This graphic illustrates how favorable or unfavorable the working class view other social classes in Great Britain. According to the 2017 survey, ** percent of those who identify as working class view their own social sector as the most favorable whilst only * percent view the upper class favorably. ** percent of respondents felt unfavorably towards the upper class.

By 2030, the middle-class population in Asia-Pacific is expected to increase from **** billion people in 2015 to **** billion people. In comparison, the middle-class population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase from *** million in 2015 to *** million in 2030. Worldwide wealth While the middle-class has been on the rise, there is still a huge disparity in global wealth and income. The United States had the highest number of individuals belonging to the top one percent of wealth holders, and the value of global wealth is only expected to increase over the coming years. Around ** percent of the world’s population had assets valued at less than 10,000 U.S. dollars, while less than *** percent had assets of more than one million U.S. dollars. Asia had the highest percentage of investable assets in the world in 2018, whereas Oceania had the highest percentage of non-investable assets. The middle-class The middle class is the group of people whose income falls in the middle of the scale. China accounted for over half of the global population for middle-class wealth in 2017. In the United States, the debate about the middle class “disappearing” has been a popular topic due to the increase in wealth among the top billionaires in the nation. Due to this, there have been arguments to increase taxes on the rich to help support the middle class.

This statistic displays which social class has the nicest people according to adults in Great Britain in 2017. The working class is viewed as the nicest social class according to those aged 25 years and older. However, ** percent of 18 to 24 year olds think the middle class has the nicest people, which is **** percentage points more than how they see the working class. No respondents aged 65 and older saw the upper class as the nicest with ** percent believing the working class has the nicest people. Only *** percent of 18 to 64 year olds thought the nicest people were in the upper class.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner. This resource arose out of research into the date of origin, characteristics, and scale of age-specific salaries, and the relative earnings among the British middle class between 1750 and 1850. Main Topics: This resource lists by name, occupation, year, department, and years of experience of clerks employed in the British East India Company between 1760 and 1850. It provides an indication of middle class incomes received by a significant group of men in the middle and upper sections of London's middle class during the classic years of the British industrial revolution. No sampling (total universe) Transcription of existing materials Compilation or synthesis of existing material

In the Brexit referendum that took place on June 23, 206, approximately 57 percent of people in upper middle-class professions voted to Remain compared with 43 percent who voted to Leave. Among those in lower-working class professions, 64 percent voted to leave, and 36 percent to Remain.

With few dissenting voices, the historiography of twentieth-century British civil society has been relayed through a prism of continuing and escalating elite disengagement. Within a paradigm of declinism, academics, politicians, and social commentators have contrasted a nineteenth and early twentieth century past, offering a richness of social commitment, against a present characterized by lowering standards in urban governance and civic disengagement. Put simply, as we entered the twentieth century the right sorts of people were no longer volunteering. Yet the data for such claims is insubstantial for we lack detailed empirical studies of social trends of urban volunteering across the first fifty years of the twentieth century. This dataset fills that void. It offers details of those involved in local politics, who were magistrates or poor law guardians, or who helped manage or represent one of 34 voluntary associations serving one ‘typical’ large city - Nottingham - and the surrounding county between 1900 and 1950. The sample covers a range of voluntary activities from the smallest to the largest of charities and associations. Three quarters of people captured by the data set lived within the city boundary. The clear majority of those sampled were middle class, only 10 per cent being working class, and 1.5 per cent upper class. Within this middle class there were major disparities in wealth, income, status, lifestyle, and self-view. Broken down, about 29 per cent of the sample overall were upper middle class, 43 per cent middle middle class, and 17 per cent lower middle class. Middle-class numbers in Nottingham, at about 22.5 per cent of the population, were roughly comparable with other Northern or Midland industrial cities. Its occupational distribution also approximately mirrored that of England.

United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data was reported at 2,810,045.942 Intl $ mn in 2017. This records an increase from the previous number of 2,731,356.238 Intl $ mn for 2016. United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data is updated yearly, averaging 1,871,560.914 Intl $ mn from Dec 1990 (Median) to 2017, with 28 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 2,810,045.942 Intl $ mn in 2017 and a record low of 972,847.658 Intl $ mn in 1990. United Kingdom UK: GNI: PPP data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United Kingdom – Table UK.World Bank.WDI: Gross Domestic Product: Purchasing Power Parity. PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars. For most economies PPP figures are extrapolated from the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) benchmark estimates or imputed using a statistical model based on the 2011 ICP. For 47 high- and upper middle-income economies conversion factors are provided by Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).; ; World Bank, International Comparison Program database.; Gap-filled total;

During a 2023 survey carried out among more than ***** marketers from the United Kingdom, it was found that marketers who identified as upper middle class had the highest average full-time earnings, with ** thousand British pounds annually. Marketers from the skilled working class were the lowest-paid group, with **** thousand pounds annually.

