This poll, fielded September 10-14, 2010, is part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that solicit public opinion on the presidency and on a range of other political and social issues. Respondents were asked whether they approved of the way Barack Obama was handling his job as president, the economy, and the situation with Afghanistan. Respondents were also asked what they thought was the most important problem facing the country, whether they thought things in the country were going in the right direction, whether they approved of the way Congress as a whole and individual Democrats and Republicans in Congress were handling their jobs, whether they thought the economy was getting better and their rating of the economy. Opinions were sought on the Republican and Democratic Party, whether the Congressional representative from their district and members of Congress deserved to be re-elected, and whether they thought Republicans in Congress or Barack Obama had a clear plan for solving the nation's problems. Respondents were asked multiple questions about Barack Obama including whether he has made progress in fixing the economy, whether he has expanded the role of government too much in trying to solve the nation's economic problems, whether the Obama Administration had increased taxes for most Americans, and whether respondents thought he had a clear plan for creating jobs. Information was collected on whether respondents thought the country needed a third political party, whether they would rather have a smaller or bigger government, whether the Republicans or the Democrats had better ideas about solving the nation's problems, whether respondents approved of the health care law that was enacted the previous March, whether Congress should repeal this health care law, and who they thought was doing more, Barack Obama or the Republicans in Congress, to improved the economy. Respondents were asked whether they thought Arab Americans, Muslims, and immigrants from the Middle East were being singled out unfairly by people in the United States, whether respondents themselves had negative feelings towards Muslims because of the attack on the World Trade Center, and whether they knew anyone that was Muslim. Additional questions focused on Sarah Palin, the war in Iraq, personal finances, the war in Afghanistan, and the Tea Party movement. Demographic information includes sex, age, race, education level, household income, employment status, military service, religious preference, reported social class, type of residential area (e.g., urban or rural), political party affiliation, political philosophy, voter registration status, and whether respondents thought of themselves as born-again Christians.

According to a survey from late December 2024, the two most important issues among Republican voters in the United States were inflation and immigration, with ** and ** percent ranking it their primary political concerns respectively. In contrast, only *** percent of Democrats considered immigration their most important issue. Inflation and healthcare were the leading issues among democrats in the U.S.

This poll is part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that solicit public opinion on the presidency and on a range of other political and social issues. Respondents were asked if they felt that things in the United States were going in the right direction and whether they approved of how Bush was handling the presidency, the economy, race relations, education, and the environment. Respondents also offered approval ratings of Congress and their own Congressional representatives, rated the condition of the economy, and indicated whether they were better off financially than in 1989 when George Bush became president. In addition, respondents gave their impressions of Bush, Bill Clinton, Ross Perot, Dan Quayle, and television character Murphy Brown. They were also asked whether Vice President Quayle would be qualified to take over as president if something happened to Bush, and whether after four years of Bush a new president was needed that could set the country in a new direction. Concerning the 1992 presidential election, those surveyed rated their chances of voting, indicated for whom they would vote if the election were held the day of the interview, and commented on whether they supported a candidate because they liked him or because they didn't like the other candidates. Perot supporters were asked whether they would vote for Bush or Clinton if Perot did not run, and whether they would switch their support from Perot to one of the two major-party candidates in November. All respondents were asked if they thought the candidates were qualified, whether there was a candidate for whom they would definitely not vote under any circumstances, and whether they would be better off financially under Bush, Clinton, or Perot. Those surveyed were also asked which candidate would do the best job of dealing with a variety of problems including race relations, unemployment, foreign affairs, the economy, the environment, health care, and protecting the Social Security system. Respondents indicated the applicability of various characteristics to each of the candidates including strong leadership, vision for the future, trustworthiness in a crisis, understanding the needs of average Americans, honesty, the right temperament to serve as president, and high moral standards. In addition, those surveyed indicated whether the views of Bush, Clinton, and Perot were too liberal, too conservative, or just about right, whether they had a good idea of where the three candidates planned to lead the nation in the next four years, and whether they would be more or less likely to support a presidential candidate who had engaged in extramarital affairs, had never run for public office, or had come from a wealthy, privileged background. Other topics included assessments of the Republican and Democratic parties, re-electing representatives in Congress, the role of the federal government, and the Los Angeles riots of 1992. Background information on respondents includes political alignment, voter registration status, most recent presidential vote choice, education, age, religion, social class, area of residence, marital status, household composition, labor union membership, employment status, Hispanic origin, household income, and sex.

