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About the Project KAPSARC is analyzing the shifting dynamics of the global gas markets, which have turned upside down during the past five years. North America has emerged as a large potential future LNG exporter while gas demand growth has been slowing down as natural gas gets squeezed between coal and renewables. While the coming years will witness the fastest LNG export capacity expansion ever seen, many questions are raised on the next generation of LNG supply, the impact of low oil and gas prices on supply and demand patterns and how pricing and contractual structure may be affected by both the arrival of U.S. LNG on global gas markets and the desire of Asian buyers for cheaper gasKey PointsAround 150 mtpa of LNG export capacity will come to global gas markets over 2015-20. While Asia seems unlikely now to be able to absorb it all, Europe emerges as a residual market for flexible volumes. The question is, therefore, which outcome(s) in the global LNG market could set the stage for a battle for market share in the European gas market between LNG suppliers and the incumbent pipeline suppliers, most importantly Russia, and how that country could respond to the potential challenge of large quantities of LNG supplies flooding European gas markets? Russia’s gas export strategy in Europe so far has been based on value maximization rather than on protecting its market share. But if increasing LNG supply to Europe becomes an extended threat to Russia’s market share, it may change its position from reactive to proactive and attempt to defend it. Whether a confrontation between Russian gas and LNG takes place and how Russia could respond depends crucially on the build-up of total LNG trade and the appetite of China for LNG. Russia has the advantage of being a low cost producer with ample spare productive capacity and underutilized pipeline capacity to Europe. A low price environment (up to $40/bbl) would actually benefit Russia more than a higher price environment, from a market share perspective, as it can reduce its prices below the variable costs of U.S. LNG and can push U.S. volumes out of the European market. In a higher price environment, U.S. LNG would continue to flow. The competition between Russian gas and U.S. LNG in Europe is also about pricing models, driven on one hand by oil market fundamentals, with some influence from Europe spot markets, and on the other hand driven by the fundamentals of the U.S. gas market and the LNG trade. The geopolitical aspect is also important. While relations between Russia and Europe have become frosty, cheap and abundant Russian gas could potentially help mend commercial ties. However, the tensions between the U.S. and Russia have been increased by the Ukraine situation, the war in Syria and sanctions. The competition between U.S. LNG and Russian pipeline gas in Europe is about more than the pure commercial aspects and will be influenced by the geopolitical standoff of the two powers.
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India Imports from Russia of Crude Oil was US$52.73 Billion during 2024, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. India Imports from Russia of Crude Oil - data, historical chart and statistics - was last updated on December of 2025.
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Crude Oil Production in the United States increased to 13844 BBL/D/1K in September from 13800 BBL/D/1K in August of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Crude Oil Production - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.
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Gasoline Prices in Russia decreased to 0.83 USD/Liter in November from 0.84 USD/Liter in October of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Russia Gasoline Prices - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.
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This dataset provides a historical and projected overview of key economic, energy, and social indicators for Russia spanning from 1991 (post-Soviet dissolution) to 2025 (including forecasts). It focuses on the oil and gas sector, which has been a cornerstone of Russia's economy, alongside broader macroeconomic and demographic metrics. The data is useful for analyzing trends in energy production, exports, fiscal dependencies, inflation, and social inequality during periods of economic transformation, crises (e.g., 1998 ruble crisis, 2014 sanctions), and recent geopolitical events. Key Features:
Time Coverage: Annual data from 1991 to 2025 (with projections for 2024-2025 based on estimates). Rows: 35 (one per year). Columns: 29, covering energy production, prices, exports, fiscal indicators, demographics, and more. File Format: CSV (UTF-8 encoded for compatibility with special characters like en-dash in tax rates). Data Sources: Compiled from public sources including Rosstat, World Bank, IMF, EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), and Russian Central Bank reports. Projections for 2024-2025 are estimates based on trends and may require updates. Missing Values: Some fields (e.g., early years for FDI or import volumes) are blank due to data unavailability; handle with imputation if needed.
