The following dashboards provide data on contagious respiratory viruses, including acute respiratory diseases, COVID-19, influenza (flu), and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) in Massachusetts. The data presented here can help track trends in respiratory disease and vaccination activity across Massachusetts.

Find local risk levels for Eastern Equine Encephalitis (EEE) and West Nile Virus (WNV) based on seasonal testing from June to October.

The table includes 1 products with the active ingredient Influenza A Virus A/massachusetts/18/2022 (h3n2) Recombinant Hemagglutinin Antigen.

The main entity of this document is a taxonomy with accession number 1865945

This dataset is no longer being updated as of 6/30/2022. It is being retained on the Open Data Portal for its potential historical interest.

In November 2020, the City of Cambridge began collecting and analyzing COVID-19 data from municipal wastewater, which can serve as an early indicator of increased COVID-19 infections in the city. The Cambridge Public Health Department and Cambridge Department of Public Works are using technology developed by Biobot, a Cambridge based company, and partnering with the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA). This Cambridge wastewater surveillance initiative is funded through a $175,000 appropriation from the Cambridge City Council.

This dataset indicates the presence of the COVID-19 virus (measured as viral RNA particles from the novel coronavirus per ml) in municipal wastewater. The Cambridge site data here were collected as a 24-hour composite sample, which is taken weekly. The MWRA site data ere were collected as a 24-hour composite sample, which is taken daily. MWRA and Cambridge data are listed here in a single table.

An interactive graph of this data is available here: https://cityofcambridge.shinyapps.io/COVID19/?tab=wastewater

All areas within the City of Cambridge are captured across four separate catchment areas (or sewersheds) as indicated on the map viewable here: https://cityofcambridge.shinyapps.io/COVID19/_w_484790f7/BioBot_Sites.png. The North and West Cambridge sample also includes nearly all of Belmont and very small areas of Arlington and Somerville (light yellow). The remaining collection sites are entirely -- or almost entirely -- drawn from Cambridge households and workplaces.

Data are corrected for wastewater flow rate, which adjusts for population in general. Data listed are expected to reflect the burden of COVID-19 infections within each of the four sewersheds. A lag of approximately 4-7 days will occur before new transmissions captured in wastewater data would result in a positive PCR test for COVID-19, the most common testing method used. While this wastewater surveillance tool can provide an early indication of major changes in transmission within the community, it remains an emerging technology. In assessing community transmission, wastewater surveillance data should only be considered in conjunction with other clinical measures, such as current infection rates and test positivity.

Each location is selected because it reflects input from a distinct catchment area (or sewershed) as identified on the color-coded map. Viral data collected from small catchment areas like these four Cambridge sites are more variable than data collected from central collection points (e.g., the MWRA facility on Deer Island) where wastewater from dozens of communities are joined and mixed. Data from each catchment area will be impacted by daily activity among individuals living in that area (e.g., working from home vs. traveling to work) and by daytime activities that are not from residences (businesses, schools, etc.) As such, the Regional MWRA data provides a more stable measure of regional viral counts. COVID wastewater data for Boston North and Boston South regions is available at https://www.mwra.com/biobot/biobotdata.htm

Unusually large outbreaks of mumps across the United States in 2016 and 2017 raised questions about the extent of mumps circulation and the relationship between these and prior outbreaks. We paired epidemiological data from public health investigations with analysis of mumps virus whole genome sequences from 201 infected individuals, focusing on Massachusetts university communities. Our analysis suggests continuous, undetected circulation of mumps locally and nationally, including multiple independent introductions into Massachusetts and into individual communities. Despite the presence of these multiple mumps virus lineages, the genomic data show that one lineage has dominated in the US since at least 2006. Widespread transmission was surprising given high vaccination rates, but we found no genetic evidence that variants arising during this outbreak contributed to vaccine escape. Viral genomic data allowed us to reconstruct mumps transmission links not evident from epidemiological data or standard single-gene surveillance efforts and also revealed connections between apparently unrelated mumps outbreaks.