Conventional wisdom has it that political parties have incentives to respond to public opinion. It is also conventional wisdom that in open economies, policymakers must also “respond” to markets. Research on representation has provided ample evidence in support of the first claim. Research on the political economy of globalization has not, however, provided evidence for the second. This article examines the effects of globalization on how parties respond to voters. We argue that while elections motivate parties to respond to public sentiment, economic interdependence distracts political elites from their electorates and toward market actors, reducing party responsiveness to the mean voter. Evidence from a pair of distinct data sources spanning elections in twenty advanced capitalist democracies from the 1970s to 2010 shows that while parties have incentives to respond to left-right shifts in the mean voter position, they only do so when the national economy is sufficiently sheltered from the world economy. These findings have implications for party strategies, for representation, and for the broader effects of market integration.

files to replicate analyses reported in Ezrow and Hellwig, "Responding to Voters or Responding to Markets." Article abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that political parties have incentives to respond to public opinion. It is also conventional wisdom that in open economies, policymakers must also “respond” to markets. Research on representation has provided ample evidence in support of the first claim. Research on the political economy of globalization has not, however, provided evidence for the second. This article examines the effects of globalization on how parties respond to voters. We argue that while elections motivate parties to respond to public sentiment, economic interdependence distracts political elites from their electorates and toward market actors, reducing party responsiveness to the mean voter. Evidence from a pair of distinct data sources spanning elections in twenty advanced capitalist democracies from the 1970s to 2010 shows that while parties have incentives to respond to left-right shifts in the mean voter position, they only do so when the national economy is sufficiently sheltered from the world economy. These findings have implications for party strategies, for representation, and for the broader effects of market integration.

Immigration was seen by 57 percent of people in the UK as one of the top three issues facing the country in September 2025. The economy was the second-most important issue for voters this month, ahead of health as a distant third. These three issues have consistently been identified as the most important issues for voters. Labour's popularity continues to sink in 2025 Despite winning the 2024 general election with a strong majority, the new Labour government has had its share of struggles since coming to power. Shortly after taking office, the approval rating for Labour stood at -2 percent, but this fell throughout the second half of 2024, and by January 2025 had sunk to a new low of -47 percent. Although this was still higher than the previous government's last approval rating of -56 percent, it is nevertheless a severe review from the electorate. Among several decisions from the government, arguably the least popular was the government withdrawing winter fuel payments. This state benefit, previously paid to all pensioners, is now only paid to those on low incomes, with millions of pensioners not receiving this payment in winter 2024. Sunak's pledges fail to prevent defeat in 2024 With an election on the horizon, and the Labour Party consistently ahead in the polls, addressing voter concerns directly was one of the best chances the Conservatives had of staying in power in 2023. At the start of that year, Rishi Sunak attempted to do this by setting out his five pledges for the next twelve months; halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce national debt, cut NHS waiting times, and stop small boats. A year later, Sunak had at best only partial success in these aims. Although the inflation rate fell, economic growth was weak and even declined in the last two quarters of 2023, although it did return to growth in early 2024. National debt was only expected to fall in the mid to late 2020s, while the trend of increasing NHS waiting times did not reverse. Small boat crossings were down from 2022, but still higher than in 2021 or 2020. .

