By 2030, the middle-class population in Asia-Pacific is expected to increase from 1.38 billion people in 2015 to 3.49 billion people. In comparison, the middle-class population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase from 114 million in 2015 to 212 million in 2030.

Worldwide wealth

While the middle-class has been on the rise, there is still a huge disparity in global wealth and income. The United States had the highest number of individuals belonging to the top one percent of wealth holders, and the value of global wealth is only expected to increase over the coming years. Around 57 percent of the world’s population had assets valued at less than 10,000 U.S. dollars; while less than one percent had assets of more than million U.S. dollars. Asia had the highest percentage of investable assets in the world in 2018, whereas Oceania had the highest percent of non-investable assets.

The middle-class

The middle class is the group of people whose income falls in the middle of the scale. China accounted for over half of the global population for middle-class wealth in 2017. In the United States, the debate about the middle class “disappearing” has been a popular topic due to the increase in wealth to the top billionaires in the nation. Due to this, there have been arguments to increase taxes on the rich to help support the middle-class.

This graphic illustrates how favorable or unfavorable the working class view other social classes in Great Britain. According to the 2017 survey, 48 percent of those who identify as working class view their own social sector as the most favorable whilst only 9 percent view the upper class favorably. 42 percent of respondents felt unfavorably towards the upper class.

This statistic displays which social class has the nicest people according to adults in Great Britain in 2017. The working class is viewed as the nicest social class according to those aged 25 years and older. However, 29 percent of 18 to 24 year olds think the middle class has the nicest people, which is nine percentage points more than how they see the working class. No respondents aged 65 and older saw the upper class as the nicest with 36 percent believing the working class has the nicest people. Only one percent of 18 to 64 year olds thought the nicest people were in the upper class.

Between 2018 and 2022, people in households in the ‘other’, Asian and black ethnic groups were the most likely to be in persistent low income, both before and after housing costs, out of all ethnic groups.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.

With few dissenting voices, the historiography of twentieth-century British civil society has been relayed through a prism of continuing and escalating elite disengagement. Within a paradigm of declinism, academics, politicians, and social commentators have contrasted a nineteenth and early twentieth century past, offering a richness of social commitment, against a present characterized by lowering standards in urban governance and civic disengagement. Put simply, as we entered the twentieth century the right sorts of people were no longer volunteering. Yet the data for such claims is insubstantial for we lack detailed empirical studies of social trends of urban volunteering across the first fifty years of the twentieth century. This dataset fills that void. It offers details of those involved in local politics, who were magistrates or poor law guardians, or who helped manage or represent one of 34 voluntary associations serving one ‘typical’ large city - Nottingham - and the surrounding county between 1900 and 1950. The sample covers a range of voluntary activities from the smallest to the largest of charities and associations. Three quarters of people captured by the data set lived within the city boundary. The clear majority of those sampled were middle class, only 10 per cent being working class, and 1.5 per cent upper class. Within this middle class there were major disparities in wealth, income, status, lifestyle, and self-view. Broken down, about 29 per cent of the sample overall were upper middle class, 43 per cent middle middle class, and 17 per cent lower middle class. Middle-class numbers in Nottingham, at about 22.5 per cent of the population, were roughly comparable with other Northern or Midland industrial cities. Its occupational distribution also approximately mirrored that of England.

In 2021, 20.1% of people from the Indian ethnic group were in higher managerial and professional occupations – the highest percentage out of all ethnic groups in this socioeconomic group.

United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data was reported at 2,810,045.942 Intl $ mn in 2017. This records an increase from the previous number of 2,731,356.238 Intl $ mn for 2016. United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data is updated yearly, averaging 1,871,560.914 Intl $ mn from Dec 1990 (Median) to 2017, with 28 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 2,810,045.942 Intl $ mn in 2017 and a record low of 972,847.658 Intl $ mn in 1990. United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United Kingdom – Table UK.World Bank.WDI: Gross Domestic Product: Purchasing Power Parity. PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars. For most economies PPP figures are extrapolated from the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) benchmark estimates or imputed using a statistical model based on the 2011 ICP. For 47 high- and upper middle-income economies conversion factors are provided by Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).; ; World Bank, International Comparison Program database.; Gap-filled total;

In 2023, the highest average amount of disposable income for any age group occurred in the 35 to 44-year-old group, while the age group with the lowest average disposable income were those aged 85 and over.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.

