Graph and download economic data for Fertility Rate, Total for the United States (SPDYNTFRTINUSA) from 1960 to 2023 about fertility, rate, and USA.

Today, globally, women of childbearing age have an average of approximately 2.2 children over the course of their lifetime. In pre-industrial times, most women could expect to have somewhere between five and ten live births throughout their lifetime; however, the demographic transition then sees fertility rates fall significantly. Looking ahead, it is believed that the global fertility rate will fall below replacement level in the 2050s, which will eventually lead to population decline when life expectancy plateaus. Recent decades Between the 1950s and 1970s, the global fertility rate was roughly five children per woman - this was partly due to the post-WWII baby boom in many countries, on top of already-high rates in less-developed countries. The drop around 1960 can be attributed to China's "Great Leap Forward", where famine and disease in the world's most populous country saw the global fertility rate drop by roughly 0.5 children per woman. Between the 1970s and today, fertility rates fell consistently, although the rate of decline noticeably slowed as the baby boomer generation then began having their own children. Replacement level fertility Replacement level fertility, i.e. the number of children born per woman that a population needs for long-term stability, is approximately 2.1 children per woman. Populations may continue to grow naturally despite below-replacement level fertility, due to reduced mortality and increased life expectancy, however, these will plateau with time and then population decline will occur. It is believed that the global fertility rate will drop below replacement level in the mid-2050s, although improvements in healthcare and living standards will see population growth continue into the 2080s when the global population will then start falling.

The fertility rate of a country is the average number of children that women from that country will have throughout their reproductive years. In the United States in 1800, the average woman of childbearing age would have seven children over the course of their lifetime. As factors such as technology, hygiene, medicine and education improved, women were having fewer children than before, reaching just two children per woman in 1940. This changed quite dramatically in the aftermath of the Second World War, rising sharply to over 3.5 children per woman in 1960 (children born between 1946 and 1964 are nowadays known as the 'Baby Boomer' generation, and they make up roughly twenty percent of todays US population). Due to the end of the baby boom and increased access to contraception, fertility reached it's lowest point in the US in 1980, where it was just 1.77. It did however rise to over two children per woman between 1995 and 2010, although it is expected to drop again by 2020, to just 1.78.

United States Total Fertility Rate: Black data was reported at 1,581.000 % in 2023. This records a decrease from the previous number of 1,639.000 % for 2022. United States Total Fertility Rate: Black data is updated yearly, averaging 2,062.000 % from Dec 1985 (Median) to 2023, with 39 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 2,480.000 % in 1990 and a record low of 1,581.000 % in 2023. United States Total Fertility Rate: Black data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.G013: Fertility Rate.

This paper documents a set of facts about the dramatic decline in birth rates in the United States between 2007 and 2020 and explores possible explanations for it. The overall reduction in the birth rate reflects both very large declines within certain groups of women, including teens and Hispanic women – and smaller declines among demographic groups that comprise a large population share, including college-educated white women. We explore potential economic, policy, and social factors that might be responsible for the overall decline. We conclude from our empirical examination of possible factors that there is not a readily identifiable economic or policy factor or set of factors this is likely responsible for a substantial share of the decline. Instead, the patterns observed suggest that widespread, hard to quantify changes in preferences for having children, aspirations for life, and the nature of parenting are more likely behind the recent decline in US births. We conclude with a brief discussion about the societal consequences for a declining birth rate and what the United States might do about it.