The survey charted young adults' attitudes towards politics, their opinions on the principal matters in politics, and their views on the current political questions. The respondents' interest in politics was queried, as well as how much they thought politics influences various things, and to what extent they trust in decision-makers' ability to solve young people's problems. Some questions covered how firm the respondents considered their political views and party preference to be. The respondents were asked to place different political parties and themselves on the left-right axis. They indicated whether it was easy for them to choose between political parties, what is their attitude towards given parties, and on what basis they select their party. In addition, the respondents were given a list of various things (e.g. Finnishness, scientific achievements of the Finns, Finnish social security and health care system) and asked to choose which items on the list make them feel proud about Finland. They were also presented with a set of attitudinal statements on topics such as voting, entrepreneurship, the Government, Parliament, social differences, political parties, politicians, unemployment, welfare state, law, refugees, immigrants, development aid, nuclear power, the EC, income taxation, and traditional Finnish values. In relation to voting and elections, the respondents' views were probed on what basis election candidates were assessed, how citizens should relate to elections and voting, what kind of voting habits the respondents' parents had, whether the respondents had used their right to vote, whether they were going to use that right in the future, and whether our political system works or not. Background variables included the respondent's gender, municipality of residence, age, marital status, number of children, type of accommodation, socio-economic status, education level, mother tongue, parents' and spouse's occupation and education level, membership in various organisations or associations (e.g. sports clubs, youth organisations, student associations), place of birth, annual gross income, and annual household gross income. Those who were employed were asked about their occupational status, students were asked about their educational institution and main subject, and those who were unemployed were in turn asked about the duration of unemployment during the past two years and occupational status before unemployment. In addition, views were queried on how important it is to work hard and to get by on the salary one receives from work. Further background variables investigated when R had moved to the capital area, from where R had moved, whether R would like to have a life that resembles that of R's parents' in the future, to what extent R follows different things on the media (e.g. technology, public figures, science), how much R spent money on various things on a monthly average (e.g. movies, food, clothes), whether R exercised regularly, which TV or radio channels R usually follow at home, how often R does various things (e.g. meets friends, visits the library, goes to a discotheque), and where R would like to travel to. Finally, views were charted on which party R would vote for in parliamentary elections, and which party R voted for in the 1987 municipal elections.

In Norway, the consumer confidence index shows that people who support the center-right parties are less optimistic about the country's economy than people who support the center-left parties. However, center-right voters are more optimistic about their private economy than voters of center-left parties. While Norway was governed by a center-right government from 2013 until the fall of 2021, a center-left government is now in office after the most recent election.

In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the Voting Rights Act that mandated federal oversight of election laws in discriminatory jurisdictions, prompting a spate of controversial new voting rules. Utilizing difference-in-differences to examine the act's 1975 revision, I provide the first estimates of the effects of "preclearance" oversight. I find that preclearance increased long-run voter turnout by 4-8 percentage points, due to lasting gains in minority participation. Surprisingly, Democratic support dropped sharply in areas subject to oversight. Using historical survey and newspaper data, I provide evidence that this was the result of political backlash among racially conservative whites.

This poll, conducted November 1-4, 2006, is part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that solicit public opinion on the presidency and on a range of other political and social issues. Respondents were asked whether they approved of the way George W. Bush was handling his job as president, whether they approved of the way the United States Congress and their own representative in Congress was handling their job, and to rate the condition of the national economy. Registered voters were asked whether they were following the upcoming congressional mid-term elections on November 7, 2006, whether they were likely to vote, and which candidate they would vote for if the election were being held that day. Registered voters who had already voted were asked which candidate they voted for, how enthusiastic they were about their vote, and whether their vote was more for one political party, or more against the other political party. Opinions were solicited on what was the most important issue in the vote for Congress, whether things in the country were generally going in the right direction, whether their reason for voting for Congress included showing support for George W. Bush, and which political party they trusted to do a better job handling issues such as the situation in Iraq and the economy. Information was collected on whether respondents had been contacted by any organization working in support of a candidate for Congress and if so, which political party they were asked to vote for, which political party best represented their own personal values, and whether the war with Iraq was worth fighting. Demographic variables include sex, age, religious preference, race, education level, voter registration and participation history, political party affiliation, political philosophy, marital status, whether anyone in the household was a veteran, and type of residential area (e.g., urban or rural).

As of October 2025, the political party that 18 to 24 year-old's in Great Britain would be most likely to vote for was the Labour Party, at 30 percent, with Labour also the joint-most popular party among those aged 25 to 49 along with Reform UK. Reform was the most popular party for the 50 to 64 age group, with 32 percent of voters saying they would vote for them. For the oldest age group, Reform was also the most popular, with 31 percent of over 65s intending to vote for them. Reform surge in the polls Since winning the last UK general election in July 2024, the ruling Labour Party have steadily become more unpopular among voters. After winning 33.7 percent of the vote in that election, the party was polling at 24 percent in April 2025, only slightly ahead of Reform UK on 23 percent. A right-wing populist party, Reform benefited from the collapse in support for the center-right Conservative Party in the last election, winning several seats at their expense. While the next UK general election is not due to be held until 2029, the government will be keen to address their collapsing approval ratings, in the face of Reform's rising support. Economic headaches for Labour in 2025 Although Labour inherited a growing economy, with falling inflation, and low unemployment from the Conservatives, the overall economic outlook for the UK is still quite gloomy. The country's government debt is around 100 percent of GDP, and without large tax rises and spending cuts, the government hopes to create a stronger, more resilient economy to reduce the deficit. While this is still a possibility, the UK's economic prospects for 2025 were recently slashed, with growth of one percent forecast, down from an earlier prediction of two percent. Although mainly due to external factors such as the threat of increasing tariffs, and general geopolitical instability, the UK's faltering economy will add further problems to the embattled government.