This study looks at middle and upper class family life in the early twentieth century and uses both documentary research and interviews. It was designed to complement the existing national quota sample of interviews, collected for the Family Life and Work Experience before 1918 project (available at the UKDA under SN 2000), with 62 further interviews, focusing on child rearing and gender roles. It was intended to represent both entrepreneurial and higher professional families, including some who spent part of the period abroad. The purpose of the research was to provide a more reliable basis for assessing the various interpretations of the nature of upper and middle class family life in this period.

For the second edition (May 2008), the study is now available in searchable PDF format direct from the UKDA.


Main Topics:

Main topics covered include: family life; upper class; middle class; childbirth; housing; discipline; education; work; leisure; religion; politics; parent-child relationship; marriage; gender; and local communities.

GDP Gross Domestic Product; bn billion; USD United States Dollar; HI high-income country; UMI upper-middle-income country; LMI lower-middle-income country, FTE full time equivalents. Sources: GDP (bn USD) [10], Number of Researcher (FTE) per mill. inhabitants [11],–no data available.

In March 2025, the top one percent of earners in the United Kingdom received an average pay of over 16,000 British pounds per month, compared with the bottom ten percent of earners who earned around 800 pounds a month.

The DAHLIA-19 ('Domestic Abuse Harnessing Learning Under Covid 19') was a research study of policy and practice responses to domestic abuse during the Covid-19 pandemic in four jurisdictions - Australia, Ireland, South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK, covering England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). All are upper or upper/middle income countries with established domestic abuse services. The overall purpose of DAHLIA-19 was to investigate policy and practice responses to domestic abuse in different jurisdictions during the crisis to harness learning to inform recovery. Data were gathered for this research between November 2020 and December 2021. The fieldwork was largely desk based with interviews and consultations conducted by telephone or online. Data were gathered in each jurisdiction from a range of sources including documents, interviews with policy and practice stakeholders and experts, and surveys. In each country a 'mapping study' was completed, followed by a more in-depth case study. The findings of all four jurisdictions are also presented in an international synthesis report.

National responses to domestic abuse under COVID-19 across all jurisdictions were of four key types:

• Resources: strengthening pre COVID-19 strategic approaches to domestic abuse;
• Collaboration and cooperation: technologically facilitated developments improving multi-sector ways of working;
• Innovation and adaptation: in direct service delivery and community-led innovations
• Working with perpetrators: new developments

The project adopted a broad approach, employing quantitative as well as qualitative methods. It covered both public and private forms of risk protection, and it analysed attitudes as well as actual behavior. First, we reviewed Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in the aforementioned five key areas. We mapped the social programmes, occupational schemes and private options that have been available since the early 1990s. The second phase was based on quantitative data analysis, making use of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the ABI Risk and Protection Survey. We analysed the take-up of insurances and how it was influenced by attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. Third, we conducted 61 qualitative interviews, where we explored personal risk management strategies of middle-income households from Scotland and England. The main result was a typology of risk management rationales that guide household economies. This stage also explored the ramifications of the recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn. Comparing England and Scotland, the purpose was to review Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in key areas: unemployment, sickness, costs of higher education for children, retirement and infirmity in old age. The aim was to map the types of statutory protection against such risks and contingencies and examine changes in the scope of public provision. In parallel, we will examine the scope of non-statutory (occupational and personal) provision, investigating how 'private welfare markets' have developed since the early 1990s. The second phase is based on quantitative data analysis of household savings and investment behaviour in insurances and private market-based contracts for risk protection. Finally, via qualitative interviews, we explore personal risk management of socially and economically similar families from Scotland and England. This stage will also explore the potential ramifications of the most recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

39.8% of workers from the Indian ethnic group were in 'professional' jobs in 2021 – the highest percentage out of all ethnic groups in this role.