Note: After November 1, 2024, this dataset will no longer be updated due to a transition in NHSN Hospital Respiratory Data reporting that occurred on Friday, November 1, 2024. For more information on NHSN Hospital Respiratory Data reporting, please visit https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/psc/hospital-respiratory-reporting.html.

Due to a recent update in voluntary NHSN Hospital Respiratory Data reporting that occurred on Wednesday, October 9, 2024, reporting levels and other data displayed on this page may fluctuate week-over-week beginning Friday, October 18, 2024. For more information on NHSN Hospital Respiratory Data reporting, please visit https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/psc/hospital-respiratory-reporting.html. Find more information about the updated CMS requirements: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/28/2024-17021/medicare-and-medicaid-programs-and-the-childrens-health-insurance-program-hospital-inpatient. 
. This dataset represents weekly respiratory virus-related hospitalization data and metrics aggregated to national and state/territory levels reported during two periods: 1) data for collection dates from August 1, 2020 to April 30, 2024, represent data reported by hospitals during a mandated reporting period as specified by the HHS Secretary; and 2) data for collection dates beginning May 1, 2024, represent data reported voluntarily by hospitals to CDC’s National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). NHSN monitors national and local trends in healthcare system stress and capacity for up to approximately 6,000 hospitals in the United States. Data reported represent aggregated counts and include metrics capturing information specific to COVID-19- and influenza-related hospitalizations, hospital occupancy, and hospital capacity. Find more information about reporting to NHSN at: https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/covid19/hospital-reporting.html

Source: COVID-19 hospitalization data reported to CDC’s National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN).

• Data source description(updated October 18, 2024): As of October 9, 2024, Hospital Respiratory Data (HRD; formerly Respiratory Pathogen, Hospital Capacity, and Supply data or ‘COVID-19 hospital data’) are reported to HHS through CDC’s National Healthcare Safety Network based on updated requirements from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). These data are voluntarily reported to NHSN as of May 1, 2024 until November 1, 2024, at which time CMS will require acute care and critical access hospitals to electronically report information via NHSN about COVID-19, Influenza, and RSV, hospital bed census and capacity, and limited patient demographic information, including age. Data for collection dates prior to May 1, 2024, represent data reported during a previously mandated reporting period as specified by the HHS Secretary. Data for collection dates May 1, 2024, and onwards represent data reported voluntarily to NHSN; as such, data included represents reporting hospitals only for a given week and might not be complete or representative of all hospitals. NHSN monitors national and local trends in healthcare system stress and capacity for approximately 6,000 hospitals in the United States. Data reported by hospitals to NHSN represent aggregated counts and include metrics capturing information specific to hospital capacity, occupancy, hospitalizations, and admissions. Find more information about reporting to NHSN: https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/psc/hospital-respiratory-reporting.html. Find more information about the updated CMS requirements: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/28/2024-17021/medicare-and-medicaid-programs-and-the-childrens-health-insurance-program-hospital-inpatient.
• Data quality: While CDC reviews reported data for completeness and errors and corrects those found, some reporting errors might still exist within the data. CDC and partners work with reporters to correct these errors and update the data in subsequent weeks. Data since December 1, 2020, have had error correction methodology applied; data prior to this date may have anomalies that are not yet resolved. Data prior to August 1, 2020, are unavailable.
• Metrics and inclusion criteria: Many hospital subtypes, including acute care and critical access hospitals, are included in the metric calculations included in this dataset. Psychiatric, rehabilitation, and religious non-medical hospital types, as well as Veterans Administration, Defense Health Agency, and Indian Health Service hospitals, are excluded from calculations. For a given metric calculation, hospitals that reported those data at least one day during a given week are included.
• Find full details on NHSN hospital data reporting guidance at https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-reporting.pdf

Notes: May 10, 2024: Due to missing hospital data for the April 28, 2024 through May 4, 2024 reporting period, data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are not available for this period in the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on May 10, 2024.