A significant increase in young people with a pro-European mind-set cast a vote in the 2019 European elections, according to a European Parliament’s in-depth Eurobarometer survey. Conducted in the weeks after the elections across all 28 Member States, nearly 28.000 citizens answered questions about their participation in the European elections and the issues that motivated them to vote.

Citizens’ support for the European Union remains at its highest level since 1983, as 68% of respondents say that their country has benefitted from being a member of the EU.

Even more significant for the democratic legitimacy of the EU is the steep increase in European citizens believing that ‘their voice counts in the EU’: 56% of respondents share this view, an increase of 7 points since March 2019 and the highest result since this question was first asked in 2002.

The overall turnout in the European elections 2019 increased by 8 points to 50,6%, resulting in the highest participation since 1994 and for the first time a reversal of turnout since 1979. It was Europe’s young and first time voters who drove turnout figures up: With 42% of the 16/18-24 year old citizens voting in the European elections, their participation rose by 50%, compared to the youth turnout of only 28% in 2014. Similarly strong was the 34% increase in the age group of 25-39 years, rising from 35% to 47%.

52% of voters said they voted in the European elections as they saw it as their civic duty, a plus of 11 points compared to 2014. Compared to the European elections 2014, significantly more citizens have also voted because they are in favour of the EU (25%, +11pp), or because they felt they could change things by voting (18%, +6pp). In 27 Member States, citizens primarily voted because they saw it as their duty as citizens, in all 28 Member States more respondents than in 2014 voted because they were in favour of the EU.

Looking at the issues that made citizens vote, the post-electoral survey shows that top issues which impacted on citizens’ voting decision were economy and growth (44%), climate change (37%) as well as human rights and democracy (37%). With 36% of mentions ‘the way the EU should be working in the future’ emerged also as top voting motivator for citizens.

This research used recorded preferences to estimate the average preferences for government activity (left-right positions) of British voters between 1950 and 2005. It explained variations in these positions using economic data together with data on public spending and taxation. It also estimated voters average positions on Europe between 1961 and 2005. The estimated positions were then combined with data on party positions and partisanship to estimate the distance between the parties and the median voter. This evidence is then used to explain election outcomes between. There are three time series data sets: (1) The original set of policy preferences based on responses to survey questions asked between 1950 and 2005 by market research organisations (Gallup, MORI, ICM, NOP, YouGov) and social scientific studies (BES, BSA, Eurobarometer). (2) The estimated preferences for government activity (or left-right position) series 1950-2005, together with parallel estimates of preferences towards Europe and voters’ self-reported positions and the economic and government expenditure data that is used to explain variations in preferences for government activity. (3) The macro polity data base consisting of vote shares at each election, partisanship, preferences for government activity, party positions based on MRG estimates. This research examines the relationship between aggregate election outcomes and the party positions between 1945 and 2005. It will use all available public opinion data to estimate the left-right position of the average voter at each election. It will then use separate analyses of the contents of election manifestos to establish the parties' positions on this dimension at each election. It will then locate both parties and voters on the same scale in order to establish the 'distance' between the two. Finally, it will estimate the relationship between these distances and the parties' vote share at each election taking into account voters' long-term loyalties. In order to provide a fuller picture of the relationship between party activity and election outcomes this research will also assess the relationship between government activity (as reflected in the state of the economy and public spending) and public opinion. In particular, it will assess the general proposition that demands for government activity increase under Conservative governments and decrease under Labour governments. This part of the research will, therefore, provide a fuller understanding of the trends and cycles in public opinion that have been noted by many scholars, journalists and politicians. The data is chiefly drawn from published sources: (e.g., Gallup Political Index) and social scientific studies (e.g., BES). The data sets are large and so it is not possible to list all sources now (though it will in the data sets and codebooks). No specific permissions were sought. The use polling data has never been challenged by market research organisations (they actively encourage political scientists to use data). Usage is covered by general permissions in case of social scientific studies. These are aggregate political opinions and behaviour. No individuals can possibly be identified.