The statistic shows the 20 countries with the lowest fertility rates in 2024. All figures are estimates. In 2024, the fertility rate in Taiwan was estimated to be at 1.11 children per woman, making it the lowest fertility rate worldwide. Fertility rate The fertility rate is the average number of children born per woman of child-bearing age in a country. Usually, a woman aged between 15 and 45 is considered to be in her child-bearing years. The fertility rate of a country provides an insight into its economic state, as well as the level of health and education of its population. Developing countries usually have a higher fertility rate due to lack of access to birth control and contraception, and to women usually foregoing a higher education, or even any education at all, in favor of taking care of housework. Many families in poorer countries also need their children to help provide for the family by starting to work early and/or as caretakers for their parents in old age. In developed countries, fertility rates and birth rates are usually much lower, as birth control is easier to obtain and women often choose a career before becoming a mother. Additionally, if the number of women of child-bearing age declines, so does the fertility rate of a country. As can be seen above, countries like Hong Kong are a good example for women leaving the patriarchal structures and focusing on their own career instead of becoming a mother at a young age, causing a decline of the country’s fertility rate. A look at the fertility rate per woman worldwide by income group also shows that women with a low income tend to have more children than those with a high income. The United States are neither among the countries with the lowest, nor among those with the highest fertility rate, by the way. At 2.08 children per woman, the fertility rate in the US has been continuously slightly below the global average of about 2.4 children per woman over the last decade.

The total fertility rate of the world has dropped from around five children per woman in 1950, to 2.2 children per woman in 2025, which means that women today are having fewer than half the number of children that women did 75 years ago. Replacement level fertility This change has come as a result of the global demographic transition, and is influenced by factors such as the significant reduction in infant and child mortality, reduced number of child marriages, increased educational and vocational opportunities for women, and the increased efficacy and availability of contraception. While this change has become synonymous with societal progress, it does have wide-reaching demographic impact - if the global average falls below replacement level (roughly 2.1 children per woman), as is expected to happen in the 2050s, then this will lead to long-term population decline on a global scale. Regional variations When broken down by continent, Africa is the only region with a fertility rate above the global average, and, alongside Oceania, it is the only region with a fertility rate above replacement level. Until the 1980s, the average woman in Africa could expect to have 6-7 children over the course of their lifetime, and there are still several countries in Africa where women can still expect to have five or more children in 2025. Historically, Europe has had the lowest fertility rates in the world over the past century, falling below replacement level in 1975. Europe's population has grown through a combination of migration and increasing life expectancy, however even high immigration rates could not prevent its population from going into decline in 2021.

This data set contains estimated teen birth rates for age group 15–19 (expressed per 1,000 females aged 15–19) by county and year.

DEFINITIONS

Estimated teen birth rate: Model-based estimates of teen birth rates for age group 15–19 (expressed per 1,000 females aged 15–19) for a specific county and year. Estimated county teen birth rates were obtained using the methods described elsewhere (1,2,3,4). These annual county-level teen birth estimates “borrow strength” across counties and years to generate accurate estimates where data are sparse due to small population size (1,2,3,4). The inferential method uses information—including the estimated teen birth rates from neighboring counties across years and the associated explanatory variables—to provide a stable estimate of the county teen birth rate. Median teen birth rate: The middle value of the estimated teen birth rates for the age group 15–19 for counties in a state. Bayesian credible intervals: A range of values within which there is a 95% probability that the actual teen birth rate will fall, based on the observed teen births data and the model.

NOTES

Data on the number of live births for women aged 15–19 years were extracted from the National Center for Health Statistics’ (NCHS) National Vital Statistics System birth data files for 2003–2015 (5).

Population estimates were extracted from the files containing intercensal and postcensal bridged-race population estimates provided by NCHS. For each year, the July population estimates were used, with the exception of the year of the decennial census, 2010, for which the April estimates were used.

Hierarchical Bayesian space–time models were used to generate hierarchical Bayesian estimates of county teen birth rates for each year during 2003–2015 (1,2,3,4).

The Bayesian analogue of the frequentist confidence interval is defined as the Bayesian credible interval. A 100*(1-α)% Bayesian credible interval for an unknown parameter vector θ and observed data vector y is a subset C of parameter space Ф such that 1-α≤P({C│y})=∫p{θ │y}dθ, where integration is performed over the set and is replaced by summation for discrete components of θ. The probability that θ lies in C given the observed data y is at least (1- α) (6).