In 2021, 20.1% of people from the Indian ethnic group were in higher managerial and professional occupations – the highest percentage out of all ethnic groups in this socioeconomic group.

Between 2018 and 2022, people in households in the ‘other’, Asian and black ethnic groups were the most likely to be in persistent low income, both before and after housing costs, out of all ethnic groups.

In March 2025, the top one percent of earners in the United Kingdom received an average pay of over 16,000 British pounds per month, compared with the bottom ten percent of earners who earned around 800 pounds a month.

GDP Gross Domestic Product; bn billion; USD United States Dollar; HI high-income country; UMI upper-middle-income country; LMI lower-middle-income country, FTE full time equivalents. Sources: GDP (bn USD) [10], Number of Researcher (FTE) per mill. inhabitants [11],–no data available.

This statistic illustrates how prepared people are to marry or enter a relationship with someone outside of their own social class in Great Britain as of 2017. Those who consider themselves upper class are ** percent more likely than the working class to not engage in a relationship with someone in a different social class. ** percent of the middle class say they would marry or enter a relationship with a different social class. This is ** percentage points higher than those who said yes in the upper class.

The DAHLIA-19 ('Domestic Abuse Harnessing Learning Under Covid 19') was a research study of policy and practice responses to domestic abuse during the Covid-19 pandemic in four jurisdictions - Australia, Ireland, South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK, covering England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). All are upper or upper/middle income countries with established domestic abuse services. The overall purpose of DAHLIA-19 was to investigate policy and practice responses to domestic abuse in different jurisdictions during the crisis to harness learning to inform recovery. Data were gathered for this research between November 2020 and December 2021. The fieldwork was largely desk based with interviews and consultations conducted by telephone or online. Data were gathered in each jurisdiction from a range of sources including documents, interviews with policy and practice stakeholders and experts, and surveys. In each country a 'mapping study' was completed, followed by a more in-depth case study. The findings of all four jurisdictions are also presented in an international synthesis report.

National responses to domestic abuse under COVID-19 across all jurisdictions were of four key types:

• Resources: strengthening pre COVID-19 strategic approaches to domestic abuse;
• Collaboration and cooperation: technologically facilitated developments improving multi-sector ways of working;
• Innovation and adaptation: in direct service delivery and community-led innovations
• Working with perpetrators: new developments

This data collection consists of 18 interview transcripts meant to explore the rationales and methods by which investors in Hong Kong buy properties in the UK. The life and impact of the residential choices of the 'super rich' has been a major strand in research by the research team. This work advanced the proposition that the upper-tier of income groups living in cities tend to exploit particular forms of service provision (such as education, cultural life and personal services), are largely distanced from the mundane flow of social life in urban areas and tend to be withdrawn from the civic life of cities more generally. Some of this work is underpinned by the literature on, for example, gated communities, but it has surprisingly been under-used as the guiding framework for close empirical work in affluent neighbourhoods, perhaps largely as a result of the perceived difficulty of working with such individuals. This project will allow us to generate insights into how super-rich neighbourhoods operate, how people come to live there and the social and economic tensions and trade-offs that exist as such processes are allowed to run. As many people question the role and value of wealth and identify inequality as a growing social problem this research will feed into public conversations and policymaker concerns about how socially vital cities can be maintained when capital investment may undermine such objectives on one level (the creation of neighbourhoods that are both exclusive and often 'abandoned' for large parts of the year), while potentially fulfilling broader ambitions at others (over tax receipts for example).Social research has tended not to focus on the super-rich, largely because they are hard to locate, and even harder to collaborate with in research. In this project we seek to address these concerns by focusing extensive research effort on the question of where and how the super-rich live and invest in the property markets of the cities of Hong Kong and London. We see these cities as exemplary in assisting in the construction of further insights and knowledge in how the super-rich seek residential investment opportunities, how they live there when they are 'at home' in such residences and how these patterns of investment shape the social, political and economic life of these cities more broadly. Given that the super-rich make such decisions on the basis of tax incentives and the attraction of major cultural infrastructure (such as galleries and theatre) we have proposed a program of research capable of offering an inside account of the practices that go to make-up these investment patterns including processes of searching for suitable property, its financing, the kinds of property deemed to be suitable and an analysis of how estate agents and city authorities seek to capitalise and retain the potentially highly mobile investment by the super-rich. In economic terms the life and functioning of rich neighbourhood spaces appears intuitively important. For example, attractive and safe spaces for captains of industry, senior figures in political and non-government organizations are often regarded as major markers of urban vitality and the foundation of social networks that may make-up the broader glue of civic and political society. Yet we know very little about how such neighbourhoods operate, who they attract and how they are linked to other cities and their neighbourhoods globally. Our aim in this research is to grapple with what might be described as the 'problem' of these super-rich neighbourhoods - sometime called the 'alpha territory' - and undertake research that will help us to understand more about the advantages and disadvantages of these kinds of property investment. The research was carried out using semi-structured interviews and participant observation at property fairs and development sites in Hong Kong and different cities in the UK. Moreover, semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the rationales and methods by which investors in Hong Kong buy properties in the UK. Participants were recruited using searches for relevant key actors as well as accessing personal and professional networks that enabled snowballing techniques to elicit further contacts. Interviews were conducted with individual investors, local government officials, planning officers, inward investment agencies, city government officials and estate agents. Interviews were conducted in both English and Cantonese.

