The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USRECD) from 1854-12-01 to 2025-07-10 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

United States Recession Probability data was reported at 14.120 % in Oct 2019. This records a decrease from the previous number of 14.505 % for Sep 2019. United States Recession Probability data is updated monthly, averaging 7.668 % from Jan 1960 (Median) to Oct 2019, with 718 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 95.405 % in Dec 1981 and a record low of 0.080 % in Sep 1983. United States Recession Probability data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S021: Recession Probability.

Graph and download economic data for Equity Market Volatility Tracker: Financial Crises (EMVFINCRISES) from Jan 1985 to May 2025 about volatility, uncertainty, equity, financial, and USA.

Abstract The paper aims to analyze the wide range of unconventional monetary policies adopted in the U.S. since the 2007-2008 financial crises, focusing on conceptual aspects, the implementation of different programs and measures adopted by FED, and their effectiveness. It is argued that the use of credit and quasi-debt policies had significant effects on the financial conditions and on a set of macroeconomic variables in the US, such as output and employment. This result raises questions about the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy and the forward guidance, both of which were key elements in the New Macroeconomics Consensus view that preceded the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

The statisic shows the concern among Americans around the impact of the European financial crisis on the United States economy. According to the source, 15 percent of those polled stated that they were 'not too concerned' about the impact of the European financial crisis on the U.S. economy.

Do international lenders of last resort create financial instability by generating moral hazard? The evidence is thin and plagued with measurement error. We use the number of American troops hosted by third countries to measure the strength of American commitment to ensuring the countries’ economic health. We test several hypotheses against a dataset covering about sixty-eight countries between 1960 and 2009. Using evidence from fixed-effects and instrumental-variable models, we find that increasing the number of US troops by one standard deviation above the mean raises the probability of a financial crisis in the host country by up to 13 percentage points. We also investigate the channels through which moral hazard materializes. Countries with more US troops conduct more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, implement riskier financial regulations, and receive more capital, especially from US banks. While many scholars of international relations view the American overseas military presence as a source of stability, we identify an underexplored mechanism by which it generates instability.

The Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, reaching its lowest point in June 2009. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, during which a number of systemically critical financial institutions failed or came close to bankruptcy. The crisis in the financial sector quickly spread to the non-financial economy, where firms were adversely hit by the tightening of credit conditions and the drop in consumer confidence caused by the crisis. The largest monthly drop in the IPI came in September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. government was forced to step in to backstop the financial sector. Industrial production would begin to recover in the Summer of 2009, but remained far below its pre-crisis levels.

This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and Its Long-Term Impact: An Interrupted Time-Series Natural Experimental Analysis" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.

The financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 brought a sharp increase in the number of bank failures in the United States. This article investigates characteristics of banks that failed and regional patterns in bank failure rates during 2007-2010. The article compares the recent experience with that of 1987-1992, when the United States last experienced a high number of bank failures.

The Great Recession was a period of economic contraction which came in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent bankruptcies among Wall Street financial institutions, the most significant of which being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. These economic convulsions caused consumer confidence, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), to drop sharply in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. How does the Consumer Confidence Index work? The CCI measures household's expectation of their future economic situation and, consequently, their likely future spending and savings decisions. A score of 100 in the index would indicate a neutral economic outlook, with consumers neither being optimistic nor pessimistic about the near future. Scores below 100 are then more pessimistic, while scores above 100 indicate optimism about the economy. Consumer confidence can have a self-fulfilling effect on the economy, as when consumers are pessimistic about the economy, they tend to save and postpone spending, contracting aggregate demand and causing the economy to slow down. Conversely, when consumers are optimistic and willing to spend, this can have a reinforcing effect as wages and employment may rise when consumers spend more. CCI and the Great Recession As the reality of the trouble which the U.S. financial sector was in set in over 2007, consumer confidence dropped sharply from being slightly positive, to being deeply pessimistic by the Summer of 2008. While confidence began to slowly rebound up until September 2008, with the panic caused by Lehman's bankruptcy and the freezing of new credit creation, the CCI plummeted once more, reaching its lowest point during the recession in February 2008. The U.S. government stepped in to prevent the bankruptcy of AIG in 2008, promising to do the same for any future possible failures in the financial system. This 'backstopping' policy, whereby the government assured that the economy would not be allowed to fall further into crisis, along with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies used to restart the economy, contributed to a rebound in consumer confidence in 2009 and 2010. In spite of this, consumers still remained pessimistic about the economy.

A deep financial and economic crisis ravaged many Asian nations during 1997 and 1998. In this article, the authors examine the impact of the crisis on corporate risk for a subset of large United States firms that are included in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 stock market index. They find that the Asian crisis changed many of these firms' exposure to stock market movements -- that is, their "betas," or sensitivity to stock market risk. In particular, the extent of a firm's sales exposure to Asia appears to be an important link through which the crisis affected beta. This effect is amplified by greater financial leverage.

Countries become more politically polarized and fractionalized following financial crises, reducing the likelihood of major financial reforms precisely when they might have especially large benefits. The evidence from a large sample of countries provides strong support for the hypotheses that following a financial crisis, voters become more ideologically extreme and ruling coalitions become weaker, independently of whether they were initially in power. The evidence that increased polarization and weaker governments reduce the chances of financial reform and that financial crises lead to legislative gridlock and anemic reform is less clear-cut. The US debt overhang resolution is discussed as an illustration.

This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Effects: An Interrupted Time-Series Analysis of the Impact of its Quantitative Easing Programs" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.

ABSTRACT This paper was written in 2003-04 and aims to investigate the two cycles of US economic expansion in the late of the 20th Century and the 2001 financial crisis. For this purpose, it starts an examination of the mutations of the capital since the 1970s. In the end, it analyzes the international context and the changes in the US hegemony nature at the beginnings of the 21st Century.

Continued consolidation of the US banking industry and a general increase in the size of banks have prompted some policymakers to consider policies that discourage banks from getting larger, including explicit caps on bank size. However, limits on the size of banks could entail economic costs if they prevent banks from achieving economies of scale. This paper presents new estimates of returns to scale for US banks based on nonparametric, local-linear estimation of bank cost, revenue, and profit functions. We report estimates for both 2006 and 2015 to compare returns to scale some 7 years after the financial crisis and 5 years after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act with returns to scale before the crisis. We find that a high percentage of banks faced increasing returns to scale in cost in both years, including most of the 10 largest bank holding companies. Also, while returns to scale in revenue and profit vary more across banks, we find evidence that the largest four banks operate under increasing returns to scale.

This study examines the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission among the USA, Germany, and four major Eastern European emerging stock markets, with particular attention to the impact of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The results show that both the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission were strengthened among these markets after the crisis. The influence of Germany became noticeable on all the Eastern European markets only after the crisis but not before the crisis. We also conduct a rolling generalized VAR analysis to confirm the robustness of the main findings.