County borders in Alaska changed, and new counties were formed and others were merged, during 2003–2015. These changes were reflected in the population files but not in the natality files. For this reason, two counties in Alaska were collapsed so that the birth and population counts were comparable. Additionally, Kalawao County, a remote island county in Hawaii, recorded no births, and census estimates indicated a denominator of 0 (i.e., no females between the ages of 15 and 19 years residing in the county from 2003 through 2015). For this reason, Kalawao County was removed from the analysis. Also , Bedford City, Virginia, was added to Bedford County in 2015 and no longer appears in the mortality file in 2015. For consistency, Bedford City was merged with Bedford County, Virginia, for the entire 2003–2015 period. Final analysis was conducted on 3,137 counties for each year from 2003 through 2015. County boundaries are consistent with the vintage 2005–2007 bridged-race population file geographies (7).

In 2025, there are six countries, all in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average woman of childbearing age can expect to have between 5-6 children throughout their lifetime. In fact, of the 20 countries in the world with the highest fertility rates, Afghanistan and Yemen are the only countries not found in Sub-Saharan Africa. High fertility rates in Africa With a fertility rate of almost six children per woman, Chad is the country with the highest fertility rate in the world. Population growth in Chad is among the highest in the world. Lack of healthcare access, as well as food instability, political instability, and climate change, are all exacerbating conditions that keep Chad's infant mortality rates high, which is generally the driver behind high fertility rates. This situation is common across much of the continent, and, although there has been considerable progress in recent decades, development in Sub-Saharan Africa is not moving as quickly as it did in other regions. Demographic transition While these countries have the highest fertility rates in the world, their rates are all on a generally downward trajectory due to a phenomenon known as the demographic transition. The third stage (of five) of this transition sees birth rates drop in response to decreased infant and child mortality, as families no longer feel the need to compensate for lost children. Eventually, fertility rates fall below replacement level (approximately 2.1 children per woman), which eventually leads to natural population decline once life expectancy plateaus. In some of the most developed countries today, low fertility rates are creating severe econoic and societal challenges as workforces are shrinking while aging populations are placin a greater burden on both public and personal resources.

Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander women had the highest fertility rate of any ethnicity in the United States in 2022, with about 2,237.5 births per 1,000 women. The fertility rate for all ethnicities in the U.S. was 1,656.5 births per 1,000 women. What is the total fertility rate? The total fertility rate is an estimation of the number of children who would theoretically be born per 1,000 women through their childbearing years (generally considered to be between the ages of 15 and 44) according to age-specific fertility rates. The fertility rate is different from the birth rate, in that the birth rate is the number of births in relation to the population over a specific period of time. Fertility rates around the world Fertility rates around the world differ on a country-by-country basis, and more industrialized countries tend to see lower fertility rates. For example, Niger topped the list of the countries with the highest fertility rates, and Taiwan had the lowest fertility rate.

The average for 2022 based on 195 countries was 18.38 births per 1000 people. The highest value was in Niger: 45.03 births per 1000 people and the lowest value was in Hong Kong: 4.4 births per 1000 people. The indicator is available from 1960 to 2022. Below is a chart for all countries where data are available.

In 2024, the fertility rate in Africa was *** children per woman. The average number of newborn infants per woman on the continent decreased compared to 2000, when women had approximately **** children throughout their reproductive years. By 2030, fertility in Africa is projected to decline to around *** births per woman, yet it will remain high. The highest fertility rate worldwide Despite its gradually declining rate, fertility in Africa is the highest in the world. In 2021, the average fertility rate on the continent stood at **** children per woman, compared to a global average of **** births per woman. In contrast, Europe and North America were the continents with the lowest proportion of newborns, each registering a fertility rate below two children per woman. Additionally, Africa records the highest fertility rate among the young female population aged 15 to 19 years. In 2021, West and Central Africa had an adolescent fertility rate of *** children per 1,000 girls, the highest value worldwide. Lower fertility in Northern Africa Fertility levels vary significantly across Africa. In 2021, Niger, Somalia, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were the countries with the highest fertility rates on the continent. In those countries, women had an average of over *** children in their reproductive years. The number of adolescent girls giving birth also differed within Africa. For instance, the adolescent fertility rate in North Africa stood at around **** children per 1,000 young women in 2023. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan Africa registered a higher rate of ****** children per 1,000 girls in 2021. In general, higher poverty levels, inadequate social and health conditions, and increased infant mortality are some main drivers of higher fertility rates.

