Developing and emerging market economies have increased their debt exposure to China in recent years. Despite its initial promise, many borrowers of Chinese loans face difficulties in meeting these loan obligations. Under what circumstances do Chinese borrowers in debt distress turn to the International Monetary Fund? Our starting point is that Chinese loans are tied into projects that promise to generate sufficient revenue to repay these loans. We expect that governments turn to the IMF for bailout funding when a severe shock erodes the value of the underlying loan collateral, requiring mobilizing revenues and implementing austerity measures. Without alternative financing options, the IMF becomes the most viable option to weather financial distress. We expect governments to accept a `whatever-it-takes' number of loan conditions. Using cross-country time series analysis for up to 162 countries between 2000 and 2018, we show that defaults on Chinese debt trigger IMF programs only when a country experiences a severe adverse shock. Countries tapping the IMF also accept a greater number of loan conditions. From a policy perspective, current financial distress in borrowing countries underscores the urgency to design and deploy targeted governance reform measures beyond program safeguards and loan conditions to mitigate the built-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities, independent of where the money is coming from.
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This dataset provides values for PRIVATE DEBT TO GDP reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.
Attribution 3.0 (CC BY 3.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
License information was derived automatically
The International Development Association (IDA) credits are public and publicly guaranteed debt extended by the World Bank Group. IDA provides development credits, grants and guarantees to its recipient member countries to help meet their development needs. Credits from IDA are at concessional rates. Data are in U.S. dollars calculated using historical rates. This dataset contains the latest available snapshot of the IDA Statement of Credits and Grants.
Two Excel files that fully replicate all figures and tables. Each file includes short ReadMe files to guide users: • “HowChinaLends_DataandResults” includes the raw data and derives all results and statistics that are presented in the paper and appendix. The data in this file is identical to the dataset posted on the AidData website (https://www.aiddata.org/data/how-china-lends-dataset-version-1-0). The source links are updated to direct users to our online repository. The ContractData sheet contains the full coding results for all 100 Chinese loan contracts and all 142 benchmark contracts from Cameroon. • HowChinaLends_ChartBook presents all tables and figures from the paper based on statistics derived from “HowChinaLends_DataandResults".
If you use the data, please cite as: Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B., & Trebesch, C. (2021). How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Center for Global Development, and AidData at William & Mary.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
External Debt in Thailand increased to 200924.70 USD Million in the third quarter of 2024 from 185501.66 USD Million in the second quarter of 2024. This dataset provides - Thailand External Debt - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
The benchmark interest rate in China was last recorded at 3.10 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - China Interest Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
China 10Y Bond Yield was 1.88 percent on Wednesday March 26, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. China 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on March of 2025.
Attribution 3.0 (CC BY 3.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
License information was derived automatically
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans are public and publicly guaranteed debt extended by the World Bank Group. IBRD loans are made to, or guaranteed by, countries that are members of IBRD. IBRD may also make loans to IFC. IBRD lends at market rates. Data are in U.S. dollars calculated using historical rates. This dataset contains the latest available snapshot of the Statement of Loans.
CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedicationhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
License information was derived automatically
These are research indicators of comparative empirical investigation of South Eastern European Countries (SEECs) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) that were compiled from the criteria and factors of the World Bank. This dataset consists of data for SEECs and PRC for the period of 2000 to 2016. The World Bank Research Indicators consist of (1) GNI, Atlas Method (Current US$); (2) GNI per capita, Atlas; (3) GNI PPP (Current International $); (4) GNI per capita, PPP (Current International $); (5) Energy Use (kg of Oil Equivalent per capita); (6) Electric Power Consumption (kWh per capita); (7) GDP (Current US$); (8) GDP Growth (Annual %); (9) Inflation, GDP Deflator (Annual %); (10) Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP); (11) Industry, Value Added (% of GDP); (12) Service, etc., Value Added (% of GDP); (13) Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP); (14) Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP); (15) Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP); (16) Revenue, excluding Grants (% of GDP); (17) Time Required to Start a Business (Days); (18) Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP); (19) Tax Revenue (% of GDP); (20) High-Technology Exports (% of Manufactured Exports); (21) Merchandise Trade (% of GDP); (22) Net Barter Terms of Trade Index (2000 = 100); (23) External Debt Stock, Total (DOD, Current US$); (24) Total Debt Service (% of Exports of Goods, Services and Primary Income); (25) Personal Remittances, Received (Current US$); (26) Foreign Direct Investment, Net Flows (BoP, Current US$); and (27) Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US$). Furthermore, statistical data of SEECs and PRC were retrieved from Atlas 2.1 – Growth Lab at the Center for International Development at Harvard University and WITS – UNSD COMPTRADE.
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Developing and emerging market economies have increased their debt exposure to China in recent years. Despite its initial promise, many borrowers of Chinese loans face difficulties in meeting these loan obligations. Under what circumstances do Chinese borrowers in debt distress turn to the International Monetary Fund? Our starting point is that Chinese loans are tied into projects that promise to generate sufficient revenue to repay these loans. We expect that governments turn to the IMF for bailout funding when a severe shock erodes the value of the underlying loan collateral, requiring mobilizing revenues and implementing austerity measures. Without alternative financing options, the IMF becomes the most viable option to weather financial distress. We expect governments to accept a `whatever-it-takes' number of loan conditions. Using cross-country time series analysis for up to 162 countries between 2000 and 2018, we show that defaults on Chinese debt trigger IMF programs only when a country experiences a severe adverse shock. Countries tapping the IMF also accept a greater number of loan conditions. From a policy perspective, current financial distress in borrowing countries underscores the urgency to design and deploy targeted governance reform measures beyond program safeguards and loan conditions to mitigate the built-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities, independent of where the money is coming from.