This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers in creases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17 to 0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants, and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.

How do voters respond to economic crises: do they turn against the incumbent, reward a certain political camp, polarize to the extremes, or perhaps continue to vote much like before? Analyzing extensive data on electorates, parties and individuals in 24 countries for over half a century, we document a systematic pattern whereby economic crises tend to disproportionately favor the right. Three main forces underlie this pattern. First, voters tend to decrease support for the party heading the government when the crisis erupts. Second, after crises voters tend to assign greater importance to issues typically owned by the right. Third, when center-right parties preside over a crisis, voters often drift further rightward to nationalist parties rather than defect to the left. The far-right thus serves as an effective vehicle for keeping the center-right in power even when facing post-crisis disaffection by its voters.

This poll, fielded September 19-22, 2008, is part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that solicit public opinion on the presidency and on a range of other political and social issues. A national sample of 1,082 adults was surveyed, including oversamples of African Americans for a total of 163 African American respondents. Respondents were asked whether the Democratic or Republican party could be trusted to do a better job coping with the main problems the nation would face over the next few years, whether things in the country were going in the right direction, and how concerned they were about the national economy. Respondents were also asked how closely they were following the 2008 presidential race, their opinions of presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, their opinion of Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, for whom they would vote in the general election in November, which candidate had the best chance of getting elected, and how comfortable respondents would be with a president who was African American or a president over the age of 72. Respondents identifying with the Democratic party, were asked for whom they originally voted for to be the party nominee: Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama. Economic topics addressed how concerned respondents were that they could maintain their current standard of living, the most difficult economic issue affecting their family, particularly personal finances, the stock market, and the ability to obtain bank loans. Demographic variables include sex, age, race, marital status, political party affiliation, voter registration status and participation history, political philosophy, education level, religious preference, military service, household income, type of residential area (e.g., urban or rural), home ownership and whether respondents considered themselves to be a born-again Christian.

As of June 2025, 56 percent of people in Great Britain thought that it was wrong to leave the European Union, compared with 31 percent who thought it was the right decision. During this time period, the share of people who regret Brexit has been slightly higher than those who support it, except for some polls in Spring 2021, which showed higher levels of support for Brexit. Is Bregret setting in? Since late July 2022, the share of people who regret Brexit in these surveys has consistently been above 50 percent. Additionally, a survey from January 2025 highlighted that most people in the UK thought that Brexit had had a mainly negative impact, especially on the cost of living and the economy. Despite there being a clear majority of voters who now regret Brexit, there is as yet no particular future relationship with the EU that has overwhelming support. As of late 2023, 31 percent of Britons wanted to rejoin the EU, while 30 percent merely wanted to improve trade relations and not rejoin either the EU or the single market. Leave victory in 2016 defied the polls In the actual referendum, which took place on June 23, 2016, Leave won 51.9 percent of the votes and Remain 48.1 percent, after several polls in the run-up to the referendum put Remain slightly ahead. Remain were anticipated to win until early results from North East England suggested that Leave had performed far better than expected, with this pattern replicated throughout the country. This event was repeated somewhat in the U.S. election of that year, which saw Donald Trump win several key swing states such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, despite predictions that these states would vote for Hillary Clinton.

This special topic poll, fielded June 6-11, 2008, is a part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that solicit public opinion on the presidency and on a range of other political and social issues. This poll focuses on the opinions of 1,062 residents of the state of New York, including 931 registered voters. Respondents were asked for their opinions of David Patterson and whether they approved of the way he was handling his job as Governor of New York, and for their opinions of the New York State Legislature in Albany and public officials such as United States Senators Charles Schumer and Hillary Clinton, New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Nassau County Executive Thomas Suozzi, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Speaker of the New York City Council Christine Quinn, United States Representative Anthony Weiner, and former New York City Major Rudolph Giuliani. Opinions were solicited on whether things in the state of New York and New York City were going in the right direction, the condition of the New York State economy, which of New York State's problems respondents wanted Governor Patterson to concentrate on the most, whether the State Senate and Assembly should be controlled by the same political party, whether respondents wanted to be living in the same place in four years, and whether the Bloomberg Administration had done enough to balance the need for more safety in the construction industry and the economic benefits of development. Respondents were asked how much attention they had been paying to the 2008 presidential campaign, which candidate they would vote for if the 2008 presidential election were being held that day, for their opinions of the 2008 presidential candidates and of former President Bill Clinton, whether Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign was mostly positive, whether Hillary or Bill Clinton used race in an offensive way during the course of her presidential campaign, and which candidate they voted for in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. Additional topics included corruption in New York State government, civil unions and New York State recognizing same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions, racial issues concerning police use of deadly force and the 2006 case of Sean Bell, respondents' financial situation, housing costs, term limits for city officials, and former Governor Eliot Spitzer's involvement as a client in a prostitution ring. Demographic information includes sex, age, race, education level, household income, marital status, religious preference, frequency of religious attendance, type of residential area (e.g., urban or rural), political party affiliation, political philosophy, voter registration status and participation history, the presence of children under 18 in the household, and what type of school respondents' children were enrolled in at that time (public or private).