In 2021, the birth rate in the United States was highest in families that had under 10,000 U.S. dollars in income per year, at 62.75 births per 1,000 women. As the income scale increases, the birth rate decreases, with families making 200,000 U.S. dollars or more per year having the second-lowest birth rate, at 47.57 births per 1,000 women. Income and the birth rate Income and high birth rates are strongly linked, not just in the United States, but around the world. Women in lower income brackets tend to have higher birth rates across the board. There are many factors at play in birth rates, such as the education level of the mother, ethnicity of the mother, and even where someone lives. The fertility rate in the United States The fertility rate in the United States has declined in recent years, and it seems that more and more women are waiting longer to begin having children. Studies have shown that the average age of the mother at the birth of their first child in the United States was 27.4 years old, although this figure varies for different ethnic origins.

Over the past 30 years, the birth rate in the United States has been steadily declining, and in 2023, there were 10.7 births per 1,000 of the population. In 1990, this figure stood at 16.7 births per 1,000 of the population. Demographics have an impact The average birth rate in the U.S. may be falling, but when broken down along ethnic and economic lines, a different picture is painted: Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander women saw the highest birth rate in 2022 among all ethnicities, and Asian women and white women both saw the lowest birth rate. Additionally, the higher the family income, the lower the birth rate; families making between 15,000 and 24,999 U.S. dollars annually had the highest birth rate of any income bracket in the States. Life expectancy at birth In addition to the declining birth rate in the U.S., the total life expectancy at birth has also reached its lowest value recently. Studies have shown that the life expectancy of both men and women in the United States has been declining over the last few years. Declines in life expectancy, like declines in birth rates, may indicate that there are social and economic factors negatively influencing the overall population health and well-being of the country.

This collection contains information on county-level vital events that occurred in the United States from 1915-2007. When sources allow, data are disaggregated by county of occurrence, county of residence, and race. The data include information on vital events such as the number of infant deaths, births to unmarried women, births in the presence of hospital attendants, and infant birth weight.

Number and percentage of live births, by month of birth, 1991 to most recent year.

In 1970, the United States' birth rate was slightly higher than that of the Soviet Union, at 18.2 births per thousand people compared to 17.4 respectively. Over the subsequent two decades, the U.S.' rate would fall below 16 births per thousand people, whereas the USSR's rate would climb to 19.4 births per thousand people in 1985, before falling rather sharply in the late 1980s.

This dataset contains a variety of demographic measures (related to fertility, marriage, mortality and migration), plus a range of socio-economic indicators (related to households, age structure, and social class) for the 2000+ Registration Sub Districts (RSDs) in England and Wales for each census year between 1851 and 1911, and for the 600+ Registration Districts of Scotland 1851-1901. The measures have mainly been derived from the computerised individual level census enumerators' books (and household schedules for 1911) enhanced under the I-CeM project. I-CeM does not currently include data for England and Wales 1871, although the project has been able to access a version of the data for that year it does not contain information necessary to calculate many of the variables presented here. Scotland 1911 is also not available. Users should therefore beware that 1871 does not contain data for many of the variables. Additional data has been derived from the tables summarising numbers of births and deaths by year and areas, which were published by the Registrar General of England and Wales in his quarterly, annual and decennial reports of births, deaths and marriages. Data from the decennial reports was obtained from Woods (SN 3552) and we transcribed data from the quarterly and annual reports ourselves. Counts of births and deaths for Scottish Registration Districts were obtained from the Digitising Scotland project at the University of Edinburgh. The dataset builds on SN 8613 and SN 853547 which provide data for a more limited set of variables and for England and Wales only (the same dataset also has two UKDS SN numbers as it was re-routed by UKDS during the deposit process).

