This study explore the effect of an unprecedented summer storm on Arctic marine mammals in the Mackenzie Delta.

This article takes a disparate theoretical approach to understanding The Filmmakers of Greece (FoG), a group that emerged in 2009 amid Greece’s economic crisis. It contributes to the field of Greek national and transnational cinema from 2009 by concentrating on its political subjecthood. It challenges the lenses through which FoG – as a group and a film corpus – has been interpreted in studies/juries/publications: the national cinema concept, the economic crisis as narrative allegory, and the ‘Greek New/Weird Wave’ label. These paradigms obfuscate the content of the films and the motivations of their creators. Instead, the article emphasises that FoG articulates autonomy; this is accomplished through the filmmaking process and the films’ narratives. While the films do not adhere to narratives of nationhood, FoG does not cast off ‘Greekness’. Where the Greek state has assumed increasingly neoliberal and technocratic modes of governance, the filmmakers’ ‘weird’ representational and technical approaches reveal the emancipatory potential of the screen. In this way, filmmaking practice becomes a critical arena for the performative assertion of autonomy in line with crisis-driven articulations of resistance. Ultimately, the article makes the disjuncture that FoG09 (a label coined) can be understood through two concepts: it is a counterpublic and transnational film movement. Similar to other youth movements and groups during the crisis, The Filmmakers of Greece represent a textual and paratextual opposition to the state. This opposition enables the filmmakers to affirm their citizenship figuratively: they make a return to the nation as ‘Greek’ filmmakers who make transgressive films.

Fault Lines Widen in the Global Recovery

Economic prospects have diverged further across countries since the April 2021 World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast. Vaccine access has emerged as the principal fault line along which the global recovery splits into two blocs: those that can look forward to further normalization of activity later this year (almost all advanced economies) and those that will still face resurgent infections and rising COVID death tolls. The recovery, however, is not assured even in countries where infections are currently very low so long as the virus circulates elsewhere.

The global economy is projected to grow 6.0 percent in 2021 and 4.9 percent in 2022.The 2021 global forecast is unchanged from the April 2021 WEO, but with offsetting revisions. Prospects for emerging market and developing economies have been marked down for 2021, especially for Emerging Asia. By contrast, the forecast for advanced economies is revised up. These revisions reflect pandemic developments and changes in policy support. The 0.5 percentage-point upgrade for 2022 derives largely from the forecast upgrade for advanced economies, particularly the United States, reflecting the anticipated legislation of additional fiscal support in the second half of 2021 and improved health metrics more broadly across the group.

Recent price pressures for the most part reflect unusual pandemic-related developments and transitory supply-demand mismatches. Inflation is expected to return to its pre-pandemic ranges in most countries in 2022 once these disturbances work their way through prices, though uncertainty remains high. Elevated inflation is also expected in some emerging market and developing economies, related in part to high food prices. Central banks should generally look through transitory inflation pressures and avoid tightening until there is more clarity on underlying price dynamics. Clear communication from central banks on the outlook for monetary policy will be key to shaping inflation expectations and safeguarding against premature tightening of financial conditions. There is, however, a risk that transitory pressures could become more persistent and central banks may need to take preemptive action.

Risks around the global baseline are to the downside. Slower-than-anticipated vaccine rollout would allow the virus to mutate further. Financial conditions could tighten rapidly, for instance from a reassessment of the monetary policy outlook in advanced economies if inflation expectations increase more rapidly than anticipated. A double hit to emerging market and developing economies from worsening pandemic dynamics and tighter external financial conditions would severely set back their recovery and drag global growth below this outlook’s baseline.

Multilateral action has a vital role to play in diminishing divergences and strengthening global prospects. The immediate priority is to deploy vaccines equitably worldwide. A $50 billion IMF staff proposal, jointly endorsed by the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and World Bank, provides clear targets and pragmatic actions at a feasible cost to end the pandemic. Financially constrained economies also need unimpeded access to international liquidity. The proposed $650 billion General Allocation of Special Drawing Rights at the IMF is set to boost reserve assets of all economies and help ease liquidity constraints. Countries also need to redouble collective efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These multilateral actions can be reinforced by national-level policies tailored to the stage of the crisis that help catalyze a sustainable, inclusive recovery. Concerted, well-directed policies can make the difference between a future of durable recoveries for all economies or one with widening fault lines—as many struggle with the health crisis while a handful see conditions normalize, albeit with the constant threat of renewed flare-ups.

