic Unit: None Convenience sample of Decision Research web-panel participation located throughout the United States. Funding insitution(s): National Science Foundation (SES-0901036). web-based survey
The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.