May 17, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), Minnesota (MN), and Guam (GU) for the May 5,2024 through May 11, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on May 1, 2024.

May 24, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), and Minnesota (MN) for the May 12, 2024 through May 18, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on May 24, 2024.

May 31, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Virgin Islands (VI), Massachusetts (MA), and Minnesota (MN) for the May 19, 2024 through May 25, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on May 31, 2024.

June 7, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Virgin Islands (VI), Massachusetts (MA), Guam (GU), and Minnesota (MN) for the May 26, 2024 through June 1, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on June 7, 2024.

June 14, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), and Minnesota (MN) for the June 2, 2024 through June 8, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on June 14, 2024.

June 21, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), West Virginia (WV), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Guam (GU), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the June 9, 2024 through June 15, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on June 21, 2024.

June 28, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the June 16, 2024 through June 22, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on June 28, 2024.

July 5, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), West Virginia (WV), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the June 23, 2024 through June 29, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on July 5, 2024.

July 12, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), West Virginia (WV), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the June 30, 2024 through July 6 , 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on July 12, 2024.

July 19, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the July 7, 2024 through July 13, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on July 19, 2024.

July 26, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the July 13, 2024 through July 20, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on July 26, 2024.

August 2, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), West Virginia (WV), and Minnesota (MN) for the July 21, 2024 through July 27, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on August 2, 2024.

August 9, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), Guam (GU), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the July 28, 2024 through August 3, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on August 9, 2024.

August 16, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the August 4, 2024 through August 10, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics report released on August 16, 2024.

August 23, 2024: Data for Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Massachusetts (MA), American Samoa (AS), Virgin Islands (VI), and Minnesota (MN) for the August 11, 2024 through August 17, 2024 reporting period are not available for the Weekly NHSN Hospitalization Metrics

This dataset includes COVID-19 Weekly and Daily Cases by Town in Massachusetts, representing counts of daily new positive infections and cumulative sum since the start of the pandemic for each one of the 351 in Massachusetts. The data span is April 1st, 2020 to January 19th, 2021 for the dataset Daily_Town_COVID19_MA.csv, and April 14th, 2020 to January 21st, 2021 for the dataset Weekly_Town_COVID19_MA.csv. The original data were extracted from the Department of Public Health (DPH). The weekly dataset was created as part of the Northeastern University seed grant NU SVPR COVID-19: “Decision Support in Combating the Virus. Anticipating the next virus hot spot: Threats to Armed Forces and citizens”. (Note: The authorship is alphabetical when excluding the first and last authors.)

This dataset represents preliminary estimates of cumulative U.S. RSV –associated disease burden estimates for the 2024-2025 season, including outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and deaths. Real-time estimates are preliminary and based on continuously collected surveillance data from patients hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infections. The data come from the Respiratory Syncytial Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RSV-NET), a surveillance platform that captures data from hospitals that serve about 8% of the U.S. population. Each week CDC estimates a range (i.e., lower estimate and an upper estimate) of RSV-associated disease burden estimates that have occurred since October 1, 2024.

Note: Data are preliminary and subject to change as more data become available. Rates for recent RSV-associated hospital admissions are subject to reporting delays; as new data are received each week, previous rates are updated accordingly.

Note: Preliminary burden estimates are not inclusive of data from all RSV-NET sites. Due to model limitations, sites with small sample sizes can impact estimates in unpredictable ways and are excluded for the benefit of model stability. CDC is working to address model limitations and include data from all sites in final burden estimates.