BackgroundMost studies on social media usage and parasocial relationships (PSRs) have been conducted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) societies, potentially overlooking the unique cultural, social, and economic factors present in non-WEIRD contexts. Examining these phenomena in a non-WEIRD setting is essential for a comprehensive understanding of social media’s global impact.MethodsSecondary data from 574 participants in Qatar who followed Instagram influencers were analyzed using Bayesian analyses aided by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms to examine the relationships between social media usage time, PSRs, and demographic factors.FindingsThe analysis results show that, regarding linear effects, a stronger parasocial relationship with Instagram influencer(s) is associated with higher daily social media usage time. Meanwhile, being male, being older, and having higher incomes all have negative associations with daily social media usage time. When parasocial relationships and the three demographic factors are seen in their interactions, negative associations with social media usage were also found in a similar pattern. To elaborate, among those with high parasocial relationship degrees, females, young people, and poor people tend to use social media for more hours each day.ConclusionsThis study highlights that demographic factors such as gender, age, and income in their interactions with parasocial relationships are associated with social media usage time within the non-WEIRD social context of Qatar. The findings underscore the necessity of considering the specific local cultural settings when studying social media behaviors.

The Funny Cat Stick market has emerged as a delightful segment within the pet accessories industry, capturing the love and attention of both feline enthusiasts and pet owners alike. This quirky product, designed to engage and entertain cats through a variety of interactive features, including bright colors, amusing

BackgroundMost studies on social media usage and parasocial relationships (PSRs) have been conducted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) societies, potentially overlooking the unique cultural, social, and economic factors present in non-WEIRD contexts. Examining these phenomena in a non-WEIRD setting is essential for a comprehensive understanding of social media’s global impact.MethodsSecondary data from 574 participants in Qatar who followed Instagram influencers were analyzed using Bayesian analyses aided by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms to examine the relationships between social media usage time, PSRs, and demographic factors.FindingsThe analysis results show that, regarding linear effects, a stronger parasocial relationship with Instagram influencer(s) is associated with higher daily social media usage time. Meanwhile, being male, being older, and having higher incomes all have negative associations with daily social media usage time. When parasocial relationships and the three demographic factors are seen in their interactions, negative associations with social media usage were also found in a similar pattern. To elaborate, among those with high parasocial relationship degrees, females, young people, and poor people tend to use social media for more hours each day.ConclusionsThis study highlights that demographic factors such as gender, age, and income in their interactions with parasocial relationships are associated with social media usage time within the non-WEIRD social context of Qatar. The findings underscore the necessity of considering the specific local cultural settings when studying social media behaviors.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

Unemployment is common in every country, no matter how developed the economy is. But the unusual and persistent rise in unemployment is detrimental to the economy and the economic growth of the country. The problem of unemployment creates a sense of inferiority in the individual and society. This hinders the progress of society. Today every country in the world is facing unemployment.
India is a country that has been struggling with unemployment since its independence. A person who is qualified and eager to work but is jobless can be defined as unemployed. Unemployment in the Indian perspective is giving rise to abject poverty in the country. Unemployment in India is becoming a socio-economic problem that has taken a fierce form in modern times. Many reasons can be attributed to employment. Indiscriminate mechanization in India, growing population, declining growth rate, illiteracy, and caste system can be mentioned as the main reasons.

BackgroundMost studies on social media usage and parasocial relationships (PSRs) have been conducted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) societies, potentially overlooking the unique cultural, social, and economic factors present in non-WEIRD contexts. Examining these phenomena in a non-WEIRD setting is essential for a comprehensive understanding of social media’s global impact.MethodsSecondary data from 574 participants in Qatar who followed Instagram influencers were analyzed using Bayesian analyses aided by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms to examine the relationships between social media usage time, PSRs, and demographic factors.FindingsThe analysis results show that, regarding linear effects, a stronger parasocial relationship with Instagram influencer(s) is associated with higher daily social media usage time. Meanwhile, being male, being older, and having higher incomes all have negative associations with daily social media usage time. When parasocial relationships and the three demographic factors are seen in their interactions, negative associations with social media usage were also found in a similar pattern. To elaborate, among those with high parasocial relationship degrees, females, young people, and poor people tend to use social media for more hours each day.ConclusionsThis study highlights that demographic factors such as gender, age, and income in their interactions with parasocial relationships are associated with social media usage time within the non-WEIRD social context of Qatar. The findings underscore the necessity of considering the specific local cultural settings when studying social media behaviors.

