The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

Social services provision is countercyclical; it proliferates during economic downturns and periods of crisis when assistance and funding are most needed. The pandemic was one such crisis. It exacerbated the need for social assistance, including family counseling and crisis intervention services. Federal funding from the CARES Act supported the funding, benefiting nonprofit establishments and those qualified for government funds, supporting revenue volatility that rose from low to near-high levels, with demand experiencing a significant jump. The industry quickly adapted to meet demand because of the fragmented nature of service provision and the diversity of services offered (counseling, rehabilitation, shelter and food, crisis intervention and self-help). It expanded with growth in the number of establishments and employment. As the drop in the unemployment rate and gains in per capita disposable income offset the drop in federal funding for social services later in the period, industry-wide revenue is expected to grow at a CAGR of 6.5%, reaching $73.1 billion in 2025, including a revenue gain of 2.6% in 2025 alone. Advances in the quality and scope of telehealth have impacted industry costs, competition and services. The ability to conduct counseling sessions remotely reduces service interruption from cancellations or missed appointments, saving revenue. Telehealth innovations permit the expansion of markets, leading to economies of scale. Increased familiarity with telehealth has encouraged remote services and spurred entry, heightening competition while bringing needed services to underserved locations. Developments in artificial intelligence applications strengthen the quality of services by offering immediate strategies to clients when live respondents are unavailable. The industry is poised for growth but at a slower pace. Poverty and crime rates are forecast to drop, dampening the need for some services. The declining unemployment rate and increasing per capita disposable income will positively impact consumers’ discretionary funds. Telehealth options are expanding, but the impact of competition for skilled workers and operations costs are expected to climb and erode profit. With some reduction expected in social services expenditures - barring any significant shift in government policy away from programs that provide crisis services or drastic declines in funding for other industry services - industry revenue is expected to expand at a CAGR of 1.3% through 2030 to an estimated $78.0 billion.

According to a survey taken just over a month before the 2024 presidential election, approximately half of Americans were uneasy regarding Trump's ability to deal wisely with an international crisis. In contrast, 42 percent of the respondents exhibited confidence in the abilities of the former president.

A deep financial and economic crisis ravaged many Asian nations during 1997 and 1998. In this article, the authors examine the impact of the crisis on corporate risk for a subset of large United States firms that are included in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 stock market index. They find that the Asian crisis changed many of these firms' exposure to stock market movements -- that is, their "betas," or sensitivity to stock market risk. In particular, the extent of a firm's sales exposure to Asia appears to be an important link through which the crisis affected beta. This effect is amplified by greater financial leverage.

This data collection contains three files of United States and Soviet crises data that focus on behavior and policy responses that took place after international crises occurring in 1946-1976. The dataset contains one file of crises that were considered to be of concern to the Soviet Union, 1946-1975 (Part 1), and two files of crises data that were of concern to the United States, 1946-1976 (Parts 2 and 3). The data in Part 1 encompass 386 crises, including a subset of 101 crises (1956-1975) chosen for intensive coding. Variables include 29 general characteristics coded for the 386 crises. The subset crises were selected because of their relation to the Soviet policy process and are associated with variables for 43 Soviet management problems, 59 Soviet objectives, and 64 Soviet actions. Part 2 contains 307 crises coded into 21 crises characteristics. Part 3 contains a subset of 101 crises chosen for intensive coding from the 307 crises in Part 2. The 101 crises are associated with variables for 79 United States management problems, 48 United States objectives, and 57 United States actions. The variables for all three parts of the data collection were designed to answer questions concerning the crisis event (who, when, how did it turn out), Soviet or United States actions (what), objectives (why), and problems (what went wrong). Differences between United States and Soviet crises concerns and behavior rendered many variables drawn from research on the United States inapplicable to the Soviet research. Therefore, not all specific variables in the United States data collection are contained in the data collection for the Soviet Union and vice versa.

The statisic shows the concern among Americans around the impact of the European financial crisis on the United States economy. According to the source, 15 percent of those polled stated that they were 'not too concerned' about the impact of the European financial crisis on the U.S. economy.

ABSTRACT This work, to begin with, draws attention to the clear contrast between the intensity and evolution of the crisis of the thirties and the one that bursts into the early eighties, originating the so-called “lost decade” which, in fact and except for few exceptions, has not yet been overcome. Several main issues are emphasized. On the one hand, the incidence of the first crisis was substantially more serious than the second. On the other, the external circumstances were more disadvantageous and prolonged due to the repercussion of the crisis on the “central economies” and the incidence of the Second World War. In spite of these circumstances, most of the Latin American countries could initiate their recuperation and maintain their so-called “inward development” up to, approximately, the sixties. In the last part, after analysing different facts which influenced the evolution - mainly, the role played by the central economies in the two recalled crisis -, emphasis is made on the fact that we “live in another Latin America” and that it is necessary, above all, to constitute other socio-political agglomerations inherent to the internal and external realities of present time.