| Column Name | Description | Unit | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Calendar year | - | From 1991 to 2025 |
| oil_prices(barrel/USD) | Average annual price of crude oil | USD per barrel | Brent or Urals benchmark |
| gas_prices(MMBtu/USD) | Average annual price of natural gas | USD per million BTU | Henry Hub or European hub prices |
| Oil_production_volume(million_b/y) | Annual oil production | Million barrels per year | Russian Federation total |
| Gas_production_volume(billion_c_m/y) | Annual gas production | Billion cubic meters per year | Includes Gazprom and independents |
| Oil_export_volume(million tons) | Annual oil exports | Million tons | Crude and products |
| Gas_export_volume(billion_c_m) | Annual gas exports | Billion cubic meters | Pipeline and LNG |
| Share_of_oil_and_gas_revenues(%) | Oil & gas revenues as share of federal budget | % | Dependency on energy sector |
| TB(billion USD) | Trade balance | Billion USD | Exports minus imports |
| FDI(billion USD) | Foreign direct investment inflows | Billion USD | Net inflows |
| Import_volume(billion USD) | Total import volume | Billion USD | Goods and services |
| Key_rate(%) | Central Bank key interest rate | % | Average or end-of-year |
| level_of_public_debt(% of GDP) | Public debt as percentage of GDP | % of GDP | General government |
| tock_Market_Index(MOEX Index) | MOEX Russia Index value | Index points | Year-end or average |
| inflation_rate(%) | Annual inflation rate (CPI-based) | % | Consumer price index change |
| exchange_rates(RUB/USD) | Average RUB to USD exchange rate | RUB per USD | Annual average |
| GNP(milliard USD) | Gross National Product | Milliard USD (billion) | Nominal |
| ISI(0-10) | The index of sanctions pressure | Scale 0-10 | Pressure on the economy through sanctions |
| Migration_rate(net_migration th/p) | Net migration rate | Thousands of people | Inflows minus outflows |
| Gini_coefficient(%) | Gini coefficient for income inequality | % | 0 = perfect equality, 100 = perfect inequality |
| population_size(p) | Total population | People | Mid-year estimate |
| unemployment_rate(%) | Unemployment rate | % | Labor force survey |
| per_c_i(thousands USD) | Per capita income | Thousands USD | Nominal, PPP-adjusted in some years |
| Non_oil_GDP(%) | Non-oil GDP share | % | GDP excluding oil/gas extraction |
| CPI | Consumer Price Index | Index (base year varies) | Cumulative inflation measure |
| Military_expenditures(% of GDP) | Military spending as % of GDP | % of GDP | SIPRI or official data |
| tax_rates(VAT%) | Value-Added Tax rate | % | Standard rate |
| tax_rates(PIT%) | Personal Income Tax rate | % or range | Flat rate or progressive brackets (e.g., "13-15") |
| tax_receipts(billion USD) | Total tax receipts | Billion USD | Federal budget collections |
Githab rep https://github.com/AsDo001/Forecasting-of-revenues-to-the-budget-of-the-Russian-Federation
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China Imports from Russia was US$129.88 Billion during 2024, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. China Imports from Russia - data, historical chart and statistics - was last updated on December of 2025.
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TwitterOpen Database License (ODbL) v1.0https://www.opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/
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About the Project KAPSARC is analyzing the shifting dynamics of the global gas markets, which have turned upside down during the past five years. North America has emerged as a large potential future LNG exporter while gas demand growth has been slowing down as natural gas gets squeezed between coal and renewables. While the coming years will witness the fastest LNG export capacity expansion ever seen, many questions are raised on the next generation of LNG supply, the impact of low oil and gas prices on supply and demand patterns and how pricing and contractual structure may be affected by both the arrival of U.S. LNG on global gas markets and the desire of Asian buyers for cheaper gasKey PointsAround 150 mtpa of LNG export capacity will come to global gas markets over 2015-20. While Asia seems unlikely now to be able to absorb it all, Europe emerges as a residual market for flexible volumes. The question is, therefore, which outcome(s) in the global LNG market could set the stage for a battle for market share in the European gas market between LNG suppliers and the incumbent pipeline suppliers, most importantly Russia, and how that country could respond to the potential challenge of large quantities of LNG supplies flooding European gas markets? Russia’s gas export strategy in Europe so far has been based on value maximization rather than on protecting its market share. But if increasing LNG supply to Europe becomes an extended threat to Russia’s market share, it may change its position from reactive to proactive and attempt to defend it. Whether a confrontation between Russian gas and LNG takes place and how Russia could respond depends crucially on the build-up of total LNG trade and the appetite of China for LNG. Russia has the advantage of being a low cost producer with ample spare productive capacity and underutilized pipeline capacity to Europe. A low price environment (up to $40/bbl) would actually benefit Russia more than a higher price environment, from a market share perspective, as it can reduce its prices below the variable costs of U.S. LNG and can push U.S. volumes out of the European market. In a higher price environment, U.S. LNG would continue to flow. The competition between Russian gas and U.S. LNG in Europe is also about pricing models, driven on one hand by oil market fundamentals, with some influence from Europe spot markets, and on the other hand driven by the fundamentals of the U.S. gas market and the LNG trade. The geopolitical aspect is also important. While relations between Russia and Europe have become frosty, cheap and abundant Russian gas could potentially help mend commercial ties. However, the tensions between the U.S. and Russia have been increased by the Ukraine situation, the war in Syria and sanctions. The competition between U.S. LNG and Russian pipeline gas in Europe is about more than the pure commercial aspects and will be influenced by the geopolitical standoff of the two powers.