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The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many “bystander” countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding US and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-China tariffs identify whether a country’s exports complement or substitute US or China and its supply curve’s slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) US and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.
On September 1, 2019, the United States imposed import tariffs on *** billion U.S. dollars worth of Chinese goods, such as footwear, food products, and some home electronics. A trade war between the world's two largest economies was initiated by president Trump in mid-2018 and escalated further throughout 2019.
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The livestock farming technology market is vulnerable to changes in US tariffs, particularly on equipment imported from countries such as China and other international suppliers. US tariffs could lead to an increase in production costs, raising prices for essential farming technologies like IoT sensors, automated feeding systems, and milking robotics.
These higher prices may hinder adoption, especially among smaller or rural farms that are already constrained by financial limitations. It is estimated that tariffs could lead to an increase in costs by up to 25% for certain imported technologies.
For farmers, this could result in delayed investments or a shift towards less sophisticated, lower-cost alternatives, potentially impacting the overall growth of the market in the US. Companies within the US may also need to source domestically or from other countries not impacted by tariffs, which could disrupt existing supply chains.
➤➤➤ Get More Insights about US Tariff Impact Analysis @ https://market.us/report/livestock-farming-technology-market/free-sample/
This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict after 40 Years of Special Protection, PIIE Working paper 19-7.
If you use the data, please cite as: Bown, Chad P. (2019). The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict after 40 Years of Special Protection. PIIE Working paper 19-7. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, all products (%) in China was reported at 5.36 % in 2022, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. China - Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, all products - actual values, historical data, forecasts and projections were sourced from the World Bank on July of 2025.
President Trump's proposals to impose universal tariffs as well as tariffs on Chinese, Canadian, and Mexican imports would considerably increase the average tariff rate. It's estimated that, if put into effect, the average tariff rate including dutiable imports would reach almost 18 percent, up from two percent in 2024. Tariff rates are higher when dutiable imports are included because they refer only to goods that are actually subject to tariffs, rather than all imports. This skews the average tariff rate upward because it excludes duty-free goods. Trump's proposal for a universal 10 percent tariff on all imports would impose a flat tax on all imports, rather than just dutiable goods. This would result in a sharp increase in the overall tariff burden because previously duty-free goods would be taxed.
This data package includes the underlying data files to replicate the data, tables, and charts presented in Why Trump’s tariff proposals would harm working Americans, PIIE Policy Brief 24-1.
If you use the data, please cite as: Clausing, Kimberly, and Mary E. Lovely. 2024. Why Trump’s tariff proposals would harm working Americans. PIIE Policy Brief 24-1. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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We measure the tariff shocks by matching the U.S. products of Section 301 Tariffs with China provincial customs export data in 2017, the year before the trade war.First, based on the tariffed product lists released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which specify products at the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) eight-digit code level, we calculate the proportion of tariffed product categories under each six-digit HTS code. For instance, under the U.S. HTS-6 code 6309.29 (tents of other textile material), the corresponding sub-code includes 6306.29.11 (tents of cotton) and 6306.29.21 (tents made of other materials), with only 6306.29.11 being subject to additional tariffs. Thus, the tariffed rate for HTS code 6309.29 is 50%.Second, since the HTS-6 codes are consistent under the Harmonized System (HS) across countries, we estimate the scale of Chinese export affected by the trade war by multiplying the export data of HS-6 products by the corresponding HTS-6 tariffed rate.Third, we further adjust for provincial differences by dividing each province’s tariff-affected export scale by its total export scale.Fourth, the intensity of tariffs varied across the four rounds of the trade war. In the first three rounds, listed products were subjected to a 25% tariff, whereas the fourth round, while covering nearly all remaining U.S.-bound exports, had a lower tariff rate (7.5%), following the signing of the “Phase One” trade agreement between China and the U.S. in January 2020. To account for these differences, we assign a weight of 0.25 to the first three rounds and a weight of 0.075 to the fourth round. The weighted sum serves as a proxy variable for the provincial exposure of the U.S.-China trade war.
This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in The US–China trade war and phase one agreement, PIIE Working Paper 21-2.
If you use the data, please cite as: Bown, Chad P. (2021). The US–China trade war and phase one agreement. PIIE Working Paper 21-2. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Trump’s renewed tariffs on China are shaking up global trade. Here’s what they could mean for Australian industries facing shifting demand, prices and supply chains.