Graph and download economic data for Equity Market Volatility Tracker: Financial Crises (EMVFINCRISES) from Jan 1985 to May 2025 about volatility, uncertainty, equity, financial, and USA.

We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)

Do international lenders of last resort create financial instability by generating moral hazard? The evidence is thin and plagued with measurement error. We use the number of American troops hosted by third countries to measure the strength of American commitment to ensuring the countries’ economic health. We test several hypotheses against a dataset covering about sixty-eight countries between 1960 and 2009. Using evidence from fixed-effects and instrumental-variable models, we find that increasing the number of US troops by one standard deviation above the mean raises the probability of a financial crisis in the host country by up to 13 percentage points. We also investigate the channels through which moral hazard materializes. Countries with more US troops conduct more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, implement riskier financial regulations, and receive more capital, especially from US banks. While many scholars of international relations view the American overseas military presence as a source of stability, we identify an underexplored mechanism by which it generates instability.

Abstract The paper aims to analyze the wide range of unconventional monetary policies adopted in the U.S. since the 2007-2008 financial crises, focusing on conceptual aspects, the implementation of different programs and measures adopted by FED, and their effectiveness. It is argued that the use of credit and quasi-debt policies had significant effects on the financial conditions and on a set of macroeconomic variables in the US, such as output and employment. This result raises questions about the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy and the forward guidance, both of which were key elements in the New Macroeconomics Consensus view that preceded the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

Market Size statistics on the Family Counseling & Crisis Intervention Services industry in the US

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Jun 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

Comprehensive dataset of 4 Crisis centers in Pennsylvania, United States as of July, 2025. Includes verified contact information (email, phone), geocoded addresses, customer ratings, reviews, business categories, and operational details. Perfect for market research, lead generation, competitive analysis, and business intelligence. Download a complimentary sample to evaluate data quality and completeness.

This study examines the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission among the USA, Germany, and four major Eastern European emerging stock markets, with particular attention to the impact of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The results show that both the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission were strengthened among these markets after the crisis. The influence of Germany became noticeable on all the Eastern European markets only after the crisis but not before the crisis. We also conduct a rolling generalized VAR analysis to confirm the robustness of the main findings.

In 2022, advertising spend in the United States increased by eight percent, considering the expenditures of the country's 100 largest advertisers. Investment in advertising bounced back from 2020 when the ad industry felt the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic. That year, the U.S. 100 biggest spenders cut their budget by 7.5 percent. In general, the American ad industry has shown resilience after periods of crisis. For instance, investment in advertising shrunk by 18.2 percent in 1933, when the Great Depression reached its nadir. In 1934, ad spend rebounded by 24.5 percent. Likewise, advertising expenditures in 1943 bounced back from 1942, right after the United States entered World War II.

... The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy then provided a formal charge, asking PITAC members to concentrate their efforts on the focus, balance, and affectiveness of current Federal cyber security research and development R and D activities see Appendix A. To conduct this examination, PITAC established the Subcommittee on Cyber Security, whose work culminated in this report, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization...

ABSTRACT This paper was written in 2003-04 and aims to investigate the two cycles of US economic expansion in the late of the 20th Century and the 2001 financial crisis. For this purpose, it starts an examination of the mutations of the capital since the 1970s. In the end, it analyzes the international context and the changes in the US hegemony nature at the beginnings of the 21st Century.

The Asian financial crisis caused a decline in most states' exports of manufactured goods to East Asia during 1998, but the severity of the decline varied across states. In this article, the authors estimate the size of this export shock for all states. Primarily because western states tend to be more dependent on East Asian markets for export sales, they were hit the hardest by the sharp reduction in Asian demand for United States-produced manufactured goods. Of the states in which the decline in exports to East Asia lowered the growth of manufacturing output by more than 1 percent, two-thirds were western states. The export changes caused by the Asian crisis, however, were found to matter little for manufacturing employment growth across states during 1998. Meanwhile, states with a high concentration of manufacturing industries that use petroleum products extensively as an input tended to have larger manufacturing employment increases during 1998 than other states. Consequently, the authors conclude that the oil price declines during late 1997 and 1998, some portion of which can be attributed to the Asian crisis, appear to be more important than the export effects in influencing manufacturing employment across states.