References

1. Reed C, Chaves SS, Daily Kirley P, et al. Estimating influenza disease burden from population-based surveillance data in the United States. PLoS One. 2015;10(3):e0118369. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118369 
2. Rolfes, MA, Foppa, IM, Garg, S, et al. Annual estimates of the burden of seasonal influenza in the United States: A tool for strengthening influenza surveillance and preparedness. Influenza Other Respi Viruses. 2018; 12: 132– 137. https://doi.org/10.1111/irv.12486
3. Tokars JI, Rolfes MA, Foppa IM, Reed C. An evaluation and update of methods for estimating the number of influenza cases averted by vaccination in the United States. Vaccine. 2018;36(48):7331-7337. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2018.10.026 
4. Collier SA, Deng L, Adam EA, Benedict KM, Beshearse EM, Blackstock AJ, Bruce BB, Derado G, Edens C, Fullerton KE, Gargano JW, Geissler AL, Hall AJ, Havelaar AH, Hill VR, Hoekstra RM, Reddy SC, Scallan E, Stokes EK, Yoder JS, Beach MJ. Estimate of Burden and Direct Healthcare Cost of Infectious Waterborne Disease in the United States. Emerg Infect Dis. 2021 Jan;27(1):140-149. doi: 10.3201/eid2701.190676. PMID: 33350905; PMCID: PMC7774540.
5. Reed C, Kim IK, Singleton JA,  et al. Estimated influenza illnesses and hospitalizations averted by vaccination–United States, 2013-14 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2014 Dec 12;63(49):1151-4. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6349a2.htm 
6. Reed C, Angulo FJ, Swerdlow DL, et al. Estimates of the Prevalence of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, United States, April–July 2009. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009;15(12):2004-2007. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1512.091413  
7. Devine O, Pham H, Gunnels B, et al. Extrapolating Sentinel Surveillance Information to Estimate National COVID-19 Hospital Admission Rates: A Bayesian Modeling Approach. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/irv.70026. Volume18, Issue10. October 2024.
8. https://www.cdc.gov/covid/php/covid-net/index.html">COVID-NET | COVID-19 | CDC 
9. https://www.cdc.gov/covid/hcp/clinical-care/systematic-review-process.html 
10. https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/1/3/pgac079/6604394?login=false">Excess natural-cause deaths in California by cause and setting: March 2020 through February 2021 | PNAS Nexus | Oxford Academic (oup.com)
11. Kruschke, J. K. 2011. Doing Bayesian data analysis: a tutorial with R and BUGS. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Section 3.3.5.

Jamestown Canyon virus (JCV) is a neuroinvasive arbovirus that is found throughout North America and increasingly recognized as a public health concern. From 2004 to 2012, an average of 1.7 confirmed cases were reported annually in the United States, whereas from 2013 to 2018 this figure increased over seventeen-fold to 29.2 cases per year. The rising number of reported human infections highlights the need for better understanding of the clinical manifestations and epidemiology of JCV. Here, we describe nine patients diagnosed with neuroinvasive JCV infection in Massachusetts from 2013, the year of the first reported case in the state, to 2017. Because current diagnostic testing relies on serology, which is complicated by cross-reactivity with related orthobunyaviruses and can be negative in immunosuppressed patients, we developed and evaluated an RT-qPCR assay for detection of JCV RNA. We tested this on the available archived serum from two patients, but did not detect viral RNA. JCV is transmitted by multiple mosquito species and its primary vector in Massachusetts is unknown, so we additionally applied the RT-qPCR assay and confirmatory RNA sequencing to assess JCV prevalence in a vector candidate, Ochlerotatus canadensis. We identified JCV in 0.6% of mosquito pools, a similar prevalence to neighboring Connecticut. We assembled the first Massachusetts JCV genome directly from a mosquito sample, finding high identity to JCV isolates collected over a 60-year period. Further studies are needed to reconcile the low vector prevalence and low rate of viral evolutionary change with the increasing number of reported cases.