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The U.S. tariff policies on semiconductor components, including DRAM chips, have significantly impacted the global DRAM market. Tariffs, particularly on Chinese imports, have led to higher production costs for U.S. companies that rely on Chinese-manufactured DRAM.
These tariffs have increased the cost of DRAM chips, particularly for mobile phones and other electronic devices. U.S. companies that rely on Chinese suppliers for DRAM components have been forced to raise their prices or absorb higher production costs. This has resulted in increased prices for consumers and limited affordability, especially in sectors like consumer electronics and smartphones, where DRAM is a key component.
However, the demand for DRAM in mobile phones, computers, and gaming devices remains strong, ensuring continued market growth despite the tariff challenges. The U.S. tariff impact is particularly significant for the DDR SDRAM and mobile phone segments, where approximately 20-25% of the market depends on imported DRAM components.
The U.S. tariff on DRAM components has affected approximately 20-25% of the market, especially impacting sectors like mobile phones and DDR SDRAM, which heavily rely on imported DRAM chips.
➤➤➤ Get More Detailed Insights about US Tariff Impact @ https://market.us/report/dynamic-random-access-memory/free-sample/
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The U.S. semiconductor track system market has faced challenges due to tariffs on semiconductor imports, which have affected both cost structures and global sourcing strategies.
With the U.S. imposing tariffs on semiconductor components, the cost of production for semiconductor track systems has increased, particularly for memory chips and fully automatic systems, leading to higher prices for U.S. consumers and manufacturers.
The tariffs on Chinese imports, especially in semiconductor manufacturing, have disrupted global supply chains, prompting many companies to consider domestic sourcing or alternative regions. This shift may encourage more local production and increase demand for domestic manufacturing of semiconductor track systems.
However, this could also lead to a rise in operational costs for companies that rely on imported parts, potentially slowing down growth in the short term but creating opportunities for U.S.-based manufacturers to increase their market share.
➤➤➤ Get More Insights about US Tariff Impact Analysis @ https://market.us/report/semiconductor-track-system-market/free-sample/
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Graph and download economic data for U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis from China (IMPCH) from Jan 1985 to May 2025 about imports, China, goods, and USA.
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China recorded a trade surplus of 114.77 USD Billion in June of 2025. This dataset provides - China Balance of Trade - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.
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The United States' total Imports in 2024 were valued at US$3.36 Trillion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. The United States' main import partners were: Mexico, China and Canada. The top three import commodities were: Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers; Electrical, electronic equipment and Vehicles other than railway, tramway. Total Exports were valued at US$2.06 Trillion. In 2024, The United States had a trade deficit of US$1.29 Trillion.
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The United States recorded a trade deficit of 71.52 USD Billion in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Balance of Trade - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.
This dataset presents information concerning 8- and 10-digit trade codes related to the rechargeable lithium-ion battery (LIB) supply chain for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, and the United States as classified by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) rulings. Note that this dataset is not intended to be a complete or comprehensive list of trade codes for the LIB supply chain; rather, it presents trade codes from the PRC and the EU that more granularly classify products related to LIB supply chain in comparison to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). CBP rulings are included to indicate existing classification decisions for relevant products related to the LIB supply chain. Disaggregated trade codes offer more detailed insight into trade flows, supply chains, and the state of domestic and international industries. The dataset covers raw materials, refined and processed materials, battery materials, cell components, batteries and battery components, end-of-life batteries, and machinery. Tariff line information was assembled through conversations with experts and reviews of supply chain process flows in concert with an examination of trade databases, domestic trade documentation, and primary international customs import and export tariff documents.
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100070 Global import shipment records of Tariff Of with prices, volume & current Buyer's suppliers relationships based on actual Global export trade database.
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The Australian beef industry is optimistic despite U.S. tariff changes, seeing new opportunities in export markets, particularly China.
Prices were expected to change for all agri-food products in the United States due tariffs imposed on China, Mexico, and Canada in 2025. Imported products were expected to suffer the greatest price increases, but domestic products would see prices rise too, mostly due to the fact that stages of the production process might involve raw materials from other countries. Among the domestic agri-food products processed, rice would see the highest price increase, with 4.8 percent, while among imported products wheat would see the highest increase at 14.9 percent.
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The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many “bystander” countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding US and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-China tariffs identify whether a country’s exports complement or substitute US or China and its supply curve’s slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) US and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.