The benchmark interest rate in the United States was last recorded at 4.50 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Fed Funds Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Inflation Rate in the United States increased to 2.70 percent in June from 2.40 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides - United States Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

United States US: Real Interest Rate data was reported at 2.208 % pa in 2016. This records an increase from the previous number of 2.152 % pa for 2015. United States US: Real Interest Rate data is updated yearly, averaging 3.162 % pa from Dec 1961 (Median) to 2016, with 56 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 8.720 % pa in 1981 and a record low of -1.280 % pa in 1975. United States US: Real Interest Rate data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.World Bank.WDI: Interest Rates. Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions attached to lending rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability.; ; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files using World Bank data on the GDP deflator.; ;

Core consumer prices in the United States increased 2.90 percent in June of 2025 over the same month in the previous year. This dataset provides - United States Core Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Inflation Expectations in the United States decreased to 3 percent in June from 3.20 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides - United States Consumer Inflation Expectations- actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The benchmark interest rate in Japan was last recorded at 0.50 percent. This dataset provides - Japan Interest Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Unemployment Rate in the United States increased to 4.20 percent in July from 4.10 percent in June of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Graph and download economic data for Personal Saving Rate (PSAVERT) from Jan 1959 to Jun 2025 about savings, personal, rate, and USA.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.

Inflation Rate in Japan decreased to 3.30 percent in June from 3.50 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Japan Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Inflation Rate in Turkey decreased to 35.05 percent in June from 35.41 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Turkey Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Monetary policy is generally regarded as a central element in the attempts of policy makers to attenuate business-cycle fluctuations. According to the New Keynesian paradigm, central banks are able to stimulate or depress aggregate demand in the short run by adjusting their nominal interest rate targets. The effects of interest rate changes on aggregate consumption, the largest component of aggregate demand, are well understood in the context of this paradigm, on which the canonical "workhorse'' model used in monetary policy analysis is grounded. A key feature of the model is that aggregate consumption is fully described by the amount of goods consumed by a representative household. A decline in the policy rate for instance implies that the real interest rate declines, the representative household saves less and hence increase its demand for consumption. At the same time, general equilibrium effects let labour income grow causing consumption to increase further. However, the mechanism outlined above ignores a considerable amount of empirically-observed heterogeneity among households. For example, households with a higher earnings elasticity to interest rate changes benefit more from a rate cut than those with a lower elasticity; households with large debt positions are at a relative advantage over households with large bond holdings; and households with low exposure to inflation are relatively better off than those holding a sizeable amount of nominal assets. As a result, the contribution to the aggregate consumption response differs substantially across households, implying that monetary expansions and tightenings produce relative "winners'' and relative "losers''. The aim of the project laid out in this proposal is to give a disaggregated account of the heterogeneous effects of monetary-policy induced interest rate changes on household consumption and a detailed analysis of the channels underlying them. Additionally, it seeks to draw conclusions about the determinants of the strength of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. To do so, it relies on a large panel comprising detailed data from the universe of all households residing in Norway between 1993 and 2015 supplemented with additional micro-data provided by the European Commission. I will be assisted by two project partners, Pascal Paul who is a member of the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Martin Holm who is affiliated with the Research Unit of Statistics Norway and the University of Oslo. In addition, I would like to collaborate with and help train a doctoral student based at the University of Lausanne on this project. Existing empirical studies of the consumption response to monetary policy at the micro level rely on survey data. Therefore, they are subject to a number of severe data limitations. The surveys employed typically have either no or only a short panel dimension, suffer from attrition, include only limited information on income and wealth, are top-coded, and contain a significant amount of measurement error. The administrative data set provided to us by Statistics Norway suffers from none of these issues, implying that we are in a unique position to evaluate the household-level effects of policy rate changes. In a first step, we use forecasts published by the Norwegian central bank to derive monetary policy shocks that are robust to the simultaneity problem inherent in the identification of the effects of monetary policy following Romer and Romer (2004). We then confront the micro-data with the estimated shocks to study the consumption response along different segments of the income and wealth distribution and to test the importance of heterogeneity in labour earnings, financial income, liquid assets, inflation exposure and interest rate exposure among others. The findings will be of high relevance as they will not only allow us to evaluate channels hypothesised in the analytical literature, improve our understanding of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and its distributional consequences but also serve as a benchmark for structural models built both by theorists and practitioners.

United States CSI: Expected Inflation: Next Yr: Up by 1-2% data was reported at 29.000 % in May 2018. This stayed constant from the previous number of 29.000 % for Apr 2018. United States CSI: Expected Inflation: Next Yr: Up by 1-2% data is updated monthly, averaging 18.000 % from Jan 1978 (Median) to May 2018, with 485 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 34.000 % in Oct 2016 and a record low of 1.000 % in May 1980. United States CSI: Expected Inflation: Next Yr: Up by 1-2% data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by University of Michigan. The data is categorized under Global Database’s USA – Table US.H030: Consumer Sentiment Index: Unemployment, Interest Rates, Prices and Government Expectations. The questions were: 'During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?' and 'By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average, during the next 12 months?'

The benchmark interest rate in Turkey was last recorded at 43 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Turkey Interest Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Inflation Rate in Germany remained unchanged at 2 percent in July. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Germany Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

CSI: Expected Interest Rates: Next Yr: Don’t Know data was reported at 2.000 % in May 2018. This records an increase from the previous number of 1.000 % for Apr 2018. CSI: Expected Interest Rates: Next Yr: Don’t Know data is updated monthly, averaging 2.000 % from Jan 1978 (Median) to May 2018, with 485 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 14.000 % in Feb 1978 and a record low of 0.000 % in Nov 2017. CSI: Expected Interest Rates: Next Yr: Don’t Know data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by University of Michigan. The data is categorized under Global Database’s USA – Table US.H030: Consumer Sentiment Index: Unemployment, Interest Rates, Prices and Government Expectations. The question was: No one can say for sure, but what do you think will happen to interest rates for borrowing money during the next 12 months -- will they go up, stay the same, or go down?

The benchmark interest rate in Mexico was last recorded at 8 percent. This dataset provides - Mexico Interest Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Inflation Rate In the Euro Area remained unchanged at 2 percent in July. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Euro Area Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This dataset provides values for INFLATION RATE reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

Inflation Rate in Georgia increased to 4 percent in June from 3.50 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Georgia Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.