In October 2025, approximately 20 percent of people in the UK would vote for the governing Labour Party in a potential general election, behind Reform UK on 27 percent, with the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats in joint-third on 17 percent. Since returning to power, support for the Labour Party has fallen considerably, with the government's sinking approval rating approaching the unpopularity of the previous government. Labour's return to power in 2024 On May 22, 2024, Rishi Sunak announced his decision to hold the 2024 general election on July 4. Sunak's surprise announcement came shortly after some positive economic figures were released in the UK, and he may have hoped this would boost his poor job ratings and perhaps also his government's low approval ratings. This was a long-shot, however, and as predicted in the polls, Labour won the 2024 general election by a landslide, winning 412 out of 650 seats. The sting in the tale for the Labour Party was that despite this large majority, they won a relatively low share of the votes and almost immediately saw their popularity fall in the second half of 2024. Sunak's five pledges in 2023 After a tough 2022, in which Britain suffered through its worst cost of living crisis in a generation, the economy was consistently identified as the main issue facing the country, just ahead of healthcare. To respond to these concerns, Rishi Sunak started 2023 with five pledges; halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce national debt, cut NHS waiting times, and stop small boats. By the end of that year, just one pledge can be said to have been fully realized, with CPI inflation falling from 10.1 percent at the start of 2023 to 4 percent by the end of it. There is some ambiguity regarding the success of some of the other pledges. The economy shrank in the last two quarters of 2023 but started to grow again in early 2024. National debt increased slightly, while small boat arrivals declined compared to 2022, but were still higher than in most other years. The pledge to cut NHS waiting times was not fulfilled either, with the number of people awaiting treatment rising in 2023.

The main themes of the survey were social change and the need for transformation in society, equality and inequality, and the European Union. First, the respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with a number of statements relating to, for instance, political parties and the political system, science and technology, employment, economic growth, changes in society, equality, education, environment, free competition, public services, globalisation, Finland's NATO membership, market forces, national debt, immigration etc. Opinions were charted on why the Finnish society was slow to change and reform. Reasons mentioned included, for instance, sensible caution and moderation, lack of public funds, complexity and size of social problems, bureaucracy, inability to cooperate of different actors in society, lack of leadership in society, atmosphere that discourages responsiblity and risk-taking, and opposition to reform among citizens. The respondents were also asked what kind of voter they were (i.e. core voter, swing voter, abstaining voter) as well as how they would place themselves on the left-right and liberal-conservative axes. One set of questions charted opinions on the equality/inequality between Finns in various issues and between different groups, for instance, income distribution, health, educational opportunities, genders, generations/age groups, municipalities, occupational groups, taxation, political rights and opportunities, freedom of speech, and ethnicities. Views on the acceptability of different means of influencing in society were investigated (e.g. boycotting, infiltrating and/or recording in production facilities, legal demonstrations, rioting, traffic blockades, nonviolent direct action in order to draw the attention of the media). Views were charted on characteristics of the Finns and Finland and the effects of these characteristics in society. Opinions were studied on Finnish education in international comparison. Relating to the European Union, opinions were charted on Finland's EU membership and the currency change to euro. The respondents were also asked whether the EMU membership and euro were advantageous or disadvantageous to Finland in the economic situation at the time of the survey, whether their opinion of the EU had become more positive or negative, and whether they would vote for or against Finland's EU membership if a referendum were held at the time of responding. The background variables included the respondent's gender, year of birth, region of residence (NUTS3), basic and vocational education, economic activity and occupational status, industry of employment, political party choice if parliamentary elections were held at the time of survey, membership in a trade union, self-perceived social class, and number of inhabitants in the municipality of residence.