West Nile virus is a mosquito-borne Flavivirus which is the leading cause of global arboviral encephalitis. We sequenced WNVs from an American crow found in Connecticut and an alpaca found in Massachusetts which were submitted to the Connecticut Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory (CVMDL). We report here the complete protein-coding sequences (CDS) of the WNVs (WNV 21-3957/USA CT/Crow/2021 and WNV 21-3782/USA MA/Alpaca/2021) and their phylogenetic relationship with other WNVs recovered from across the United States. In the phylogenetic analysis, the WNVs from this study belonged to the WNV lineage 1. The WNV 21-3957/USA CT/Crow/2021 clustered with WNVs from a mosquito and birds in New York during 2007–2013. Interestingly, the virus detected in the alpaca, WNV 21-3782/USA MA/Alpaca/2021 clustered with WNVs from mosquitos in New York, Texas, and Arizona during 2012–2016. The genetic differences between the viruses detected during the same season in an American crow and an alpaca suggest that vector-host feeding preferences are most likely driving viral transmission. The CDS of the WNVs and their phylogenetic relationships with other WNVs established in this study would be useful as reference data for future investigations on WNVs. Seasonal surveillance of WNV in birds and mammals and the genetic characterization of detected viruses are necessary to monitor patterns of disease presentations and viral evolution within a geographical area.

no abstract provided

This table will no longer be updated after 5/30/2024 given the end of the 2023-2024 viral respiratory vaccine season. This table shows the cumulative number and percentage of CT residents who have received an updated COVID-19 vaccine during the 2023-2024 viral respiratory season by age group (current age). CDC recommends that people get at least one dose of this vaccine to protect against serious illness, whether or not they have had a COVID-19 vaccination before. Children and people with moderate to severe immunosuppression might be recommended more than one dose. For more information on COVID-19 vaccination recommendations, click here. • Data are reported weekly on Thursday and include doses administered to Saturday of the previous week (Sunday – Saturday). All data in this report are preliminary. Data from the previous week may be changed because of delays in reporting, deduplication, or correction of errors. • These analyses are based on data reported to CT WiZ which is the immunization information system for CT. CT providers are required by law to report all doses of vaccine administered. CT WiZ also receives records on CT residents vaccinated in other jurisdictions and by federal entities which share data with CT Wiz electronically. Electronic data exchange is being added jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction. Currently, this includes Rhode Island and New York City but not Massachusetts and New York State. Therefore, doses administered to CT residents in neighboring towns in Massachusetts and New York State will not be included. A full list of the jurisdiction with which CT has established electronic data exchange can be seen at the bottom of this page (https://portal.ct.gov/immunization/Knowledge-Base/Articles/Vaccine-Providers/CT-WiZ-for-Vaccine-Providers-and-Training/Query-and-Response-functionality-in-CT-WiZ?language=en_US) • Population size estimates used to calculate cumulative percentages are based on 2020 DPH provisional census estimates*. • People are included if they have an active jurisdictional status in CT WiZ at the time weekly data are pulled. This excludes people who live out of state, are deceased and a small percentage who have opted out of CT WiZ. DPH Provisional State and County Characteristics Estimates April 1, 2020. Hayes L, Abdellatif E, Jiang Y, Backus K (2022) Connecticut DPH Provisional April 1, 2020, State Population Estimates by 18 age groups, sex, and 6 combined race and ethnicity groups. Connecticut Department of Public Health, Health Statistics & Surveillance, SAR, Hartford, CT.

We performed single-cell RNA sequencing (scRNA-Seq) on nasal wash cells freshly collected from adults with COVID-19, influenza A, or no disease (healthy). Major cell types and subtypes were defined using cluster analysis and classic transcriptional markers. Seq-Well single-cell RNA-Seq analysis of cells taken from nasal wash samples from healthy donors and patients diagnosed with either COVID-19 or influenza A

This dataset represents preliminary estimates of cumulative U.S. COVID-19 disease burden for the 2024-2025 period, including illnesses, outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and deaths. The weekly COVID-19-associated burden estimates are preliminary and based on continuously collected surveillance data from patients hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections. The data come from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)-Associated Hospitalization Surveillance Network (COVID-NET), a surveillance platform that captures data from hospitals that serve about 10% of the U.S. population. Each week CDC estimates a range (i.e., lower estimate and an upper estimate) of COVID-19 -associated burden that have occurred since October 1, 2024.

