This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.

This study employs a CES production function to construct a theoretical model of labor income share and uses a two-way fixed effects model to test the causal effects of local government debt (LGD) on the labor income share of enterprises. Local government debt governance policies are utilized as exogenous shocks, and a DID (Difference-in-Differences) model is applied for endogeneity testing. The results have passed a series of robustness checks. The findings suggest that LGD decreases the share of firms’ labor income. The mechanism analysis suggests that LGD lowers the labor remuneration of residents, the employment of labor in enterprises, and the size of bank loans mainly; while raising the cost of using funds in enterprises. Moreover, this negative effect is more apparent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises with high financing constraints. This study presents new evidence on how the labor income share of enterprises is affected from the perspective by local governments in China. It has important implications for further deepening local government debt governance and achieving common prosperity.