This graph shows the average tax rates of the *** taxpayers reporting the highest adjusted annual gross income to the IRS in the United States from 1992 to 2014. The total income tax is defined as income tax after credits. The average tax rate of the *** taxpayers with the highest income in 2014 was at ***** percent.

We study the effects of decentralized wealth taxation on mobility and the effectiveness of tax coordination at mitigating tax competition. We exploit the reintroduction of the Spanish wealth tax, after which all regions except Madrid levied positive tax rates. We find the mobility responses to wealth taxes are within the range of prior estimates with respect to income taxes. However, wealth tax mobility responses generate losses to personal income tax revenues that are six times larger than the direct losses to wealth taxes. Madrid could achieve higher total regional revenues by agreeing to a harmonized positive tax rate.

We study how reported wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intra-national variation in Switzerland, we find that a 1 percentage point drop in the wealth tax rate raises reported wealth by at least 43% after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi-randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24% of the effect arise from taxpayer mobility and 21% from a concurrent rise in reported house prices. Savings responses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth.

In 2021, the effective tax rate of total household income among the top percentile of earners in Israel was **** percent, increasing by *** percentage points from the previous year. Over the observed period, the effective tax rate steadily increased from **** percent in 2013. A slight decline was measured in 2017 due to a ******** government decision to implement a tax incentive to release "trapped" capital gains taxes.

Graph and download economic data for Federal Government; Current Taxes on Income, Wealth, etc. Received (IMA), Transactions (FGTIWRQ027S) from Q4 1946 to Q1 2025 about wealth, IMA, transactions, tax, federal, government, income, and USA.

This paper argues that high marginal labor income tax rates on top earners are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have high labor supply elasticity, make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. We construct a large scale overlapping generations model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a realistic wealth distribution and numerically characterize the optimal top marginal rate. We find that marginal tax rates for top 1% earners of 79% are optimal as long as the model earnings and wealth distributions display a degree of concentration as observed in US data.

This statistic represents the tax burden of the leading one percent in the U.S. in 2018, by state. The tax rate is the total average state and local taxes as a percentage of income. In 2018, the leading one percent in California paid around **** percent of their family income as tax.

According to the Chamley-Judd result, capital should not be taxed in the long run. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not follow from the very models used to derive it. For the main model in Judd (1985), we prove that the long-run tax on capital is positive and significant, whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one. For higher elasticities, the tax converges to zero but may do so at a slow rate, after centuries of high tax rates. The main model in Chamley (1986) imposes an upper bound on capital taxes. We provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever, implying positive long-run taxes. When this is not the case, the long-run tax may be zero. However, if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally nonconstant (e.g., not additively separable over time), a zero long-run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth (zero tax base) or by zero labor taxes (first-best). Finally, we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever-increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation.

Recent studies suggest that public policy in established democracies mostly caters to the interests of the rich and ignores the average citizen when their preferences diverge. I argue that high-income taxation has become a clear illustration of this pattern, and I test the proposition on a least likely case: Norway. I asked Norwegians to design their preferred tax rate structure, and subsequently matched their answers with registry data on what people at different incomes actually pay in tax. I find that within the top 1 percent, tax rates are far below (as much as 23 percentage points) from where citizens want them to be. A follow-up survey showed that this divergence is entirely driven by capital incomes being taxed too low. My results suggest that even in a fairly egalitarian society like Norway, the rich get away with paying considerably less in tax than what people deem fair.