We use nationwide deed-level records on home foreclosures to examine the effects of economic distress on electoral outcomes and individual voter turnout. County-level difference-in-differences estimates show that counties that suffered larger increases in foreclosures did not punish or reward members of the incumbent president’s party more than less affected counties. Linking the Ohio voter file to individual foreclosures, difference-in-differences estimates show that individuals whose homes were foreclosed on were less likely to turn out, rather than being mobilized. However, in 2016 counties more exposed to foreclosures supported Trump at substantially higher rates. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the effect of local economic distress on incumbent performance is generally close to zero and only becomes substantial in unusual circumstances.

NOTE: The included files cover the data and replication code for each of the three working papers that comprise this dissertation. By the time these files are available, it is likely that the author will have updated versions of each of these files. If you are interested in using these data, please contact the author directly or visit his website for the most updated versions. Concerns about domestic authority shape how governments conduct their foreign policies. However, this influence is often difficult to observe in highly opaque, non-democratic political systems. In the first part of the dissertation, I investigate the link between domestic authority and foreign policy in the context of diplomacy and trade in late imperial China, a period that spans the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. I argue that international diplomacy can serve leaders’ domestic political needs when it is highly visible to relevant audiences; conducted with counterparts held in relatively high esteem domestically; when certain diplomatic practices are historically associated with regime authority; or when diplomacy is wielded by leaders with relatively low levels of legitimacy. Using an original dataset of over 5,000 Ming and Qing tribute exchanges, I demonstrate that Chinese emperors newly in power conducted a disproportionately high volume of diplomatic activity. I find weaker evidence that this effect was more salient among low-legitimacy emperors. An accompanying case study illustrates how the Yongle Emperor deployed tribute diplomacy as a tool for domestic authority consolidation. Turning to the trade policies of the same period, I argue that beyond leaders, other autocratic elites who participate in foreign policy making are motivated by similar authority concerns. Extant research on non-democratic trade policy has largely neglected this group of actors. I develop a theory that predicts variation in elite policy preferences based on top-down and bottom-up authority relations with the leader and local trading communities, respectively. To assess these claims, I introduce a dataset on the maritime trade preferences of several hundred individual elite officials in late imperial China created through 10 months of archival work in Beijing and Taipei. The data suggest that coastal provincial officials became key pro-trade advocates during the Qing dynasty. The findings offer an example of how trade preferences can vary within a non-democratic regime, and how historical cases can be especially useful for empirically studying these preferences. In the third paper, the dissertation then flips the focus from the domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy to how other states’ internal politics shape their engagement with contemporary China. I argue that leaders of small developing countries can seek greater domestic authority by acquiring “prestige projects,” defined as highly visible, nationally salient international development projects. After identifying a set of Chinese government-financed prestige projects using a new dataset on Chinese development finance, I show that these projects are overwhelmingly concentrated in the world’s poorest and smallest countries, and that their implementation may be associated with higher public support for recipient governments. I also find that China’s government supplies more prestige projects to states that increase their support for Chinese diplomatic objectives.