Note: Data are preliminary and subject to change as more data become available. Rates for recent COVID-19-associated hospital admissions are subject to reporting delays; as new data are received each week, previous rates are updated accordingly.

References

1. Reed C, Chaves SS, Daily Kirley P, et al. Estimating influenza disease burden from population-based surveillance data in the United States. PLoS One. 2015;10(3):e0118369. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118369 
2. Rolfes, MA, Foppa, IM, Garg, S, et al. Annual estimates of the burden of seasonal influenza in the United States: A tool for strengthening influenza surveillance and preparedness. Influenza Other Respi Viruses. 2018; 12: 132– 137. https://doi.org/10.1111/irv.12486
3. Tokars JI, Rolfes MA, Foppa IM, Reed C. An evaluation and update of methods for estimating the number of influenza cases averted by vaccination in the United States. Vaccine. 2018;36(48):7331-7337. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2018.10.026 
4. Collier SA, Deng L, Adam EA, Benedict KM, Beshearse EM, Blackstock AJ, Bruce BB, Derado G, Edens C, Fullerton KE, Gargano JW, Geissler AL, Hall AJ, Havelaar AH, Hill VR, Hoekstra RM, Reddy SC, Scallan E, Stokes EK, Yoder JS, Beach MJ. Estimate of Burden and Direct Healthcare Cost of Infectious Waterborne Disease in the United States. Emerg Infect Dis. 2021 Jan;27(1):140-149. doi: 10.3201/eid2701.190676. PMID: 33350905; PMCID: PMC7774540.
5. Reed C, Kim IK, Singleton JA,  et al. Estimated influenza illnesses and hospitalizations averted by vaccination–United States, 2013-14 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2014 Dec 12;63(49):1151-4. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6349a2.htm 
6. Reed C, Angulo FJ, Swerdlow DL, et al. Estimates of the Prevalence of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, United States, April–July 2009. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009;15(12):2004-2007. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1512.091413  
7. Devine O, Pham H, Gunnels B, et al. Extrapolating Sentinel Surveillance Information to Estimate National COVID-19 Hospital Admission Rates: A Bayesian Modeling Approach. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/irv.70026. Volume18, Issue10. October 2024.
8. https://www.cdc.gov/covid/php/covid-net/index.html">COVID-NET | COVID-19 | CDC 
9. https://www.cdc.gov/covid/hcp/clinical-care/systematic-review-process.html 
10. https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/1/3/pgac079/6604394?login=false">Excess natural-cause deaths in California by cause and setting: March 2020 through February 2021 | PNAS Nexus | Oxford Academic (oup.com)
11. Kruschke, J. K. 2011. Doing Bayesian data analysis: a tutorial with R and BUGS. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Section 3.3.5.

Retroviruses contain a small protein, MA (matrix), which forms a protein lining immediately beneath the phospholipid membrane of the mature virus particle. MA is located in the N-terminal region of the Gag precursor polyprotein. The N-terminal segment of MA proteins directs the Gag protein to the plasma membrane where budding takes place, and has been called the M domain. This domain forms an alpha helical bundle structure.

