Wages in the United States increased 4.72 percent in May of 2025 over the same month in the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Wages and Salaries Growth - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Minimum Wages in Chile increased to 529000 CLP/Month in 2025 from 500000 CLP/Month in 2024. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Chile Minimum Monthly Wages - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

In April 2025, the UK minimum wage for adults over the age of 21 in will be 12.21 pounds per hour. For the 2025/26 financial year, there will be four minimum wage categories, three of which are based on age and one for apprentice workers. Apprentices, and workers under the age of 18 will have a minimum wage of 7.55 pounds an hour, increasing to ten pounds for those aged 18 to 20. When the minimum wage was first introduced in 1999, there were just two age categories; 18 to 21, and 22 and over. This increased to three categories in 2004, four in 2010, and five between 2016 and 2023, before being reduced down to four in the most recent year. The living wage The living wage is an alternative minimum wage amount that employers in the UK can voluntarily pay their employees. It is calculated independently of the legal minimum wage and results in a higher value figure. In 2023/24, for example, the living wage was twelve pounds an hour for the UK as a whole and 13.15 for workers in London, where the cost of living is typically higher. This living wage is different from what the UK government has named the national living wage, which was 10.42 in the same financial year. Between 2011/12 and 2023/24, the living wage has increased by 4.80 pounds, while the London living wage has grown by 4.85 pounds. Wage growth cancelled-out by high inflation 2021-2023 For a long period between the middle of 2021 and late 2023, average wage growth in the UK was unable to keep up with record inflation levels, resulting in the biggest fall in disposable income since 1956. Although the UK government attempted to mitigate the impact of falling living standards through a series of cost of living payments, the situation has still been very difficult for households. After peaking at 11.1 percent in October 2022, the UK's inflation rate remained in double figures until March 2023, and did not fall to the preferred rate of two percent until May 2024. As of November 2024, regular weekly pay in the UK was growing by 5.6 percent in nominal terms, and 2.5 percent when adjusted for inflation.

Wages in Manufacturing in the United States remained unchanged at 28.87 USD/Hour in June. This dataset provides - United States Average Hourly Wages in Manufacturing - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Minimum Wages in Egypt increased to 7000 EGP/Month in 2025 from 6000 EGP/Month in 2024. This dataset provides - Egypt Minimum Wages- actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Wages in China increased to 120698 CNY/Year in 2023 from 114029 CNY/Year in 2022. This dataset provides - China Average Yearly Wages - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.