Advani, Hughson and Tarrant (2021) model the revenue that could be raised from an annual and a one-off wealth tax of the design recommended by Advani, Chamberlain and Summers in the Wealth Tax Commission’s Final Report (2020). This deposit contains the code required to replicate the revenue modelling and distributional analysis. The modelling draws on data from the Wealth and Assets Survey, supplemented with the Sunday Times Rich List, which we use to implement a Pareto correction for the under-coverage of wealth at the top.Around the world, the unprecedented public spending required to tackle COVID-19 will inevitably be followed by a debate about how to rebuild public finances. At the same time, politicians in many countries are already facing far-reaching questions from their electorates about the widening cracks in the social fabric that this pandemic has exposed, as prior inequalities become amplified and public services are stretched to their limits. These simultaneous shocks to national politics inevitably encourage people to 'think big' on tax policy. Even before the current crisis there were widespread calls for reforms to the taxation of wealth in the UK. These proposals have so far focused on reforming existing taxes. However, other countries have begun to raise the idea of introducing a 'wealth tax'-a new tax on ownership of wealth (net of debt). COVID-19 has rapidly pushed this idea higher up political agendas around the world, but existing studies fall a long way short of providing policymakers with a comprehensive blueprint for whether and how to introduce a wealth tax. Critics point to a number of legitimate issues that would need to be addressed. Would it be fair, and would the public support it? Is this type of tax justified from an economic perspective? How would you stop the wealthiest from hiding their assets? Will they all simply leave? How can you value some assets? What happens to people who own lots of wealth, but have little income with which to pay a wealth tax? And if wealth taxes are such a good idea, why have many countries abandoned them? These are important questions, without straightforward answers. The UK government last considered a wealth tax in the mid-1970s. This was also the last time that academics and policymakers in the UK thought seriously about how such a tax could be implemented. Over the past half century, much has changed in the mobility of people, the structure of our tax system, the availability of data, and the scope for digital solutions and coordination between tax authorities. Old plans therefore cannot be pulled 'off the shelf'. This project will evaluate whether a wealth tax for the UK would be desirable and deliverable. We will address the following three main research questions: (1) Is a wealth tax justified in principle, on economic or other grounds? (2) How should a wealth tax be designed, including definition of the tax base and solutions to administrative challenges such as valuation and liquidity? (3) What would be the revenue and distributional effects of a wealth tax in the UK, for a variety of design options and at specified rates/thresholds? To answer these questions, we will draw on a network of world-leading exports on tax policy from across academia, policy spheres, and legal practice. We will examine international experience, synthesising a large body of existing research originating in countries that already have (or have had) a wealth tax. We will add to these resources through novel research that draws on adjacent fields and disciplines to craft new solutions to the practical problems faced in delivering a wealth tax. We will also review common objections to a wealth tax. These new insights will be published in a series of 'evidence papers' made available directly to the public and policymakers. We will also publish a final report that states key recommendations for government and (if appropriate) delivers a 'ready to legislate' design for a wealth tax. We will not recommend specific rates or thresholds for the tax. Instead, we will create an online 'tax simulator' so that policymakers and members of the public can model the revenue and distributional effects of different options. We will also work with international partners to inform debates about wealth taxes in other countries. The modelling draws on data from the Wealth and Assets Survey, supplemented with the Sunday Times Rich List, which we use to implement a Pareto correction for the under-coverage of wealth at the top.

This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elasticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-in-difference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.

The table below showcases the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of actual property tax paid on residential properties for each zip code in Rich Square, North Carolina. It's important to understand that property tax rates can vary greatly and can change yearly.

In June 2020, the decision to increase the tax rate up to 15 percent for personal income exceeding five million Russian rubles per year was supported by 63 percent of Russians. The proposed tax hike for the wealthy would start from 2021.

According to a 2021 survey conducted by the Fight Inequality Alliance in India, ** percent of respondents disagreed that corporations and wealthy individuals should receive tax rebates. ** percent of respondents agreed with this sentiment. In September 2019, corporate tax rates in India were cut from ** percent to ** percent, resulting in a considerable loss of tax revenue.

This table presents income shares, thresholds, tax shares, and total counts of individual Canadian tax filers, with a focus on high income individuals (95% income threshold, 99% threshold, etc.). Income thresholds are based on national threshold values, regardless of selected geography; for example, the number of Nova Scotians in the top 1% will be calculated as the number of taxfiling Nova Scotians whose total income exceeded the 99% national income threshold. Different definitions of income are available in the table namely market, total, and after-tax income, both with and without capital gains.

This data set contains historical average tax rates by Counties in Utah from 2004-2013. Average tax rates are computed by dividing total locally and centrally assessed taxes charged by total taxable value, excluding motor vehicle fee-in-lieu value.

Units Per Cent. Data from Piketty, Thomas, "Capital in the 21st Century, Harvard University Press", 2014

Key information about Greece Tax Revenue

• Greece Tax Revenue was reported at 18.881 USD bn in Sep 2024.
• This is a decrease from the previous figure of 19.759 USD bn for Jun 2024.
• Greece Tax Revenue data is updated quarterly, averaging 13.902 USD bn from Mar 1999 to Sep 2024, with 103 observations.
• The data reached an all-time high of 20.908 USD bn in Dec 2007 and a record low of 6.826 USD bn in Mar 2001.
• Greece Tax Revenue data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by CEIC Data.
• The data is categorized under World Trend Plus’s Global Economic Monitor – Table: Tax Revenue: USD: Quarterly.

CEIC calculates quarterly Tax Revenue as the sum of Taxes on Production and Imports, Current Taxes on Income and Wealth and Capital Taxes and converts it into USD. Hellenic Statistical Authority provides Tax Revenue in EUR. Federal Reserve Board average market exchange rate is used for currency conversions.

This article attempts to estimate the magnitude of corporate tax avoidance and personal tax evasion through offshore tax havens. US corporations book 20 percent of their profits in tax havens, a tenfold increase since the 1980; their effective tax rate has declined from 30 to 20 percent over the last 15 years, and about two-thirds of this decline can be attributed to increased international tax avoidance. Globally, 8 percent of the world's personal financial wealth is held offshore, costing more than $200 billion to governments every year. Despite ambitious policy initiatives, profit shifting to tax havens and offshore wealth are rising. I discuss the recent proposals made to address these issues, and I argue that the main objective should be to create a world financial registry.