Fusarium graminearum virus 1 (FgV1) is a positive-sense ssRNA virus that confers hypovirulence in its fungal host, Fusarium graminearum. Like most mycoviruses, FgV1 exists in fungal cells, lacks an extracellular life cycle, and is therefore transmitted during sporulation or hyphal anastomosis. To understand FgV1 evolution and/or adaptation, we conducted mutation accumulation (MA) experiments by serial passage of FgV1 alone or with FgV2, 3, or 4 in F. graminearum. We expected that the effects of positive selection would be highly limited because of repeated bottleneck events. To determine whether selection on the virus was positive, negative, or neutral, we assessed both the phenotypic traits of the host fungus and the RNA sequences of FgV1. We inferred that there was positive selection on beneficial mutations in FgV1 based on the ratio of non-synonymous to synonymous substitutions (dN/dS), on the ratio of radical to conservation amino acid replacements (pNR/pNC), and by changes in the predicted protein structures. In support of this inference, we found evidence of positive selection only in the open reading frame 4 (ORF4) protein of DK21/FgV1 (MA line 1); mutations at amino acids 163A and 289H in the ORF4 of MA line 1 affected the entire structure of the protein predicted to be under positive selection. We also found, however, that deleterious mutations were a major driving force in viral evolution during serial passages. Linear relationships between changes in viral fitness and the number of mutations in each MA line demonstrated that some deleterious mutations resulted in fitness decline. Several mutations in MA line 1 were not shared with any of the other four MA lines (PH-1/FgV1, PH-1/FgV1 + 2, PH-1/FgV1 + 3, and PH-1/FgV1 + 4). This suggests that evolutionary pathways of the virus could differ with respect to hosts and also with respect to co-infecting viruses. The data also suggested that the differences among MA lines might also be explained by mutational robustness and other unidentified factors. Additional research is needed to clarify the effects of virus co-infection on the adaptation or evolution of FgV1 to its environments.

This dataset contains NCBI Biosample IDs and associated data. Vibrio and associated phage genomes isolated off the coast of Nahant, MA, USA.

Related Datasets:

Isolation culturing and sequencing of bacteria and viruses

This dataset is no longer being updated as of 5/11/2023. It is being retained on the Open Data Portal for its potential historical interest.

This table reports case classification and status data.

The "test mode" rows show confirmed and probable case counts for all Cambridge residents who have tested positive for COVID-19 or have been clinically diagnosed with the disease to date. The numbers represented in these rows reflect individual people (cases), not tests performed. If someone is clinically diagnosed and later gets an antibody test, for example, they will be removed from the “clinical diagnosis” category and added to the “antibody positive” category. Case classification is based on guidance from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and is as follows:

Confirmed Case: A person with a positive viral (PCR) test for COVID-19. This test is also known as a molecular test.

Probable Case: A person with a positive antigen test. This test is also known as a rapid test. A person who is a known contact of a confirmed case and has received a clinical diagnosis based on their symptoms. People in this category have not received a viral or antibody test. Whenever possible, lab results from a viral (PCR) test are used to confirm a clinical diagnosis, and if that is not feasible, antibody testing can be used.

Suspect Case: A person with a positive antibody test. This test is also known as a serology test.

The "case status" rows show current outcomes for all Cambridge residents who are classified as confirmed, probable, or suspect COVID-19 cases. Outcomes include:

Recovered Case: The Cambridge Public Health Department determines if a Cambridge COVID-19 case has recovered based on the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s criteria for ending home isolation: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/disposition-in-home-patients.html. Staff from the Cambridge Public Health Department (CPHD) or the state’s Community Tracing Collaborative (CTC) follow up with all reported COVID-19 cases multiple times throughout their illness. It is through these conversations that CPHD or CTC staff determine when a Cambridge resident infected with COVID-19 has met the CDC criteria for ending isolation, which connotes recovery. While many people with mild COVID-19 illness will meet the CDC criteria for ending isolation (i.e., recovery) in under two weeks, people who survive severe illness might not meet the criteria for six weeks or more.

Active Case: This category reflects Cambridge COVID-19 cases who are currently infected. Note: There may be a delay in the time between a person being released from isolation (recovered) and when their recovery is reported.

Death: This category reflects total deaths among Cambridge COVID 19 cases.

Unknown Outcome: This category reflects Cambridge COVID-19 cases who public health staff have been unable to reach by phone or letter, or who have stopped responding to follow up from public health staff.

This data contains isolation, culturing, and sequencing of bacteria and viruses from the Nahant Vibrio and Phage Genome Collection. Vibrio and associated phage genomes isolated off the coast of Nahant, MA, USA.

Related Datasets:

NCBI BioSample accessions for viruses and microbes: http://www.bco-dmo.org/dataset/658586