The median annual earnings in the United Kingdom was 37,430 British pounds per year in 2024. Annual earnings varied significantly by region, ranging from 47,455 pounds in London to 32,960 pounds in the North East. Along with London, two other areas of the UK had median annual earnings above the UK average; South East England, and Scotland, at 39,038 pounds and 38,315 pounds respectively. Regional Inequality in the UK Various other indicators highlight the degree of regional inequality in the UK, especially between London and the rest of the country. Productivity in London, as measured by output per hour, was 26.2 percent higher than the UK average. By comparison, every other UK region, except the South East, fell below the UK average for productivity. In gross domestic product per head, London was also an outlier. The average GDP per head in the UK was just over 37,000 pounds in 2023, but for London it was almost 64,000 pounds. Again, the South East's GDP per head was slightly above the UK average, with every other region below it. Within London itself, there is also a great degree of inequality. In 2023, for example, the average earnings in Kensington and Chelsea were 964 pounds per week, compared with 675 pounds in Barking and Dagenham. Wages continue to grow in 2025 In March 2025, weekly wages in the UK were growing by around 5.6 percent, or 1.8 percent when adjusted for inflation. For almost two years, wages have grown faster than inflation after a long period where prices were rising faster than wages between 2021 and 2023. This was due to a sustained period of high inflation in the UK, which peaked in October 2022 at 11.1 percent. Although inflation started to slow the following month, it wasn't until June 2023 that wages started to outpace inflation. By this point, the damage caused by high energy and food inflation had led to the the worst Cost of Living Crisis in the UK for a generation.

In the Brexit referendum that took place on June 23, 206, approximately 57 percent of people in upper middle-class professions voted to Remain compared with 43 percent who voted to Leave. Among those in lower-working class professions, 64 percent voted to leave, and 36 percent to Remain.

Summary Background There are 1·3 billion people with disabilities globally. On average, they have poorer health than their nondisabled peers, but the extent of increased risk of premature mortality is unknown. We aimed to systematically review the association between disability and mortality in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). Methods We searched MEDLINE, Global Health, PsycINFO, and EMBASE from Jan 1, 1990 to Nov 14, 2022. Longitudinal epidemiological studies in any language with a comparator group that measured the association between disability and all-cause mortality in people of any age were eligible for inclusion. Two reviewers independently assessed study eligibility, extracted data, and assessed risk of bias. We used a random-effects meta-analysis to calculate the pooled hazard ratio (HR) for all-cause mortality by disability status. We then conducted meta-analyses separately for different impairment and age groups. Findings We identified 6146 unique articles, of which 70 studies (81 cohorts) were included in the systematic review, from 22 countries. There was variability in the methods used to assess and report disability and mortality. The metaanalysis included 54 studies, representing 62 cohorts (comprising 270 571 people with disabilities). Pooled HRs for all-cause mortality were 2·02 (95% CI 1·77–2·30) for people with disabilities versus those without disabilities, with high heterogeneity between studies (τ²=0·23, I²=98%). This association varied by impairment type: from 1·36 (1·17–1·57) for visual impairment to 3·95 (1·60–9·74) for multiple impairments. The association was highest for children younger than 18 years (4·46, [3·01–6·59]) and lower in people aged 15–49 years (2·45 [1·21–4·97]) and people older than 60 years (1·97 [1·65–2·36]). Interpretation People with disabilities had a two-fold higher mortality rate than people without disabilities in LMICs. Interventions are needed to improve the health of people with disabilities and reduce their higher mortality rate. Funding UK National Institute for Health and Care Research; and UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

In 2025, the household cost inflation rate (HCI) for low-income households in the United Kingdom was 2.5 percent, compared with 2.5 percent for middle-income households, and 3.1 percent for high-income households. Unlike other measures of inflation such as the consumer price index (CPI) the HCI isn't based on a fixed basket of goods, but is weighted to show how price changes affect different households by their economic status.

This statistic displays the results of a survey on the socioeconomic profile of Instagram users in Great Britain (GB) from the first quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2018. During the most recent wave, it was found that the responding users from the lower middle class (C1 group) were the most common socioeconomic group. Over the period in question, the share of users from the upper middle and middle class (AB) increased by seven percentage points.