This project will present the first historic population geography of Great Britain during the late nineteenth century. This was a period of unprecedented demographic change, when both mortality and fertility started the dramatic secular declines of the first demographic transition. National trends are well established: mortality decline started in childhood and early adulthood, with infant mortality lagging behind, particularly in urban-industrial areas. The fall in fertility was led by the middle classes but quickly spread throughout society. Urban growth was fuelled by movement from the countryside to the city, but there was also considerable migration overseas, particularly from Scotland, although to some extent outmigration was offset by immigration. There was local and regional variation in these patterns, and a contrast between the demographic experiences of Scotland and of England and Wales. Marriage was later in Scotland but fertility within marriage higher, and the improvement in Scottish mortality was slower than that south of the border. However, while there has been research on local and regional patterns within each country, these have mainly been pursued separately, and it is therefore unclear whether there were real national differences or whether there were local demographic continuities across borders, and if so whether they followed economic, occupational, cultural or even linguistic lines. Understanding population processes involves a holistic appreciation of the interaction between the basic demographic components of fertility, mortality, nuptiality and migration, and how they come together, interacting with economic and cultural processes, to create a specific demographic system via the spread of people and ideas. This project is the first to consider a historical population geography of the whole of Great Britain across the first demographic transition, drawing together measures of nuptiality, fertility, mortality and migration for small geographic areas and unpacking how they interacted to produce the more readily available broad-brush national patterns for Scotland and for England and Wales.

We will build on our immensely successful project on the fertility of Victorian England and Wales, which used complete count census data for England and Wales to calculate more detailed fertility measures than ever previously possible for some 2000 small geographic areas and 8 social groups, allowing the investigation of intra-urban as well as urban-rural differences in fertility. The new measures allowed us to examine age patterns of fertility across the two countries for the first time. We were also able to calculate contextual variables from the census data which allowed us to undertake spatial analysis of the influences on fertility over time. As well as academic papers, our previous project presented summary data at a fine spatial resolution in an interactive online atlas, populationspast.org, a major new resource which is already being widely used as a teaching tool in both schools and universities.

In this new project we will calculate comparable measures of fertility and contextual variables using the full count census data for Scotland, 1851 to 1901 inclusive, to complement those for England and Wales....

For most of the past two centuries, falling birth rates have been associated with societal progress. During the demographic transition, where pre-industrial societies modernize in terms of fertility and mortality, falling death rates, especially among infants and children, are the first major change. In response, as more children survive into adulthood, women have fewer children as the need to compensate for child mortality declines. This transition has happened at different times across the world and is an ongoing process, with early industrial countries being the first to transition, and Sub-Saharan African countries being the most recent to do so. Additionally, some Asian countries (particularly China through government policy) have gone through their demographic transitions at a much faster pace than those deemed more developed. Today, in countries such as Japan, Italy, and Germany, birth rates have fallen well below death rates; this is no longer considered a positive demographic trend, as it leads to natural population decline, and may create an over-aged population that could place a burden on healthcare systems.

The intensive cultivation practices of annual cereal crops have been causing unprecedented degradation of natural resources. Perennial crops such as intermediate wheatgrass (IWG) could provide numerous benefits to address these issues, but there is still little comprehensive information about the establishment, fertilization needs, or range of IWG productivity on a regional basis in the first production year, which can be the highest over the lifespan of IWG’s grain production. The objective of this study was to evaluate how IWG establishment and first-year grain and forage yields varied across soil types, climate conditions, and in response ten fertilization treatments at six locations in the Midwestern USA. The 10 treatments included N fertilizer application at 5 rates; N application with or without P or K; varied timing of N application, and varied N fertilizer source. We found that fertilization influenced summer and fall forage yields but not grain yields. We also found that grain and forage yields varied greatly between locations, ranging from 556–1343 kg ha-1 for grain yields, 3732–8930 kg ha-1 for summer forage, and 927–3561 kg ha-1 for fall forage yields. Using a multiple linear regression approach, we found that a combination of local edaphic soil and climate factors explained 74%, 92%, and 69% of variance in grain, summer forage, and fall forage yields, respectively. Anomalies in expected and actual yields across locations led us to identify potential critical periods for IWG grain and forage production. We found accumulated precipitation in the 60 days before anthesis explained the most variance in grain and summer forage yields while the accumulated precipitation from May through October explained the most variance in fall forage yields. These findings are a first step toward identifying the regional expectations for IWG yields and could inform grower management and decisions regarding grain and forage harvest.