Cost of food in the United States increased 2.90 percent in May of 2025 over the same month in the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Food Inflation - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This memorandum is based on discussions held in Tehran in January and February 1977 and in May 1977. Iran's present economic conditions reflect an unusual combination of affluence and structural under-development. Per capita income is fairly high (over US$1,900 in 1976/77) and may be expected to continue to rise over the coming years. Iran's high per capita income, however, is closely linked to the oil sector. The windfall improvements of oil terms of trade in 1973 and 1974 resulted in a tripling of GNP (measured in current dollars) between 1972/73 and 1974/75, and enabled Iran nearly to quadruple its imports of goods and services over the same period. Iran's current account of the balance of payments, previously in deficit, has been in considerable surplus since 1974, and the capital account has been showing large outflows instead of the traditional inflows. Despite much progress over the past two decades, Iran remains in many respects firmly part of the third world, both in terms of industrial structure and the level of its social indicators. Iran's present industrial structure has oil contributing nearly three-eighths of gross domestic product, representing about 11 percent. Even when the oil sector is excluded, the share of manufacturing industry in Iran's GDP rises only to 17 percent. Less than one percent of Iran's exports are made up of manufactures; agriculture, where 37 percent of the labor force is engaged, is characterized by such low productivity that it contributes only 9 percent of GDP. Iran's social indicators, for the year 1970, compare adversely with those countries whose per capita income is about the same as in Iran (e.g. Yugoslavia), and are roughly at the same level as in Egypt whose per capita income is only a small fraction of that of Iran.

The financial surface of the globe at all times reveals a weird balanced impact of the public investment preferences, their understanding about the investment requirements, their anticipation of returns on their investments etc. Perhaps forecasting the growth of the business world would be crucial without an apposite comprehension of the investment behavior of the key part of the society called salaried class. This paper covers appraisal of various financial instruments like equity/stocks, term deposits in banks, kisan vikas patra, national savings certificate, insurance policies, mutual fund and converse the factors persuading investment decision process. The major factors influencing the financial investment behavior are demographic factors (like age, income, qualification, gender, etc.) and socio-economic factors (like family income, tax benefits, safety of fund, risk inclination, return on investment). This study aims to serve a channel to the need of a comprehension of the financial objectives of the salaried class investors with that of their determined desire for the investment returns. Certainly, this information could unwrap the prospect of predicting even the future of Indian Economy itself besides, providing span to fine-tuning the investment prudence of the public towards progressive and fruitful choices for themselves and the nation.

Israel GDP: Deflator: sa: Government Final Consumption Expenditure data was reported at 119.339 2015=100 in 2024. This records an increase from the previous number of 112.650 2015=100 for 2023. Israel GDP: Deflator: sa: Government Final Consumption Expenditure data is updated yearly, averaging 81.411 2015=100 from Dec 1995 (Median) to 2024, with 30 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 119.339 2015=100 in 2024 and a record low of 47.758 2015=100 in 1995. Israel GDP: Deflator: sa: Government Final Consumption Expenditure data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Israel – Table IL.OECD.MEI: Gross Domestic Product: GDP Deflator: Seasonally Adjusted: OECD Member: Annual. [STAT_CONC_DEF] A significant temporary discrepancy can be observed in 2024 between annual data derived from the Quarterly National Accounts and Annual National Accounts for some key volume aggregates, including GDP. This is due to an unusual price change in defence consumption in Q4 2023, which affected data chaining. Quarterly data will be revised on March 10 to reduce the gap.

The statistic shows GDP per capita in the United Kingdom from 1987 to 2020, with projections up until 2030. In 2020, GDP per capita in the United Kingdom was at around 40,230.55 US dollars. The same year, the total UK population amounted to about 67.26 million people. The United Kingdom is among the leading countries in a world GDP ranking.Falling unemployment in a time of recessionGDP is a useful indicator when it comes to measuring the state of a nation’s economy. GDP is the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time, usually a year. GDP per capita equals exactly the GDI (gross domestic income) per capita and is not a measure of an individual’s personal income.As can be seen clearly in the statistic, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the United Kingdom is beginning to increase, albeit not to pre-recession levels. The UK is beginning to see signs of an economic recovery, though as of yet it remains unclear what sort of recovery this is. Questions have been raised as to whether the growth being seen is the right sort of growth for a well balanced recovery across the necessary sectors. An interesting oddity occurred in the United Kingdom for nine months in 2012, which saw a decreasing unemployment occurring at the same time as dip in nationwide economic productivity. This seems like good - if not unusual - news, but could be indicative of people entering part-time employment. It could also suggest that labor productivity is falling, meaning that the UK would be less competitive as a nation. The figures continue to rise, however, with an increase in employment in the private sector. With the rate of inflation in the UK impacting everyone’s daily lives, it is becoming increasingly difficult for vulnerable groups to maintain a decent standard of living.