The median annual earnings in the United Kingdom was 37,430 British pounds per year in 2024. Annual earnings varied significantly by region, ranging from 47,455 pounds in London to 32,960 pounds in the North East. Along with London, two other areas of the UK had median annual earnings above the UK average; South East England, and Scotland, at 39,038 pounds and 38,315 pounds respectively. Regional Inequality in the UK Various other indicators highlight the degree of regional inequality in the UK, especially between London and the rest of the country. Productivity in London, as measured by output per hour, was 26.2 percent higher than the UK average. By comparison, every other UK region, except the South East, fell below the UK average for productivity. In gross domestic product per head, London was also an outlier. The average GDP per head in the UK was just over 37,000 pounds in 2023, but for London it was almost 64,000 pounds. Again, the South East's GDP per head was slightly above the UK average, with every other region below it. Within London itself, there is also a great degree of inequality. In 2023, for example, the average earnings in Kensington and Chelsea were 964 pounds per week, compared with 675 pounds in Barking and Dagenham. Wages continue to grow in 2025 In March 2025, weekly wages in the UK were growing by around 5.6 percent, or 1.8 percent when adjusted for inflation. For almost two years, wages have grown faster than inflation after a long period where prices were rising faster than wages between 2021 and 2023. This was due to a sustained period of high inflation in the UK, which peaked in October 2022 at 11.1 percent. Although inflation started to slow the following month, it wasn't until June 2023 that wages started to outpace inflation. By this point, the damage caused by high energy and food inflation had led to the the worst Cost of Living Crisis in the UK for a generation.

United Kingdom UK: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day: 2011 PPP: % of Population data was reported at 0.700 % in 2015. This records an increase from the previous number of 0.500 % for 2014. United Kingdom UK: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day: 2011 PPP: % of Population data is updated yearly, averaging 0.700 % from Dec 2004 (Median) to 2015, with 12 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 1.200 % in 2004 and a record low of 0.400 % in 2012. United Kingdom UK: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day: 2011 PPP: % of Population data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s UK – Table UK.World Bank: Poverty. Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $5.50 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions.; ; World Bank, Development Research Group. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database. For more information and methodology, please see PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm).; ; The World Bank’s internationally comparable poverty monitoring database now draws on income or detailed consumption data from more than one thousand six hundred household surveys across 164 countries in six regions and 25 other high income countries (industrialized economies). While income distribution data are published for all countries with data available, poverty data are published for low- and middle-income countries and countries eligible to receive loans from the World Bank (such as Chile) and recently graduated countries (such as Estonia) only. The aggregated numbers for low- and middle-income countries correspond to the totals of 6 regions in PovcalNet, which include low- and middle-income countries and countries eligible to receive loans from the World Bank (such as Chile) and recently graduated countries (such as Estonia). See PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/WhatIsNew.aspx) for definitions of geographical regions and industrialized countries.

United Kingdom UK: Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day: 2011 PPP: % data was reported at 0.100 % in 2015. This stayed constant from the previous number of 0.100 % for 2014. United Kingdom UK: Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day: 2011 PPP: % data is updated yearly, averaging 0.200 % from Dec 2004 (Median) to 2015, with 12 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 0.500 % in 2005 and a record low of 0.100 % in 2015. United Kingdom UK: Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day: 2011 PPP: % data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United Kingdom – Table UK.World Bank.WDI: Poverty. Poverty gap at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $3.20 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence.; ; World Bank, Development Research Group. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database. For more information and methodology, please see PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm).; ; The World Bank’s internationally comparable poverty monitoring database now draws on income or detailed consumption data from more than one thousand six hundred household surveys across 164 countries in six regions and 25 other high income countries (industrialized economies). While income distribution data are published for all countries with data available, poverty data are published for low- and middle-income countries and countries eligible to receive loans from the World Bank (such as Chile) and recently graduated countries (such as Estonia) only. The aggregated numbers for low- and middle-income countries correspond to the totals of 6 regions in PovcalNet, which include low- and middle-income countries and countries eligible to receive loans from the World Bank (such as Chile) and recently graduated countries (such as Estonia). See PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/WhatIsNew.aspx) for definitions of geographical regions and industrialized countries.

This statistic displays the results of a survey on the socioeconomic profile of Instagram users in Great Britain (GB) from the first quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2018. During the most recent wave, it was found that the responding users from the lower middle class (C1 group) were the most common socioeconomic group. Over the period in question, the share of users from the upper middle and middle class (AB) increased by seven percentage points.