This data explores the knowledge base around productivity and its links to energy and wellbeing. The data was generated as part of a project that mapped and reviewed 1) links between energy and productivity and 2) wellbeing and productivity. The project used two forms of expert elicitation to guide a literature review and visualisation exercise. Experts in productivity, energy, productivity and wellbeing were surveyed. Initial participants were selected based on the networks of project researchers, and the ESRC. Recruitment then followed a snowballing methodology. In total, 58 people were invited to participate in the energy study. Of these 32 completed the survey, and 12 (not including research team members) attended the workshop. 53 people were invited to participate in the wellbeing study. Of these 20 completed the survey, and 7(not including research team members) attended the workshop. The surveys contain details of who the participants believe are key figures and key papers in energy/productivity/wellbeing research. The workshop outputs are visualisations of key relationships between energy/wellbeing /productivity by participants.

Productivity growth means getting more output from fewer inputs. It is a key goal of conventional economic policy. But ‘productivity growth’ is a vague concept and there are large gaps in our understanding of it. This ESRC funded project explores links between the different types of productivity and two major gaps: the relationship between energy and productivity, and wellbeing and productivity. The aim is to map the existing evidence base and guide future ESRC productivity research. Among policymakers and economists it is widely agreed that the UK has a ‘productivity problem’. In the UK, Labour productivity growth has been falling since the mid-1960s. This trend intensified after the financial crisis, when UK labour productivity growth collapsed altogether. Although the UK situation is particularly acute, it is not unusual. Falling labour productivity growth is seen in economies across the world. This could be because of changes in the nature of energy supply and demand over the last few decades. Energy is closely related to the key elements conventionally thought to impact productivity (such as technology), but could also be linked in less obvious ways. For example, changes in the structure of the economy (as we shift from manufacturing to services), gender and income inequalities, and the physical quality of energy itself may all play a role in mediating the energy-productivity relation. Properly understanding all these factors is essential, partly because we expect big changes in the energy base of the economy as we move to low-carbon energy sources. Falling productivity growth is considered a problem because in conventional economics productivity growth (particularly labour productivity growth) is thought to be linked to material standards of living. In this view as productivity growth falls, so does growth in material living standards. In the dominant political economy, reductions in the growth of material living standards are assumed to lead to reduced wellbeing. However, it is unclear just how strong the link between productivity growth and wellbeing actually is. Productivity growth does impact some parts material living standards, such as the distribution of income. However, its impact on these elements is mediated by other factors such as government policy. At the same time, it is also possible that an over focus on productivity growth could negatively impact societal wellbeing. For example, many activities that are key providers of societal wellbeing have low levels of productivity growth. Low labour productivity growth activities include health and social care, and education—all key sectors in terms of the economy’s ability to generate wellbeing. The relation between productivity growth and wellbeing is complex and underexplored.

The rescue of the US automobile industry amid the 2008-2009 recession and financial crisis was a consequential, controversial, and difficult decision made at a fraught moment for the US economy. Both of us were involved in the decision process at the time, but since have moved back to academia. More than five years have passed since the bailout began, and it is timely to look back at this unusual episode of economic policymaking to consider what we got right, what we got wrong, and why. In this article, we describe the events that brought two of the largest industrial companies in the world to seek a bailout from the US government, the analysis that was used to evaluate the decision (including what the alternatives were and whether a rescue would even work), the steps that were taken to rescue and restructure General Motors and Chrysler, and the performance of the US auto industry since the bailout. We close with general lessons to be learned from the episode.

[This is a post-publication review symposium]Does great-power politics shape international monetary decision-making? Susan Strange (1971) and Robert Gilpin (1987) certainly thought so. In recent years, however, International Political Economy (IPE) has turned increasingly to models inspired by economic drivers—ranging from market liquidity to global integration. In their new article, “No Reservations: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve Currency,” Steven Liao and Daniel McDowell reawaken this earlier tradition, turning the spotlight on China and the Renminbi. Their article finds that as states preferences diverge from the United State, they are more likely to hold Renminbi. Monetary policy, then, becomes part of a hedging strategy against American hegemony and possibly support for an alternative international order. The article nicely ties questions of monetary policy to important issues of great-power transitions. Given recent moves by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which seem to place the Renminbi closer to reserve currency status, as well as the tumult in domestic Chinese monetary policy, this article speaks directly to events on the ground. [...]